

*Advising as Inviting to Trust*¹

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One feels it is not enough just to state one's opinion; one tries at the same time to frame it in a way that does not disconcert the other person, but helps him; one is holding the truth up for him, yes, but in such a way that he can slip into it.

—Max Frisch, *Sketchbook*, 1946

Advising is sometimes just inviting someone to act on a reason he already has: giving him strategically useful information, encouraging his flagging spirits, making vivid what he wishes to forget. In that case no reasons are *given*. Sometimes, too, you find that your interlocutor has, as you'll put it, 'no reason to do' what you think he should do. You find you need to 'give him' a reason to do it. Here you have a choice between two strategies. You can attempt to influence him in a way that's at odds with the form of address distinctive of *reasoning* with him. If you use fear or flattery to get him to do what you think he should do, you are not reasoning with him: you are merely changing his deliberative context. But you needn't descend to such tactics. Taking the alternative strategy,

1 For help with drafts of this material I'm grateful to audiences at Bowdoin College, the Claremont Colleges, Oberlin College, Rice University, Southern Methodist University, the University of Kansas, the University of Michigan, and the Pacific APA (where Tamar Schapiro commented). Thanks to Steve Darwall, David Hills, David Velleman, and Andrea Westlund for help with early drafts. Special thanks to Karen Jones for three full rounds of challenging and encouraging subsequent commentary; the paper would be significantly weaker without her provocations. (A companion paper in the epistemology of testimony, 'Telling as Inviting to Trust,' appeared in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 (May 2005); and a companion paper on the nature of judgment, 'Judging as Inviting Self-Trust,' is in preparation.)

you can attempt to give him a reason by a less coercive method. I aim here to provide a philosophically perspicuous description of this alternative form of address and to vindicate its status as interpersonal reasoning. My hypothesis is that our ability to address each other in this way explains our ability to give each other reasons without recourse to manipulating the contexts in which we deliberate.

I aim to explain how we can reason with each other by addressing each other in the way distinctive of a specific illocutionary act. I call this act *advising*, but I concede that not everything that is called advising fits the account of advising I'll develop. I am interested in a species of advising as inviting to trust. I hold that such an adviser can give her advisee reasons whose motivating and justifying force derives from that trust. Though advising takes forms other than inviting to trust, advising as inviting to trust explains your ability to give someone a practical reason by reasoning with him.

I argue for this view of advising in sections I through III. In section IV, I give an account of when it is reasonable to accept the invitation and trust another's prudential advice. In section V, I extend the account to moral advice. Each account endorses a rational presumption in favor of trust without extensive evidence of trustworthiness, assuming the non-satisfaction of certain defeating conditions. As I argue in section VI, a rational presumption in favor of trust does not merely rationalize acquiescence in others' attempts to influence us. Giving in to another's attempt to influence you when that other *invites* your trust needn't amount to acquiescence, I'll argue, because the medium of such influence is your rational faculty to trust where and only where it makes sense to trust — what I'll call your fiduciary reason.

Trust, I'll argue in sections VII and VIII, is a form of rational self-governance. Exercise of the capacity to trust where and only where it makes sense to trust can give us reasons that are not grounded in our motivational susceptibilities. Here I echo Kant on moral motivation. This rational faculty, however, responds not to principles but to persons. Here I echo Hume on the moral virtues. If we view advising as inviting to trust we can agree with Kant about the motivational efficacy of practical reasons dispensed through advice but agree with Hume about the form of intelligence that puts us in touch with them.

I

The first thing to say about inviting another's trust is that it's presumptuous. We can examine this presumption, and thereby this species of advice, by articulating a distinction useful to someone who wishes to keep the presumption hidden.

Consider this domestic melodrama.

Stephen and Anna are on their way to a visit with Anna's parents. Last time they visited, Stephen noticed an aspect of Anna's relationship with her mother that troubled him, and he now feels a powerful urge to give her a piece of advice. 'Anna,' he wishes to advise her, 'be kinder to your mother. You're no longer a teenager. You need each other. If you keep this up, you'll realize what you're doing too late and regret it. If only for your own sake, be kinder to her.'

He knows he can't say that, or anything like that. Given how things stand between them, he reasons, she would deeply resent a presumption on his part to advise her. He could get away with telling her what he thinks — well, *part* of what he thinks — but not with adopting that stance. Searching for his most unconfessional, his most just-commenting-on-the-passing-show tone of voice, he begins: 'I wonder, Anna, if things wouldn't go better if you were kinder to your mother...'

We might coherently view Stephen's strategy of indirection as resting on a distinction between two acts. Since we are not in the habit of making the distinction explicit, there is no non-stipulative vocabulary for drawing it. I'll therefore stipulate that we express it as follows. On the one hand, Stephen might tell Anna that she should be kinder in such a way as to *advise* her to be kinder. On the other hand, Stephen might *merely* tell Anna that she should be kinder. One act is advice, I'll stipulate, the other mere testimony.² Stephen fears that an attempt to perform the former act will undermine Anna's trust in him and will thus prevent him from

2 What I want to highlight, as we'll see, is the contrast between (mere) testimony and advice (i.e. testimony that is also advice), not any particular resonance from the verb 'to tell.' My use of that verb will mislead if it suggests the very different idiom 'to tell A to φ.' If Stephen tells Anna *to* be kinder, he is not testifying at all but commanding, and in a way that may or may not amount to advice. (One reason I'm using 'tell' here is to make my account of advice in this paper continuous with the account I give of testimony in 'Telling as Inviting to Trust,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 70 [2005].)

performing even the latter act. So he makes sure that she understands him as attempting to perform the latter act and *not* the former.³

Following J.L. Austin, I argue from the phenomenon of infelicity. Austin tried to explain what it is to perform various speech acts by examining cases of infelicitous performance. My approach similarly focuses on infelicity, but on an infelicity the speaker takes steps to avoid. I hope to reveal the nature of the burden you undertake when you advise someone to ϕ — as opposed to merely telling him that he should ϕ — by looking at how you might attempt to avoid that burden. Why might Stephen not want Anna to think he intends to advise her? In characterizing the dynamic between them I spoke of ‘presumption’: Stephen fears that Anna will resent the presumption manifest in intending to advise her. Now what does an adviser presume that Anna might resent? An adviser is trying to *help*, after all. What sort of help might Anna resent?

Stephen might reasonably fear that Anna will resent it if she detects in him an intention to represent himself as knowing better than she herself knows what’s in her own self-interest. Assume for simplicity that Stephen would like to advise Anna to be kinder for her own sake, not primarily for the sake of her mother. When I speak of ‘advising A to ϕ ,’ I’ll for the present mean advising A to ϕ for A’s own sake: I’ll imagine the case to involve only ‘prudential’ reasons and not reasons that might involve self-sacrifice. (I turn to moral advice in section V.) And I’ll assume that the adviser aims to *give* a reason — that the adviser views the advisee as lacking the reason were it not for the adviser’s intervention. When you dispense such advice you must represent yourself as adopting a perspective on your advisee’s self-interest that rivals in authority for the advisee the advisee’s own perspective. This follows from your aim to make available a reason that the advisee does not already possess. We can easily imagine how Anna might resent Stephen’s presumption if he intended to represent himself as having achieved such a perspective.

If, without advising, Stephen *merely* tells Anna that she should be kinder, on the other hand, he need not represent himself as taking a perspective on her self-interest. His reason for believing she should be

3 I do not deny that there are other interpretations of the melodrama, thus briefly described. I claim only that my interpretation is a coherent one. If you find it coherent, I ask you to imagine the scenario along lines that would bear it out. If you do not immediately find it coherent, I ask you to treat my fuller characterization of it in this and the next two sections as an argument for its coherence. I ask also that you not be distracted by the somewhat unsavory power dynamic between Stephen and Anna. I have tried to make Stephen’s predicament vivid by imagining a realistic — that is, a humanly flawed — context of motives.

kinder may, after all, be merely that this new course of conduct would please him. There is a general distinction here. When Sheila says to Aaron 'I think you should drop what you're doing and give me a backrub,' it may merely manifest Sheila's belief that a backrub would be nice right now. In telling Aaron that he should give her a backrub Sheila thereby gladly makes available to him a reason to join her in holding that proposition true: he should give her a backrub for *her* sake. Had she said 'I advise you to give me a backrub' it could only be a joke or an effort at coercion (most likely, an effort at coercion masquerading as a joke). But then she would not be merely taking a perspective on the costs informing Aaron's self-interest; she would be threatening to change them. (Of course, she might be offering to change the benefits. But neither is she then merely advising him.)

