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CJP Supplementary Volumes
Belief and Agency
David Hunter, editor
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From the Introduction: Aristotle famously said that humans are rational animals and he distinguished two forms or kinds of human rationality. Practical rationality aims to answer questions about how to live and about what sort of person one should be. It deals with human action and the will. Theoretical rationality aims to answer questions about the nature of our world and of our place in it. It deals with human knowledge and the understanding. Philosophical work on rationality aims to understand the similarities, differences, and relations between these forms of reasoning. Traditionally, philosophers have placed the concept of belief at the heart of accounts of theoretical rationality but have seen it as of only secondary interest to accounts of practical rationality. Instead, they have placed the concepts of desire and intention at the heart of accounts of practical reason. There is no doubt that belief is central to theoretical reasoning since theoretical reasoning aims at knowledge and belief is essential to knowledge. Indeed, on the traditional philosophical conception, to know something just is (or at least requires having) a true and justified belief. But philosophers have usually viewed belief as of only secondary interest to an account of practical rationality. Belief is relevant to action, in this view, only because we ought to consult our beliefs before we decide how to act to satisfy our desires and to form and carry out our intentions and plans. Beliefs, on this view, are a bit like maps we rely on in deciding where to go and how to get there. The papers in this volume are all concerned in one way or another with this traditional philosophical conception of the relations between belief on the one hand and intention and action on the other. Contributors: Jesse Steinberg, Robert Stalnaker, Eric Schwitzgebel, David Hunter, Sergio Tenenbaumm, Matthew Boyle, Pamela Hieronymi, Nishi Shah, Sharon Street, Matthias Haase, and David Checkland.
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Truth and Values:
Essays for Hans Herzberger
Achille C. Varzi, editor
William Seager, editor
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Hans Herzberger, now retired and emeritus professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto, had a major influence over a generation of philosophers who knew him as a colleague or teacher. In hid honour, and with appreciation for Dr. Herzbergers scholarship and personal influence, this volume is a collection of essays from a number of prominent philosophers who worked with him. Represented here are: Isaac Levi, Calvin Normore, Jamie Tappenden, Alasdair Urquhart, Achille Varzi, and Steven Yablo. This eclectic set of essays covers a large range of issues, including rational choice theory, Frege scholarship and interpretation, the nature of truth, the inexpressible and the unknowable, and fundamental ontology. Each essay is original and appears here for the first time. They are fresh, illuminating, and accessible explorations of topics of central importance in philosophy, and all dear to the heart of Hans Herzberger. This is the only book devoted to themes drawn from the work of Hans Herzberger, and it covers a range of topics of central importance in philosophy, across value theory, metaphysics, philosophy of language, and logic.
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Reasons to Be
Moral, Revisited
Samuel Black, editor
Evan Tiffany, editor
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H.A. Prichard argued that the 'why should I be moral?' question is the central subject matter of moral theory. Prichard famously claimed to have proved that all efforts to answer that question are doomed. Many contributors to this volume of contemporary papers attempt to reconstruct Prichards argument. They claim either explicitly or implicitly that Prichard was mistaken, and philosophy can contribute to meaningful engagement with the 'why be moral?' question. A theme to emerge from these papers is that arguments like Prichard's rely on numerous philosophical presuppositions. The volume therefore touches on a wide range of topics and treatments. Is there one kind of practical reason or multiple kinds of reasons? Are there separate facts that determine the rationality and reasonableness of persons? Does the conception of a practical reason found in classical philosophy have the resources to undercut Prichard's argument? Does it make sense to hold people morally accountable for their actions if it cannot be demonstrated that there are reasons to be moral? Does applied ethics have anything to contribute to the debate on morality's rational authority? This volume will be useful for advanced undergraduates and specialists working on the foundations of morality, and morality's intersection with reason and rationality. The detailed introduction enhances the collection's accessibility by providing a detailed exposition of Prichard's renowned thesis that draws on his lesser-known, mature papers. It then carefully situates the volume's contents against that background.'
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The Modularity
of Emotions
Luc Faucher, editor
Christine Tappolet, editor
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Can emotions be rational or are they necessarily irrational? Are emotions universally shared states? Or are they socio-cultural constructions? Are emotions perceptions of some kind? Since the publication of Jerry Fodor's The Modularity of Mind (1983), a new question about the philosophy of emotions has emerged: are emotions modular? A positive answer to this question would mean, minimally, that emotions are cognitive capacities that can be explained in terms of mental components that are functionally dissociable from other parts of the mind. But depending on the kind of modules that are considered, be they Chomskyan, Fodorian, Darwinian, or some other kind, the answer to this question might well be different. The twelve new essays in this volume address the question of whether emotions, or at least some of them, are, in some sense of the word, modules, and explore how this could potentially influence our understanding of emotional phenomena. |
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Global Justice,
Global Institutions
Daniel Weinstock, editor
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Defining the principles of justice that ought to govern the global economic and political sphere is one of the most urgent tasks that contemporary political philosophers face. But they must also contribute to working through the institutional implications of these principles? How might principles of global justice be realized? Mustthe institutions that aim to implement them be transnational, or can global justice be attained within the context of the state system? Can institutions of democratic self-governance be imagined beyond the nation-state? These are just some of the questions that still face political philosophers even when issues of abstract principle have been addressed.
This volume establishes a dialogue between philosophers working at all levels of abstraction. Some of the authors are concerned with the grounds and scope of the obligations that bind the citizens and governments of rich countries to those of poorer nations. But many examine the question of how these obligations can be satisfied, both within existing institutional frameworks and beyond. Together their essays constitute a major contributon to the advancement of both the theoretical understanding and the practical requirements of global justice. |
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New Essays in the
Philosophy of Language
and Mind
Maite Ezcurdia, editor
Robert Stainton, editor
Christopher Viger, editor
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This volume contains fourteen essays discussing recent issues in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. The collection is arranged into three sections: one on language, one on the intersection of language and mind, and a final section on mind. The topics include the context-sensitivity of semantics, anaphora, proper names, the nature of understanding folk psychology and the Theory of Mind, self-awareness, the structure of the human mind and the extent to which it is modular, among others. |
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The Problem of
Consciousness
Evan Thompson, editor
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Contributors to the latest Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, The Problem of Consciousness, make connections regarding what is consciousness and how it is related to the natural world. The essays in this volume address this question from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy of mind, a new trend that integrates phenomenology, analytic philosophy, and cognitive science. The guiding principle of this new thinking is that precise and detailed phenomenological accounts of subjective experience are needed if significant progress is to be made in understanding consciousness and its place in the natural world. From this standpoint, the essays collected here explore a variety of nuances concerning consciousness, including time consciousness, perception, schizophrenia, empathy, and intersubjectivity. Also addressed are fascinating methodological issues about the relationship between phenomenology and other approaches to understanding the mind in science and philosophy. |
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