[[As part of its mission to enrich philosophy within Canada, the Canadian Journal of Philosophy hosts a yearly Distinguished Lecture at the annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association, usually in late May or early June. The lecture is video-recorded and then published in the journal.///Dans le cadre de son mandat visant à enrichir la philosophie au Canada, le Canadian Journal of Philosophy organise chaque année un programme de conférenciers éminents dans le cadre du congrès annuel de L’Association canadienne de philosophie, qui se tient généralement vers la fin mai ou début juin. Ces conférences font l'objet d'enregistrements vidéo avant d'être publiées dans le Journal.]]
How to get practical about aesthetic value
dominic mciver LOPEs, University of british columbia
[[Abstract:///Résumés :]] What if aesthetic values give agents reasons to act? The supposition that aesthetic values are practical values suggests how to diagnose a fundamental error of traditional theories of aesthetic value and reorients attention on a neglected sample of aesthetic acts with features that a theory of aesthetic value should explain. I sketch the main components of a theory that locates the normativity of aesthetic value in the expert performances of socially-situated aesthetic agents.
Infinitives in practical thought
Jennifer Hornsby, Birkbeck College, [[June 2nd in Ottawa///2 JUIN À OTTAWA]]
[[Abstract:///Résumés :]] Intellectualists (at least some of them) tell us not only that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition, but also that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue that they are wrong in both cases. I think that it helps in seeing that they are wrong to consider ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When these are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have said about (what they call) “the subjects of infinitival clauses”
Social Structure, Narrative and Explanation
Sally Haslanger, Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's & Gender Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
[[Abstract:///Résumés :]] For several decades, social theorists have argued that racism, sexism, and other forms of inequality, are best understood as forms of structural injustice. On such accounts, broad social structures systematically disadvantage certain groups and privilege others. Structural explanation is intended as an alternative to accounts that rely on narratives about the bad (sexist, racist...) behavior of individuals. Recent work on discrimination suggests, however, that even those who are explicitly committed to equality are susceptible to acting in ways that reflect implicit bias, and there has been much interest in showing how implicit bias explains inequality. This paper raises questions about the relationship between structural explanations and implicit bias explanations. Are implicit bias explanations a re-emergence of individualistic explanation? Do they inherit some of the ideological presuppositions of individualism? Or are they compatible with – perhaps even a necessary component of – a structural approach?
LOVE: SELF-PROPAGATION, SELF-PRESERVATION, OR EKSTASIS
JENNIFER WHITING, CHANCELLOR JACKMAN PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
[[Abstract:///Résumés :]] Harry Frankfurt makes the lover's identification with the beloved central to his account of love in a way such that he ends up counting Agamemnon's sacrifice of Iphigenia primarily as a form of self-betrayal. Terence Irwin ascribes a similar conception of love to Plato: love as a form of “self-propagation”. Each of these “colonizing ego” views seems to me mistaken in ways revealed by the ecstatic conception of love that Martha Nussbaum rightly sees in Plato’s Phaedrus, a conception to which reciprocity and equalizing dynamics are crucial. Frankfurt and Irwin miss this because they assume a Procrustean egoism to which the ekstatic powers of genuine love cannot be made to fit.