The differentia of prudential advising as opposed to mere testifying, as I'll use the terms, is that the adviser but not necessarily the mere testifier represents herself as taking a perspective on the advisee's self-interest, a perspective which she moreover represents herself as presuming may equal or exceed in authority for the advisee the perspective of the advisee himself.⁴ Again, I do not claim that everything we call 'advising' fits this account. But it is the adviser's adoption of this distinctive perspective that warrants calling the important species of advising under study here *inviting to trust*. The prudential adviser invites her advisee to trust her perspective on the advisee's self-interest, even when it conflicts with the deliverances of his own perspective.⁵

Why, then, might an advisee resent an adviser's presumption to adopt a perspective worthy of such trust? Still restricting discussion to prudential advice, the perspective in question is that of care.⁶ When you care

4 Though I try not to stereotype gender relations in my examples, when speaking generally I'll follow the convention of making advisers female and advisees male.

5 Of course, advisers are typically far less than perfectly confident that their advice is sound, a lack of confidence reflected in their unwillingness to 'impose' their perspective on the advisee. For simplicity, unless otherwise specified I'll assume that the advisers I'll discuss are quite confident that their advice is sound.

6 I set aside the comparatively rare case in which S tells A that ϕ -ing is in A's self-interest, not because S has judged for herself that it is, but because she has taken someone else's word for it — call this other speaker S*. In this case, S* tells S that ϕ -ing is in A's self-interest, then S tells A. Does S count as advising A to ϕ here, or only as passing along S*'s advice? Or is there no advice in play here, merely testimony? Perhaps in such a case S may count as advising A without adopting a perspective of care for A. Still, S is not inviting A to trust *her* on the matter, so this is not the species of advice I am discussing in this paper. (S may invite A to take her word that S* believes he should ϕ , without inviting A to take her word that he should ϕ .)

about a person, you adopt the perspective of wanting things for him for his own sake, that is, because they are in his self-interest.⁷ This feature of advising suggests that an adviser represents herself (qua adviser) as caring about the advisee. Of course, an adviser may not in fact care about her advisee. The advice may not be *sincere*, in that while the adviser represents herself as caring she isn't even attempting to adopt the perspective of one who does care. Or the advice may not be *heartfelt*, in that while the adviser is attempting to adopt the perspective of one who cares about the advisee she doesn't in fact care about him. Insincere advice is, in Austin's sense, infelicitous: an abuse of the advisory relationship.⁸ But unheartfelt advice needn't be infelicitous, as long as the adviser is exercising a capacity to imagine what someone who does care about the advisee would want for him qua carer. For this reason, one needn't be committing an Austinian infelicity in offering unheartfelt advice. Upon discovering that a piece of advice was unheartfelt, an advisee isn't entitled to complain that he was misled. But insincere advice is misleading advice. The insincere adviser is misleading the advisee concerning the nature of the intentions on which she acts in advising him.

Stephen fears that Anna will resent an effort to advise her, we may imagine, not because she doubts his care for her but precisely because she feels it. That's the trick with care: it often feels uncomfortably close to condescension. A canny caregiver will know that he should sometimes make it look as if he doesn't care, as if what looks like advice is mere commentary on the passing show. And that's precisely what, as I imagine him, Stephen intends to do. He intends Anna to think that he is *not* adopting a perspective on her self-interest. A mere testifier does not represent himself as presuming the sort of intimacy with the one told that an adviser does represent himself as presuming. Of course, Stephen and Anna are intimate in that respect. But he cannot, given his aim, represent himself as intending to rely on that intimacy.

In what respect, then, does the speech act of advising A to ϕ differ (in my stipulative usage) from the speech act of merely telling A that he

7 For an account of the relationship between this perspective and well-being, see Stephen Darwall, *Welfare and Rational Care* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2002).

8 Austin uses the term 'abuse' to characterize infelicities that are not misfires. If a speech act 'misfires' it does not come off, but when there is an 'abuse' the speech act comes off but is 'not implemented or not consummated, rather than void or without effect' (J.L. Austin, *How to Do Things with Words*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1975), 16)

should ϕ ? The respect, I propose, is this. When S advises A to ϕ she aims thereby to make a practical reason to ϕ available to A, a reason grounded in her worthiness of A's trust. But S does not aim thereby to make a practical reason available to A when she merely tells A that he should ϕ (that is, when she merely offers it as a piece of testimony). Advising someone to ϕ , in the manner I mean to isolate, is like saying 'Trust me, ϕ ' or ' ϕ for the reason that you trust me.' Merely telling someone that he should ϕ , on the other hand, does not yet amount to an invitation that he ϕ on the basis of trust.

More specifically, I propose this quasi-Gricean account of the speech act:

S advises A to ϕ (sincerely) iff A recognizes that S, in telling A that he should ϕ , intends that A gain access to a pro tanto reason to ϕ through this very recognition.

I assume that a necessary condition for S to succeed in advising A is that A recognize the intention informing S's speech act. To my ear, if A doesn't recognize this intention, S can be said to have *tried* to advise A but not to have succeeded.⁹

We can argue for this account by noting that without it we cannot make sense of a distinction on which we can coherently view Stephen as relying in his strategy of indirection. The presumption inherent in advising is the presumption to give your advisee a reason to do what you advise him to do simply through his recognition that that is what you intend. When you advise someone, in the manner under study, you invite him simply to trust your perspective on what he should do: to treat it as a direct source of practical reasons, reasons grounded solely in your status as worthy of his trust. It is Stephen's understanding of this

9 If you hear it differently, note that nothing pertinent to my principal argument in this paper depends on the assumption. (I could simply move 'A recognizes that S intends that...' inside the scope of 'S intends that...' as on the original Gricean formulation.) The assumption has received most attention in the debate over whether a violation of free speech could occur by virtue of an intended audience's inability to recognize the illocutionary intention. (Say, a woman tries to refuse sex, but the man cannot recognize what she's doing as manifesting an intention to get him to stop. One side of the debate views her as subject to 'illocutionary disablement.') For objections to the assumption, see Daniel Jacobson, 'Freedom of Speech Acts? A Response to Langton,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 24 (1995) 72-8. For a reply, see Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton, 'Free Speech and Illocution,' *Legal Theory* 4 (1998), 28-31; then see Jacobson's rejoinder, 'Speech and Action: Replies to Hornsby and Langton,' *Legal Theory* 7 (2001) 179-201.

presumption that leads him to pursue his strategy of indirection. His predicament is not uncommon.

In advising someone to ϕ you are also, of course, telling him that he should ϕ . If the latter act gives him a reason — either because your testimony is epistemically authoritative or because it engages one of his antecedent motives (for example, his fear of your judgment) — then your advice, if it succeeds, would give him a *additional* reason to ϕ . But if your testimony is not epistemically authoritative (i.e. authoritative simply with respect to his beliefs), and if your intervention does not engage any of his antecedent motives, then the only reason you can give him is a reason generated by the quasi-Gricean mechanism. All you can do is invite him to trust you, to let himself be governed by a perspective informed by your care for him. Presumptuous as this sounds, it sometimes works.

II

Before considering this radical case more fully, let's codify the account. Return to our melodrama, but now imagine that Stephen overcomes his fears and offers his telling as advice. If Stephen succeeds in advising Anna to be kinder to her mother, I claim, he can make available to her a practical reason to be kinder. By the quasi-Gricean analysis, in advising her to be kinder, Stephen intends Anna to gain access to a reason to be kinder simply through her recognition of that intention. The act is performed when Anna recognizes his intention and thereby satisfies it. The act is consummated, in Austin's sense,¹⁰ when Anna not only recognizes his intention and thereby gains access to a reason to be kinder, but accepts his invitation to trust him and thereby acquires a reason to be kinder. (I'll explain how there could be such a reason in section IV.)

Let's draw these distinctions schematically and apply some labels.¹¹ In sincerely advising A to ϕ , S intends to bring about two distinct things: she intends (a) that A gain access to a pro tanto reason to ϕ through the quasi-Gricean mechanism, and she intends (b) that A acquire that reason by trusting her. We must therefore distinguish two forms of uptake that A might contribute in bringing off the transaction. (i) If A recognizes S's

10 See the quotation from Austin in n. 8 above.

11 The formulations in this paragraph and the next parallel those given in section III of 'Telling as Inviting to Trust' for the illocutionary act of telling A that p. Though the illocutionary and perlocutionary intentions differ, each act — telling and advising — is consummated in trust.

intention that he gain access to the reason, he satisfies her (a)-intention and he thereby gains access to the reason. (ii) If A also trusts S, he satisfies her (b)-intention and thereby comes to acquire the reason. It is worth emphasizing that A might trust S on the question whether to ϕ without actually ϕ -ing, since the reason he thereby acquires is merely pro tanto. S will, of course, typically also intend (c) that A actually ϕ .¹²

We can help ourselves to Austin's distinction and say that only S's (a)-intention is an intention to perform an *illocutionary* act. Her (c)-intention is an intention to perform a *perlocutionary* act. Her (b)-intention I've described as the intention that her illocutionary act of advising A to ϕ be consummated. When S's illocutionary act comes off, A thereby gains access to a reason to ϕ . When A consummates S's act by trusting her, he actually acquires that reason. Her perlocutionary act comes off, by contrast, only when he goes on to ϕ .

Imagine that Anna does consummate Stephen's illocutionary act by trusting him. What reason does he thereby give her? From his perspective of care for Anna, Stephen views her self-interest as giving her a reason to be kinder. When Anna trusts his advice, she attributes to him a capacity to generate a perspective on her self-interest that rivals her own perspective in authority for her, and she manifests a willingness to rely on that perspective. So she views the reason that Stephen gives her as grounded in his view of her self-interest. If she has evidence that he is advising from non-self-interested motives, and if he does not satisfy either of two important defeating conditions on trustworthiness that I'll discuss in section IV, then she's right: his view of her self-interest, a view that she does not share and that otherwise cannot get a grip on her, gives her a reason to be kinder.

Again, *she* may not view her self-interest as giving her a reason to be kinder. But if she trusts Stephen's advice, Anna manifests a willingness to rely on his perspective on her self-interest, to treat it as rivaling her own perspective in authority for her. *As long as she cares appropriately about herself*, her trust in him will generate a motive to act on his advice. The motive she thereby comes to have to be kinder is a motive she would not have if she did not, in trusting him, provide the uptake necessary to consummate his speech act. It is thus a motive that she comes to feel as a result of the process whereby she comes to have a reason to be kinder: we cannot explain her possession of the reason by appeal to antecedent motives.

12 Or that she succeed in getting A to ϕ . I'm following Grice in assuming that we can intend that others do things, but nothing hangs on that assumption.

III

The fact that Anna cares appropriately about herself may not explain her possession of the reason, but doesn't it provide the reason's motivating force? It may, of course, contribute to her motivation. But the reason's capacity to motivate her does not depend on the contribution. We can deepen our inquiry by pursuing this thought.

If Anna does not care appropriately about herself, neither her view of her self-interest nor that of a trusted adviser will influence her motives. But the implication is merely formal; it does not rest on a dependency relation. Part of *what it is* to care appropriately about yourself is to be susceptible to the influence of both your own view of your self-interest and, where it seems more reliable, that of a trusted adviser. You have to care about yourself in order to be motivated by either source, not because either draws its motivational efficacy from this care, conceived as independently constituted, but because caring about yourself constitutively involves being so motivated.

You acknowledge this when you acknowledge that you can come to exercise appropriate self-care by coming to be influenced by a trustworthy adviser. This is something you *need* to acknowledge whenever you suspect that your deliberations are skewed by a failure to care appropriately about yourself. When you find yourself in this predicament, you needn't merely wait till your capacity for self-care recovers. A deficit in self-care isn't like a deficit in white blood cells; it is a species of irrationality. What you need in this predicament isn't a cure but a reason, specifically a trust-based reason. More accurately: in this predicament a trust-based reason is the only thing that could function as a cure for your irrationality, since a cure would have to motivate you in the absence of your capacity to motivate yourself. If you cannot motivate yourself, you'll need another to motivate you.

When you fail to care appropriately about yourself, you may of course feel diverse motivational pushes and pulls. A deficit in self-care needn't manifest itself as lassitude or depression. I don't deny that an adviser can tweak these motivational susceptibilities toward the end of better self-care. An adviser can goad you into an indulgence of your self-hatred with the aim of getting you to feel its illogic — since, as it happens, you do still care about logic. Less cynically, an adviser can get you to feel how your self-hatred harms another whom you care about, perhaps the adviser herself. What an adviser cannot do by these means is reason with you (in the way I've been explicating): an adviser cannot (in that way) *give* you a reason that you don't already possess. If you don't see the illogic in your self-hatred, you may merely need information. If you don't see how it harms the adviser herself, perhaps she need merely

remind you of how much she cares about you. These strategies may work, but isn't there a less manipulative way to reach you?

That it harms her or that it's illogical is not, in any case, why one advising from a perspective of care for you will entreat you to be less self-hating. She'll think you should be less self-hating for *your* sake. Since, self-hating as you are, that consideration doesn't resonate with you, if she wants to reason with you she'll have to get you to feel its force by getting you to feel how it resonates with one who takes your self-interest more seriously. In advising as inviting you to trust her, she presents herself as speaking from that perspective and tries to get you to feel the force of the care that defines it. She thus tries to get you to act from a perspective of care for yourself by getting you to feel the force of such care from the outside. She advises with the aim of getting you to internalize the perspective from which she advises.

This description is premised on the idea that a trustworthy adviser can give her advisee a reason to care not only about others but about himself, a reason that would leave him unmoved were it not for his ability to respond specifically to the adviser's status as trustworthy. Let's remind ourselves what this might look like. Imagine, along the lines we've discussed, a different case of conversational indirection.

Stephanie and Adam are on their way to Adam's college reunion. Last time they attended one of Adam's reunions, Stephanie noticed an aspect of Adam's self-relation that troubled her, and she now feels a powerful urge to give him a piece of advice. 'Adam,' she wishes to advise him, 'be kinder to yourself. True, your life hasn't lived up to the preconceptions that gripped you in college. But that's due to a flaw in the preconceptions, not to any flaw in you. You're no longer a teenager. If you keep this up, you'll realize too late how many resources you've wasted in self-recrimination and regret it. For your own sake, be kinder to yourself.'

She knows she can't say that, or anything like that. Given how things stand between them, she reasons, he would deeply resent a presumption on her part to play caregiver. She could get away with telling him what she thinks — well, *part* of what she thinks — but not with adopting that stance. Searching for her most unconfessional, her most just-commenting-on-the-passing-show tone of voice, she begins: 'I wonder, Adam, if you aren't being a bit unfair to yourself...'

Stephanie's strategy is exactly like Stephen's in our earlier melodrama. It should be even clearer here why she needs to pursue an indirect strategy. She views Adam's deliberations as fundamentally warped by self-recrimination. She therefore views Adam's own view of his self-in-

terest as fundamentally unworthy of his trust and wishes he'd replace it with her own. Talk about presumption! So she backs off and performs an act that does not announce such a presumptuous attitude, leaving him to feel the force of her concern for him less directly than by explicitly inviting him to weigh it against his own self-hatred.

Now, as before, imagine that Stephanie overcomes her fears and offers her intervention as an explicit invitation to trust. Imagine further that Adam consummates the speech act, thereby coming to feel some motivation to act accordingly. If he does so act we can say that he wouldn't have done so had he not appropriately cared about himself, but this claim will be compatible with his having come to feel the self-care through acknowledging a trust-based reason. It would be ad hoc to hold that it is only the self-care itself that Adam comes to feel through reasonable trust, and not the motives he comes to feel through exercise of that care. Stephanie doesn't merely advise Adam to care about himself, then leave it to him to discover what self-care requires. She has applications in mind — all the specific things he does as a result of his warped deliberations. When he takes any of this advice and comes thereby to manifest appropriate self-care — by her lights (but we're assuming she's right) — his motivation derives directly from his acknowledgment of her status as trustworthy. He comes to care appropriately about himself by acting on another's view of his self-interest. And he may need to keep availing himself of this perspective till he can internalize the care.

We can describe Anna's case along these lines as well. Of both advisees we can say that they would not take the advice if they did not care appropriately about themselves. In Adam's case, there is no background motive of appropriate self-care; so this has to mean that taking the advice of this trustworthy adviser is part of *what it is* for him appropriately to care about himself.¹³ But there is no reason to describe Anna's case any differently, and some reason to think that an alternative description would get it wrong. True, Anna does have a background motive of appropriate self-care. But Stephen's invitation that she trust his perspec-

13 One may object that he must be exercising *some* species of self-care, or he wouldn't have managed to get dressed for the reunion, etc. But we can easily imagine cases — someone who really cannot manage to leave the house or even get out of bed, someone needing to be talked down from threatening a suicidal plunge, someone with a gun in his mouth — where the deficit in self-care seems closer to complete. My point is not that we must view Adam as approximating these cases but that an adviser needn't tap into his capacity for more fundamental self-care in order to reach him. Insufficiently self-caring without the melodrama, Adam contains the seed of our common predicament.

tive does not require it. Stephen's presumption is that she'll act on the basis of *his* care for her. While he could try to get her to believe that she can best pursue self-care by being kinder to her mother, relying on her background motive, that is a version of the relatively unpresumptuous strategy we imagined him retreating to in section I, no version of the highly presumptuous strategy we imagined him pursuing in section II.

If Anna accepts Stephen's presumptuous invitation, the desire she comes to have to be kinder is a desire formed through recognition of a reason, a reason which Anna possesses through an exercise of rationality that is not constitutively constrained by antecedent motives.¹⁴ But the reason guides her conduct by providing the basis of a motive on which she can act. This vindicates the Kantian thesis that practical reflection can itself give rise to motives. We can vindicate this Kantian thesis by appeal to fiduciary reason, a very unKantian faculty for rational heteronomy.¹⁵

IV

Of course, there's no reason in play unless the trust is reasonable. What would make it reasonable?¹⁶ You cannot reasonably trust an adviser unless you have evidence of her trustworthiness.¹⁷ Perhaps you can reasonably trust testimony without evidence of your interlocutor's trustworthiness.¹⁸ If so, trust in testimony and trust in advice are not on a par

14 It is what Thomas Nagel calls a 'motivated' desire whose basis does not lie in any 'unmotivated' desire, a desire 'motivated exactly as the action is... by reasons stemming from certain external factors' (*The Possibility of Altruism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1970), 29-30).

15 I'll give this claim more explication and defense in sections VII and VIII.

16 My account of the reasonability of trust constitutes the second contribution of this paper, in principle separable from my quasi-Gricean account of advising. The reader is therefore free to accept one but not the other, though I of course think the best view combines them.

17 By 'evidence' here and in similar contexts I mean *good evidence on balance*. This needn't be conclusive evidence.

18 A number of philosophers have argued for this view; for one such argument, see Tyler Burge, 'Content Preservation,' *Philosophical Review* 102 (1993) 457-88; 'Interlocution, Perception, and Memory,' *Philosophical Studies* 86 (1997) 21-47; and 'Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds,' *Philosophical Perspectives* 12 (1998) 1-37. I give a very different argument for the view in 'Telling as Inviting to Trust.'

By forming a judgment (whether about what to believe or about what to do) 'on the basis of evidence' I'll mean forming it on the basis of *antecedently possessed*

as regards the relation between being reasonable and possessing evidence. We trust the testimony of strangers on the street, and we are usually perfectly reasonable to do so. But it would often be unreasonable, sometimes comically so, to trust the advice of a stranger on the street.¹⁹

What looks like advice is often, of course, mere testimony — as, for example, when a stranger gives you directions. ‘Go two blocks, then turn right’ is not *advice* to do that, at least not of the sort that we’re considering, but mere testimony about the most direct route to your destination. It would be advice only if it included a thought about which route is worth taking — for example, ‘The shortest route is up and to the right, but I wouldn’t go there if I were you.’ Here most of us would feel justified in accepting our interlocutor’s testimony about the shortest route but would want to hear more about why we shouldn’t take it. If the stranger explains by presenting more testimony, she may win us over. If she merely gives us a knowing look and says ‘Trust me,’ we’ll probably feel stumped what the speech act could signify — and perhaps a bit peeved. Such presumption!

When S offers A prudential advice, she represents herself as an authority concerning his self-interest. Is she? If she cares about A, advises in a way that manifests that care, and is relevantly well-informed about A, then it’s possible she is. If A has evidence of such trustworthiness, that meets a necessary condition on reasonable trust. It also meets this condition if he has evidence that S can be counted on to do her utmost to advise from a perspective of care for him, even if he knows that the advice is not heartfelt (i.e. that she does not actually care about him). I lack space to consider what would constitute evidence either of care, or of a reliable disposition to advise as if one did care. I assume that most of us develop a capacity to assess such evidence in early childhood when our livelihood and even our lives depend directly on knowing whom we can trust in this dimension. It is well known how very imperfect many

evidence of the speaker’s trustworthiness. I don’t claim that when you form a judgment on some basis other than *such* evidence you do not form it on the basis of evidence at all. It may be that forming the judgment itself gives you evidence of its truth — if, for example, it’s a practical judgment of the form ‘I’ll ϕ .’ But in that case, (a) the evidence was not available until you formed the judgment, and (b) the evidence will not typically concern the speaker’s trustworthiness (although it could, since trusting someone may cause her to become more worthy of trust). For discussion of (a), see J. David Velleman, *Practical Reflection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989), 61-4; and, more fully, ‘Epistemic Freedom,’ in his *The Possibility of Practical Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000).

19 I don’t claim that it is *always* unreasonable (see below, three paragraphs hence).

of us turn out to be as adults in assessing such trustworthiness.²⁰ But it is not reasonable for you to trust an adviser unless you have evidence that you can count on her to advise from a perspective of care for you. As we'll see when we turn to moral advice in section V, reliability in advising from a perspective of care is not the only form of advisorial trustworthiness can take. But having *some* evidence of advisorial trustworthiness is in general a necessary condition on reasonable trust in an adviser.

What counts as meeting this minimal evidential condition on reasonable trust? In trivial cases ('I wouldn't eat that if I were you,' said while pointing to something unnoticed on the hamburger bun), perhaps she need merely address you sincerely. In less trivial cases ('I wouldn't befriend her if I were you'), you'll need more substantial evidence. A rule of thumb: the greater the threat that the speaker is advising from purely self-interested motives, the more substantial the evidence you'll need that she is not. This suggests a general answer to our question. A trustworthy adviser will in general be addressing you from motives that are not exclusively self-interested.²¹ If she cares about you, or is speaking from that perspective, she won't be disinterested, but she equally will not be (exclusively) *self-interested*. Trust in an adviser can be reasonable as long as you have evidence that she is addressing you from non-self-interested motives, even if you have no further evidence that she is adopting a perspective of care for you. Evidence that your adviser is speaking from a perspective of care for you suffices, of course, for this necessary condition on reasonable trust in an adviser to be satisfied. But all that is required for the necessary condition to be satisfied is that you have evidence that she is addressing you from non-self-interested motives.²²

20 In a fuller treatment we might characterize a standard for assessing care-relations as such by examining empirical literature on the many complex ways in which a care-relation can break down. See, for example, Arnold Sameroff and Robert Emde, eds., *Relationship Disturbances in Early Childhood* (New York: Basic Books 1989).

21 Of course, she may be advising partly from self-interested motives, if she believes that what you should do coincides with what she independently wants. I'll tacitly assume this qualification when I write 'non-self-interested motives' (and cognate locutions): I mean motives that are not *exclusively* self-interested.

22 One can imagine bizarre cases in which your evidence that her motives are not self-interested is also evidence that she is motivated from concern for someone who hates you and moreover just insofar as this person hates you. So the very weak formulation of the necessary condition needs to be tweaked in order to rule out these cases. The necessary condition is not met, then, unless the evidence that you have that her motives are non-self-interested is *compatible* with the proposition that she

Further conditions are required. For though evidence that an adviser speaks from a perspective of care for you is not necessary for your trust in her to be rational, evidence that an adviser does *not* speak from a perspective of care for you is sufficient for trust in her to be *unreasonable*. In an externalist spirit we might hold that the mere fact that your adviser does not speak from this perspective, whether or not there is evidence of it, suffices to make trust in her unreasonable. Since we'd still need an evidential defeating condition, that would yield two defeating conditions on reasonable trust: (a) the adviser does not speak from a perspective of care for the advisee, or (b) there is evidence that the adviser does not speak from a perspective of care for the advisee.²³ Trust is reasonable, we might propose, if (i) the advisee has evidence that the adviser is not speaking from (exclusively) self-interested motives and (ii) neither of these defeating conditions is met.

An internalist would either not treat (a) as a defeating condition on reasonable trust or would give it a reading on which it collapses into the evidential condition (b). As long as it stops short of smuggling in a positive evidential condition — that there must be positive evidence of care in order for trust to be reasonable — there is no reason in light of anything I've argued thus far to exclude this interpretation. It is not inconsistent to hold that reasonable trust both requires that there not be evidence of a failure to care and does not require evidence of care. An internalist reading of the defeating conditions on which (a) collapses into (b) need not violate my thesis that the only *positive* evidential condition is the very weak condition (i).

Pending resolution of this internalism/externalism issue, we can neutrally formulate the defeating conditions in terms of a generic notion of (robust) untrustworthiness,²⁴ leaving open an internalist reading according to which S is untrustworthy to the extent that there is evidence that she is untrustworthy. We get this account:

is advising from a perspective of care for you. Since that's too complicated to keep repeating, I'll simply take it for granted.

23 One might try to formulate (b) in terms of evidence that the addressee *has* rather than evidence that *there is*. But it is not reasonable to trust when there is good evidence of untrustworthiness that you lack through epistemic sloth. I am applying here a point that is by now standard in debates about externalist theories of epistemic warrant. For perhaps its first clear articulation, see Laurence Bonjour, *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1985), ch. 3.

24 By that 'robust' let me mark the fact that we're no longer discussing the very minimal sort of trustworthiness involved in condition (i), i.e. the possession merely of non-self-interested motives.

A's trust in S is *not* reasonable if either

- (a) S is untrustworthy on the subject, or
- (b) there is good evidence that S is untrustworthy on the subject, evidence which A ought to possess, whether A is aware of that evidence or not.²⁵

'X is worthy of Y's trust' says that Y is (pro tanto) entitled to trust X. We can leave it open whether what *disentitles* you to trust is anything beyond the existence of relevant evidence — that is, whether to embrace the externalist reading of (a). An internalist reading of the first defeating condition does not yet amount to an internalist view of the reasonability of trust, since it is compatible with trust's being reasonable in the absence of evidence that the trusted is (robustly) worthy of it. This reading is, however, an internalist view of the *unreasonability* of trust. In section V, I'll mention an argument for preferring an externalist view and say why I do not aim to adjudicate that debate here.

Trust, we can say generally, is a species of willed dependence, where the dependence is under appropriate guidance of a counterfactual sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness in the trusted. 'Appropriate guidance' means: you would not trust if you had evidence that the trusted is not worthy of your trust. Trust need, therefore, involve little active assessing, if the trusted is trustworthy. It is enough merely to be (and, counterfactually, have been) disposed to notice and respond appropriately to evidence of untrustworthiness should there be (or have been) any.

V

I have so far restricted my discussion of advising to prudential advice, to the case in which the adviser represents herself as judging that her advisee should ϕ because ϕ ing is in his self-interest. I have argued that the rational faculty exercised when you trust prudential advice is the same as the faculty you exercise when you determine that someone cares about you. You ask: 'Does she have *my* interests at heart? Is she telling me to ϕ for *my own* sake?' If there is evidence that she does and is, then

25 The 'ought'-clause leaves it open that in a given case, though there is evidence that S is untrustworthy, we don't think that A ought to possess that evidence — an agent is by no means responsible for *all* his evidentiary failures: not all arise through epistemic sloth (see note 23).

a necessary condition on reasonable trust is met. If you lack evidence that she has your interests actually *at heart*, this necessary condition will nonetheless be met so long as you have evidence that she is advising from non-self-interested motives. That would amount to at least *prima facie* evidence that she is advising from a perspective of care for you, that she is, in effect, imagining what someone who did care for you would want for you for your sake.²⁶ What now of moral advice? What of the case in which the adviser represents herself as judging that her advisee should ϕ because that is what morality requires of him?

We should not assume that one offering moral as opposed to prudential advice would aim to advise from a perspective of care for you. That would amount to assuming that morality guides through self-interest — a Platonic assumption that many philosophers would question.²⁷ But we can assume that a speaker offering genuinely moral advice would not be speaking exclusively from the perspective of her own self-interest. It seems unreasonable to trust moral advice without some evidence that the speaker is addressing you from non-self-interested motives.

Can we proceed in parallel with prudential advising and treat stronger conditions on the reasonability of trust as defeating conditions? We might simply redeploy the defeating conditions previously laid out:

A's trust in S is *not* reasonable if either

- (a) S is untrustworthy on the subject, or
- (b) there is good evidence that S is untrustworthy on the subject.²⁸

A trustworthy moral adviser must, of course, be competent on the subject of morality. An externalist will gloss the first defeating condition as requiring competence in morality, the internalist as requiring an absence of evidence of incompetence.²⁹ Again, on the view I'm recommending a trusting subject need not have positive evidence that his interlocutor is competent in order for the trust to be reasonable. It can be

26 Remember the acknowledgment of complexity in note 22.

27 Nor need we assume a moralized conception of care. That is, we need not assume it irrational to advise someone to do what's in his self-interest while conceiving his self-interest to conflict with what morality requires of him.

28 I'll henceforth treat the further clause on (b) as understood.

29 I leave it open what counts as moral competence and incompetence. I intend my account to be compatible with any normative theory or conception of morality. I do not, in particular, assume a cognitivist conception of moral competence. Moral competence needn't be like competence in seeking the truth.

reasonable to trust the moral advice of someone whom you have not positively assessed as morally competent, as long as you have evidence that she is addressing you from non-self-interested motives and neither of the defeating conditions holds.

We could have treated the prudential case along parallel lines, deeming trust in prudential advice unreasonable if your adviser is incompetent in assessing what's in your self-interest. Competence in assessing what's in your self-interest is not, after all, a competence separable from the competence exercised in adopting a perspective of care for you. Anyone whom you cannot count on to assess accurately what's in your self-interest is incapable of acting from a perspective of care for you. And we've noted that trust in prudential advice is unreasonable if your interlocutor can't be trusted to advise from such a perspective. Here we should distinguish 'caring for' from 'caring about.' Someone may in some sense be capable of caring *about* you even if she is incapable of accurately assessing what's in your self-interest.³⁰ But when you wonder whether your adviser is trustworthy you are not wondering about her feelings for you; you are wondering whether you would be wise to treat her perspective on your self-interest as rivaling your own perspective in authority for you. You would be wise to do so only if you really can count on her to get your self-interest right. Incompetence in assessing your self-interest entails incompetence in adopting a perspective of care for you.³¹

It is not, of course, always clear whether a speaker offers her advice as moral or prudential. We should therefore hold an advisee's trust presumptively reasonable just if he has evidence that his adviser is speaking non-self-interestedly. This is condition (i) from the previous section and covers both prudential and moral cases. For the presumption that the trust is reasonable to be sustained — condition (ii) — neither of the following generalized conditions must hold:

30 This is often the case with parents of adult children: they care enormously about their children, but are incapable of assessing accurately what's in their children's self-interest. Such a parent can care *for* (as opposed to merely *about*) his or her child only where the child has regressed (perhaps through illness) to the state of having most saliently only those interests that the parent can assess (perhaps mere recovery of health).

31 This is true even when the incompetent one is you yourself. Competence in assessing your own self-interest figures in a more robust form of self-care than the form discussed in section IV; there I had only caring-about in mind.

- (a) the speaker is in fact untrustworthy in relevant respects;
- (b) there is good evidence that the speaker is untrustworthy in relevant respects.³²

In the moral case, relevant trustworthiness is moral competence. In the prudential case, it is the competence manifested in acting from a perspective of care for the advisee.

It may seem a problem for an internalist reading of the defeating conditions that trust can be reasonable even when there is no evidence that the adviser is relevantly competent. For how could the mere fact that there is no evidence that an adviser is *incompetent* ground the reason that, as I've argued, her advice would make available to the advisee? On an externalist reading of the first defeating condition, the adviser must be in fact relevantly competent, and the externalist may appeal to this fact to ground the trust-based reason. The internalist may in turn complain that it can be reasonable to trust an adviser who is in fact incompetent, provided there is good evidence that she is competent. One could rest with a disjunctive account of the reasonability of trust, on which its reasonability derives either from actual competence or from evidence thereof. But this would not yield a univocal explanation of the source of trust-based reasons. I thus prefer to view the readings as competitors and merely note that I cannot hope to resolve that debate here.

Can advice give moral reasons via the quasi-Gricean mechanism? If the quasi-Gricean analysis of advising is correct, and assuming there *are* morally trustworthy advisers, it must be possible to acquire a reason to perform some particular morally advisable act simply by recognizing such an adviser's intention to give you a reason to perform that act. I have argued for the account but not for the assumption. If the assumption is false, the account merely measures the depth of our predicament — both what we must resist and what we must do without.

32 At the beginning of the next section, I'll note how standards of trustworthiness are relative to context and subject matter. It is important also to note that some advisings serve, given the standard appropriate to their context and subject matter, to give immediate evidence that the adviser is *untrustworthy*. If I hardly know you yet give you advice that presumes an intimate familiarity with your daily rhythms, you need seek no further for evidence that I am untrustworthy. And perhaps there are some matters that are *so* intimate — or so complex? — that *no one* could give advice without thereby giving evidence of untrustworthiness. Here is another respect in which it is important to join Fricker in 'disaggregating' (see the next note).

VI

So much for the formal relations between reasonable trust and standards of trustworthiness. What now of the standards themselves? Though I lack space for an exhaustive treatment, let me offer a few remarks about these standards and about how they inform our trust more materially.

Standards of trustworthiness are generally sensitive to context and subject matter. This is true of mere testimony: X is a reliable guide to the truth about jazz but not about opera. Y's testimony is reliable tête-à-tête, but in groups she tends to exaggerate. Z recounts the old days as if they were yesterday but yesterday as if it were prehistory reconstructed from fossils. And it is equally true of advice: Your co-worker Pat gives great advice on anything related to sex, but doesn't understand your spiritual needs. Aunt Agnes, who still remarks on how much you've grown since she last saw you, is an unreliable adviser on adult life but invaluable in helping you come to terms with your inner child. Your parents, on the other hand, are too eager to convince themselves you've grown up to be good advisers on any matter beyond career and parenthood.

Standards of testimonial and advisorial reliability cannot, in sum, be applied or even formulated without lots of worldly and interpersonal know-how.³³ One thing we learn from sad experience is that the standards are sometimes very high. As Karen Jones has emphasized, standards are particularly high in the case of testimony and advice on moral matters, given what's usually at stake there.³⁴ But my thesis of the presumptive reasonability of trust can accommodate this. It does not recommend gullibility.

We should specifically resist Jones's conclusion that 'the appropriate default stance toward testifiers about morality is one of distrust.'³⁵ Jones

33 Here I agree with the spirit of Elizabeth Fricker's polemic on behalf of what she calls 'disaggregation' in the epistemology of testimony ('Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony,' *Mind* 104 (1995) 393-411, section VI). But I do not agree with the letter of that polemic, whose upshot would, if applied to advice, amount to the thesis that trusting advice is presumptively reasonable only given certain contexts and subject matters. I've argued that trusting advice is always presumptively reasonable (given satisfaction of the weak evidential condition). As I'll argue presently, differences in standards of reliability mark differences in what it would take to *defeat* this presumption.

34 Karen Jones, 'Trust as an Affective Attitude,' *Ethics* 107 (1996), 20-5; and 'Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,' *Journal of Philosophy* 96 (1999), 70-7

35 'Second-Hand Moral Knowledge,' 72. Jones is disagreeing here with C.A.J. Coady's claim that our default stance should be one of trust in testimony (*Testimony: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992), 46-7). But Coady articu-

is right that the species of competence relevant to trust on moral matters is harder to come by than other species of competence. And she is right that wish-fulfillment and self-interest pose relatively greater threats to the reasonability of trusting moral testimony or advice. But it concedes too much to these phenomena to hold that such trust cannot be reasonable without evidence of positive moral competence. We accommodate them just as well by holding that trust cannot be reasonable in the face of evidence of moral incompetence.

When you trust moral testimony or advice you will rightly be held to a high standard of sensitivity to relevant evidence. But a sensitivity to relevant evidence needn't involve assessments of interlocutors for moral competence.³⁶ As I've argued, such assessments stand in the way of exercising your capacity to trust and therein to provide the uptake these interlocutors intend you to contribute to their speech acts. A sensitivity to evidence can amount to nothing more than a disposition to track whatever relevant evidence exists rather than active reconnaissance in search of it. If there is good evidence of moral incompetence, a reasonable advisee will note it and refrain from trusting. But if there is no such evidence, it may well be reasonable to trust without assessing the adviser for competence at all.

What if you live in a community in which it is evident that few people are morally competent? Here it may not be reasonable to trust without seeking evidence of positive moral competence.³⁷ But we can view this reconnaissance as simply the form your sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness must take in such conditions. Sensitivity to evidence of

lates nothing like my defeasibility account of the rational presumption in favor of trust, nor does Jones consider anything like my account.

36 It may seem that seriousness about morality requires a commitment not to take moral advice without assessing the adviser as morally competent. But that, I believe, is too strong. Moral seriousness requires that you be very sensitive to evidence that you should not take the advice. Yet it doesn't require that you manifest that sensitivity by actively searching for evidence. Actively searching for evidence of X is only *one* way of manifesting sensitivity to evidence of X.

37 Thanks to Ann Cudd for pressing me on this point. Alasdair Norcross reminds me that the point may hold for prudential advice as well. Imagine you live in a community in which it is evident that few people are willing to advise, or are competent in advising, from the perspective of care for you. In that case, since there's this evidence of general untrustworthiness, you'll need positive evidence that any given adviser is advising from the perspective of care for you. I can accommodate the case along the lines that I'm about to use to accommodate the moral case. Against this unfortunate background, sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness requires a search for evidence of trustworthiness.

X generally involves, among other things, implicit knowledge of when to be on the lookout for evidence of X. If there is good evidence that moral competence is a rare trait among those who would advise you, you could not count as sensitive to evidence of untrustworthiness if you did not assess your advisers for moral competence. On the other hand, if moral competence is not evidently in short supply, your sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness need not manifest itself in such vigilance. I obviously lack space to defend the claim that for most of us it is the antecedent of the latter conditional that is true. I claim only that the truth of the sadder antecedent would not vindicate a general norm requiring assessment of an moral adviser for positive competence. It would instead show merely that your circumstances were not ideal for moral advice.³⁸

In both the moral and the prudential case, your adviser typically won't rest with 'Trust me' but will go on to produce more specific reasons why you should perform the recommended act. Sometimes she'll intend these as further reasons to perform the act, as if to say 'You don't need me to get you to do this; examine the reasons on your own.' But sometimes the more specific reasons will play a different role, that of neutralizing what would otherwise count as evidence of untrustworthiness. An adviser who rests with 'Trust me' usually thereby manifests a patronizing attitude toward her advisee, an attitude that in most contexts gives immediate evidence of untrustworthiness. Though my account of advising as inviting to trust strikes me as truistic, I think philosophers have overlooked it because they have not distinguished between these roles. Sometimes when an adviser appears to be engaging her advisee's deliberative capacity, she means only to engage the sensitivity at the core of his capacity for reasonable trust.

In the best case, sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness works by cognitive and affective mechanisms that operate quite reliably beneath the level of self-conscious awareness and regulation. Just as epistemic processes of belief formation make the assessment of evidence possible

38 What would mark this difference in communities? Doug Ehring informs me of a local eccentric who had the habit of spending weekend afternoons on a parkbench under a sign proclaiming 'Free Advice.' Taking separately the cases of moral and prudential advice, and assuming the availability of evidence that the eccentric's motives were not exclusively self-interested, the question 'Would advice thus dispensed directly give a pro tanto reason to take it?' could serve as a barometer of manifest trustworthiness in the cultural atmosphere. It is not obvious to me that there are not such reasons, both prudential and moral, available where I live. (Of course, manifest eccentricities and an overwillingness to advise typically count as defeaters of reasonable trust, so we'd have to imagine the Free Adviser free from these defects, which doesn't seem impossible.)

by providing us with starting points for such assessment, so exercise of the capacity for reasonable trust makes deliberative assessment of another's advice possible against the backdrop of practical conceptions accepted simply on trust. We have reason to hope the best case is sometimes realized. None of us could form a humanly livable set of practical commitments from the ground up, relying only on what we can defend without trust. We can no more form a reasonable conception of how to live without trusting (perhaps internalized) critics and advisers than we can form a reasonable conception of the world without trusting our senses. Our undergoing influences at this level is undeliberated, but it need not therefore be unreasoned.³⁹

When you trust, you put yourself under another person's influence, and it is usually irrational to do so utterly blindly. I am not arguing for blind submission. I am arguing for a species of reliance that should be familiar as *reliance on character*. Advising as inviting to trust is the act of inviting your interlocutor to rely on your trustworthy character. Though I lack space to elaborate this aspect of the view, I am arguing for an aretetic conception of interpersonal practical rationality.

39 I do not offer the reflections in this paragraph as a positive argument for my thesis that trust is presumptively reasonable. (My positive argument was in the previous sections; I am here merely deflecting objections.) Considered as a positive argument, the paragraph would run afoul of Fricker's distinction between global and local reductionisms ('Telling and Trusting,' sections IV and V). Fricker argues that it is no argument against a *local* reductionist requirement in the epistemology of testimony — for example, that you cannot here-and-now acquire a reason to believe that p from having been told that p unless you have good evidence of the teller's reliability on the matter — to note, contra *global* reductionism, that it cannot be the case that our entitlement to *all* of what we take ourselves to know through prior testimony should meet that requirement. It may be that the critical faculties whose employment is required by the local reductionism cannot develop except against a background of entitlement that presupposes the falsity of global reductionism. And the point seems to hold not only for epistemic but for practical reasons: that we could not build a humanly livable set of practical commitments from the ground up does not show that, having done so with the help of advice, we are not *now* responsible for assessing new advisers for positive competence.

Fricker's argument depends on a sharp distinction between immature and mature deployments of practical reason. Although the point is by no means decisive, I regard it as an attraction of my anti-reductionist approach that it views the maturity of an agent's practical reason as a relative matter — relative both to the capacities of other agents and to past and potential future capacities of the agent himself.

VII

I am also arguing for a species of *practical internalism*, a species that generates by a novel route some conclusions falsely believed distinctive of Kantian or externalist approaches, including a forceful reply to the amoralist.⁴⁰

First, distinguish practical internalism from the epistemic internalism we discussed in sections IV and V when we considered whether trustworthiness rests on evidence. Next, following Stephen Darwall's codification of the practical issue, distinguish a morality/reasons internalism issue from a reasons/motives internalism issue.⁴¹ Morality/reasons internalism holds that A morally ought to ϕ only if A has a reason to ϕ . (There will be debates within the internalist camp over whether the reason must be overriding.) Reasons/motives internalism holds that A has a reason to ϕ only if A either feels some motivation to ϕ , or would feel some motivation to ϕ if he were fully rational.⁴² The argument in this paper generates a broadly internalist position on both issues.

Your position on one internalism issue may well depend on your position on the other internalism issue. If you view reasons as constrained by motives in the way distinctive of reasons/motives internalism, you may well view moral obligations as *not* importing reasons in the way distinctive of morality/reasons internalism. This would be a position like Hume's or Nietzsche's: any given agent may lack a reason to do what morality requires *because* he may lack motivational susceptibility to doing what morality requires, even if we idealize him as fully rational.⁴³ If, on the other hand, you view moral obligations as importing

40 This is a principal theme of 'Trust and Reasons,' where I defend the claim more fully and argue that this resolution of the traditional (practical) internalism/externalism issue generates a new internalism/externalism issue, now about the nature of fiduciary reason. (I don't mean the epistemic issue that I discussed in sections IV and V.)

41 Stephen Darwall, 'Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction,' in S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton, eds., *Moral Discourse and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1997)

42 By 'reasons/motives internalism' I throughout mean what Darwall calls 'reasons/motives *existence* internalism' (not what he calls 'reasons/motives *judgment* internalism').

43 For a Humean defense of reasons/motives internalism, see Bernard Williams, 'Internal and External Reasons,' in his *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981); 'Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,' in his *Making Sense of Humanity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); 'Internal and External

reasons in the way distinctive of morality/reasons internalism, you may well view reasons as *not* constrained by motives in the way distinctive of reasons/motives internalism. This would be a position like that of John McDowell's Aristotle: what reasons an agent has is not constrained by his rational motivational susceptibilities *because* his moral obligations give him reasons independently of his rational motivational susceptibilities.⁴⁴

From a perspective like Kant's, by contrast, the fact that a given agent lacks motivational susceptibility to doing what he is morally obligated to do only shows that he is not fully rational. On a Kantian approach, morality/reasons internalism tells us how to understand the force of reasons/motives internalism. We should understand the latter in terms

Reasons (A Reply to McDowell),' in *World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams*, J.E.J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1995); and 'Values, Reasons, and the Theory of Persuasion,' *Ethics, Rationality, and Economic Behaviour*, F. Farina, F. Hahn, and S. Vannucci, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996). For a Nietzschean rejection of morality/reasons internalism, see Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1985); and 'Nietzsche's Minimal Moral Psychology,' in his *Making Sense of Humanity*.

- 44 For an Aristotelian defense of morality/reasons internalism, see John McDowell, 'Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?' and 'Virtue and Reason,' both in his *Mind, Value, and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1998); 'Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle's Ethics,' in *Aristotle and Moral Realism*, R. Heinaman, ed. (Boulder: Westview 1995); and 'Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics,' in *Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty*, S. Engstrom and J. Whiting, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996). For an Aristotelian rejection of reasons/motives internalism, see McDowell, 'Might There Be External Reasons?' in his *Mind, Value and Reality*.

I disagree with Darwall's classification of McDowell as a reasons/motives existence internalist ('Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality,' 308). Darwall calls McDowell a 'perceptual' reasons/motives existence internalist, since for McDowell no one can know what reasons he has to act without 'seeing' his actions in a way that is intrinsically motivating. This, as Darwall notes, is an epistemic thesis concerning, not whether the agent has a given reason, but what is involved in his knowing that he does. Yet McDowell explicitly rejects the internalist thesis that an agent's *possession* of a given reason entails any fact about his motivational state or susceptibilities. It seems that epistemic internalism should be, not a species of existence internalism, but a genus set alongside existence internalism and judgment internalism. Existence internalism holds that possessing a reason entails being in some appropriate motivational state, judgment internalism holds that self-ascribing a reason entails being in some appropriate motivational state, and epistemic internalism holds that knowing that you have a reason entails being in some appropriate motivational state. McDowell is an epistemic but not an existence internalist (nor, it seems, a judgment internalist).

of a constraint not on what reasons an agent has but on when an agent counts as fully rational.⁴⁵ A Kantian in effect argues from an internalist position on both issues to a distinctive view of practical rationality.

We can use the resources developed in this paper to make a parallel argument. We can argue that the capacity reasonably to trust moral advice is a rational means of putting an agent in touch with his moral obligations. I have argued that moral advice, where trustworthy, gives a trusting agent a reason independently of his prior motivational susceptibilities. We can now claim that an untrusting agent has a reason to follow trustworthy moral advice, independently of his prior motivational susceptibilities, because if reasonable he would trust that advice. What would make this plausible, in internalist fashion, is that trust is itself a source of motives. The reason an untrusting agent has to follow trustworthy moral advice is a consideration that would motivate him if he were reasonable. This is not *quite* morality/reasons internalism, since it is the advice that would make the reason available, not the moral obligation on its own. But like Kant we can cite the distinctive conception of practical reason informing our reasons/motives internalism to justify this advisorial link between morality and reasons.

We can thus argue that trustworthy moral advice gives even an amoralist a reason to be moral. It gives him that reason because if he exercised his capacity for reasonable trust he would be motivated by trust in that advice to act morally. On the assumption that trustworthy moral advice is in plentiful supply, the only amoralist who would fail to have a reason to act morally is one whose capacity for reasonable trust is somehow impaired.⁴⁶ The amoralist's insistence that he lacks a reason to take the moral advice of what are in fact trustworthy advisers would be belied by his failure to exercise his fiduciary reason.

45 Christine Korsgaard was the first to point out this difference; see her 'Skepticism about Practical Reason,' *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (1986) 5-25.

46 One might wonder whether agents whose capacity for reasonable trust is impaired aren't beyond the reach of morality in another respect as well: Are they ultimately morally responsible for their actions? It seems plausible that a capacity for reasonable trust and distrust forms the ultimate basis of an agent's status as morally responsible for his actions, since it is plausible that to be a fit subject of moral praise and blame an agent must be capable of taking responsibility for himself by rationally adjudicating the interpersonal influences that shape him. We might view this as a candidate for what Susan Wolf calls 'deep responsibility' in *Freedom within Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990), a less flatly externalist candidate than her own view. (I pursue this thought further in 'Regret and Responsible Agency,' in preparation.)

VIII

This reply to the amoralist raises issues that I cannot hope to settle here; I offer it merely as a sketch. Since a fuller reply would emphasize the status of fiduciary reason as an irreducible species of practical rationality, let me suggest how to generalize the argument of section III.

How can trust serve as a source of motives in the absence of an antecedent motive to act on the basis of trust? On the view I propose, trust can serve as a source of motives by serving as a source of reasons, where the motive you gain through trust derives from your acknowledgment of the reason you gain through trust. This is a *new* reason whose basis lies in the trust itself. One might object that when trust in another's advice moves you to act, it does so because you antecedently have a standing motive to act on the basis of advice you deem trustworthy. But that would put the cart before the horse. You are willing to do what she advises you to do, insofar as you are, because you view her advice as a source of reasons. In the paradigmatic case, you become motivated to follow her advice by acknowledging the reason that advice makes available to you. To say that you are antecedently disposed to follow her advice is to say that you assume that her advice will make a reason available to you, not that you are simply willing to do what she says. Your motive derives from acknowledgment of this reason; the reason in turn derives from the consideration that she is trustworthy. It is because trust can be a source of reasons that it can be a source of motives.

How does acknowledgment of a reason gained through trust provide a motive? In the same way as trust itself provides a motive. Trust is a species of dependence. When you depend on an adviser in the way characteristic of trust, you depend on her *as far as you can trust her*. 'I can trust her up to the point at which her sentimentality kicks in,' you think. Or 'I can trust her on politics but not on personal matters.' Or 'I can trust her on any matter that does not trigger her envy of me.' It is almost never reasonable to trust someone across the board. Although I've been using the term without qualification, in the real world no one is trustworthy *sans phrase*. Trust is dependency, but under the guidance of your sense of when trust is sensible. When you do trust, however, your dependency takes the form of a disposition to let the trusted succeed in her efforts to influence you. Trust creates motives in a way that is perfectly mundane: you are susceptible to another's influence. But, unlike other species of dependence, the process is under the guidance of a kind of rationality. We should therefore understand it not as mere susceptibility to influence but as the acknowledgment of a reason.

The false assumption that trust could motivate only by tapping into background motives is what leads one to object that prudential advice

could motivate only by tapping into a background desire to do what's in your self-interest. On this assumption, an advisee depends on his adviser's conception of how he can succeed in acting on this desire, but the dependency could only generate a reason that derived from the desire. I gave grounds for rejecting the assumption in section III. We can now see that it puts the cart before the horse in the same way as the previous objection. I've just argued that your motive to act on the basis of trust in another derives from your recognition of a trust-based reason, and I would make a parallel argument for the case in which the trusted is you yourself. On what rational basis do you follow your own judgment concerning what's in your self-interest? Only through an exercise of fiduciary reason. If you are not worthy of your own trust on this very important matter — if either you are unreliable or there is good evidence that you are unreliable⁴⁷ — what reason could you have to act in accordance with your judgment? Here you'd do better to look for someone else to guide you.⁴⁸

Free from the assumption that advice must motivate by engaging a background desire in the prudential case, we can free ourselves from the assumption in the moral case. The amoralist we are imagining need have no difficulty recognizing moral competence; he merely fails to feel its rational force. Here he fails to exercise his fiduciary reason. I am not replying to moral skepticism or nihilism; it does not beg the question against the amoralist to assume that there really are morally competent advisers. But if there are, then there is trustworthy moral advice. Imagine our amoralist receiving some. If his fiduciary reason is not impaired, I conclude that he *can* come to feel the rational force of this advice — despite what he says. If his fiduciary reason is impaired, I conclude that he is to that extent not fully rational. So the amoralist is either not, contrary to his self-presentation, beyond the reach of morality or he is, again contrary to his self-presentation, beyond the reach of the relevant species of rationality. Either his practical reflections are irrational

47 For simplicity, I assume an externalist reading of the first defeating condition. And we can't, of course, require that you possess evidence that you are judging from non-self-interested motives! There is at least this disanalogy between the intra- and the inter-personal cases.

48 In 'Trust and Diachronic Agency' (*Noûs* 37 [2003] 25-51) I argue that diachronic agency — forming and then later following through on an intention — requires a robust species of self-trust, given that you have to follow through on the deliverance of your earlier self without redeliberating. But I am now making the more radical claim that forming the intention in the first place requires self-trust. I give a full argument for the claim in 'Regret and Responsible Agency.'

through failing to register all available reasons, or he himself is irrational through having failed to develop an important rational faculty.

IX

My account explains how an adviser needn't manipulate her advisee's antecedent motives in order to bring his conduct in line with what she believes are his reasons. It thus explains how she can count as genuinely reasoning with him. Rather than bully or bribe him into doing what she judges right, she can invite him to trust her judgment; she can intend him to act on the reason she makes available by being a trustworthy adviser. She can acknowledge that, left to his own devices, he has no motivational susceptibility to the consideration that she believes gives him a reason to do what she would advise. Left to his own devices, in other words, he has no reason to do what she would advise. But he isn't left to his own devices. My argument begins from the observation that as advisers we presume that our interlocutors are not left to their own devices. Advising as inviting to trust is the speech act that embodies this presumption. We would be deluded in the presumption if it were impossible to give someone a reason based simply in trust. Perhaps we are deluded: I have not argued that anyone is relevantly trustworthy. I have argued that if we are trustworthy then we can make available trust-based reasons. On this possibility depends the possibility of our genuinely reasoning with each other: of our reasoning each other into possession of reasons that we would not otherwise possess.

Reasoning with each other hangs, then, on our possession of fiduciary reason. This is a form of practical intelligence that assesses not principles but persons. It thus resembles the species of practical intelligence informing Hume's treatment of the moral virtues. But whereas Hume holds that a reason can derive from personal assessment via your capacity to sympathize with how another would assess you,⁴⁹ I hold that a reason can derive from your responsiveness to another as manifesting the virtue of trustworthiness. We needn't sympathize with others' assessments of us to view ourselves as equipped with a reason to act as someone whom we trust advises.

49 For this interpretation of Hume, see Charlotte Brown, 'From Spectator to Agent: Hume's Theory of Obligation,' *Hume Studies* 20 (1994) 19-35. I do not claim that my account supplants Hume's. The capacity to trust trustworthy advice does not exhaust our practical intelligence.

I thus supplement Humean 'love of fame' — our general concern that others think well of us — with the very different passion of trust. The mechanism of influence here is not sympathy. In the case in which an adviser will be most concerned to intervene, you will prove unable to resonate to her perspective on you, since you will be motivationally unsusceptible to the considerations on which she believes you should act. But you needn't therefore prove motivationally unsusceptible to her manifest trustworthiness.

My account relocates the normative force of sympathy to the other side of the speech act. The ability to sympathize with an interlocutor's point of view does inform the practical intelligence required of a trustworthy adviser. To grasp this final point, let's revisit the speech act's presumption.

Advising as inviting to trust presumes that your interlocutor may act on a reason deriving entirely from your manifestation to him of trustworthy character. In accepting the invitation, he would acknowledge this aspect of your character as reason-giving and in so doing acquire a motive to act accordingly. Of course, the reason is merely *pro tanto*; if it is overridden by better reasons, all things considered, it will not be rational for him to act on it. But if he trusts you he manifests a willingness to give your trustworthiness practical-reflective weight as such. Being advised to ϕ can, you presume, in this way give him a reason to ϕ independently of whether he otherwise is or can become motivated to ϕ .

The speech act puts us under a distinctive set of obligations. Conscience may indeed prick us hardest when we sympathetically imagine ourselves from the perspective of an interlocutor wondering whether to trust our advice. Against the presumption of our invitation we can measure the aspect of our character that would warrant its acceptance.

