
*Respect and Loving Attention*¹

CARLA BAGNOLI
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee
Milwaukee, WI 53201
USA

On Kant's view, the feeling of respect is the mark of moral agency, and is peculiar to us, animals endowed with reason. Unlike any other feeling, respect originates in the contemplation of the moral law, that is, the idea of lawful activity. This idea works as a constraint on our deliberation by discounting the pretenses of our natural desires and demoting our selfish maxims. We experience its workings in the guise of respect. Respect shows that from the agent's subjective perspective, morality is the experience of being bound and necessitated, but also of being free and emancipated from inclinations.

Respect is a feeling that is generated by the agent's reflection on the nature of her own agency. It is not directed to anybody in particular, but to the very idea of rational agency, which is characterized by self-mastery and self-legislation. Contrary to animals, we do not derive our ends from nature, but we are capable of setting ends of our own, by exercising practical reason, that is, by engaging in the activity of law making. It is on this ground, Kant argues, that respect qualifies as the appropriate

1 Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Conference of the *U.K. Kantian Society* at the University of Reading in 1999, at the Department of Philosophy at UW-Milwaukee in 1999, at the meeting of the Central Division of the *American Philosophical Association* in 2000, at the University of Pavia and at the University of Rome in 2001. I should like to thank Clotilde Calabi, Stephen Darwall, Luca Ferrero, Luca Fonnesu, Mark LeBar, Tito Magri, Elijah Millgram, Richard Moran, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O'Neill, Peter Railton, Amélie Rorty, Marco Santambrogio, Julius Sensat, Sally Sedgwick, Gabriele Usberti, Salvatore Veca, Eric Wiland, my A.P.A. commentator, Daniel Weinstock, and in particular, two anonymous referees whose comments enabled me to improve this paper.

evaluative attitude toward persons, that is, beings capable of making laws and, therefore, setting ends. We value persons insofar as they are endowed with reason, hence capable of lawful activity and thus susceptible to morality. Respect for persons is held equivalent to the reverence for this capacity, in which resides our humanity, and it is considered the key concept to express mutual recognition.²

Kant's account of respect as a mark of moral agency and as the evaluative attitude due to persons has been the target of severe and relentless criticisms.³ Iris Murdoch is generally counted among Kant's fiercest opponents, and praised for providing an alternative picture of moral agency and sensibility. Murdoch's attack aims at the very heart of Kantian ethics, and anticipates in many ways the worries voiced by later critics.⁴ She argues that Kant's conception of respect expresses a mis-

2 Kant uses 'respect' to name a moral feeling, a category of duty, a tribute, a maxim, and a sensitive basic concept. I will be concerned with respect as a moral feeling, which marks moral agency, arises from the contemplation of the law, and is directed to the value-category of dignity. The value-category of dignity refers to all rational beings capable of setting ends for themselves. Thus, for Kant respect also expresses mutual recognition, that is, the acknowledgement of humanity in ourselves as well as in all other rational beings. In this sense, respect qualifies as the evaluative attitude that is appropriate toward others. There are some important issues as to how the moral feeling of respect generates duties of respect, and relates to love and duties of love. I shall set aside the discussion of respect as a category of duty; my response to Murdoch is elaborated independently of these issues.

3 In many respects, contemporary philosophers move objections to Kant's moral psychology which are similar to the ones formulated by his first critics, Schiller and Hegel; see F. Schiller, *Ueber Anmut und Würde, Schillers Werke* (Stuttgart: 1867) 238-96, esp. 270-5; F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1942), 90; F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979), 260-2, 386. The literature on the subject is extensive, but see e.g. H. Allison, *Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990), 180-98; K. Ameriks, 'The Hegelian Critique of Kantian Morality,' in *New Essays on Kant*, B. den Ouden and M. Moen, eds. (New York: Peter Lang 1987) 155-78; D. Henrich, 'Der Begriff der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft,' in *Kant: Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln*, G. Prauss, ed. (Koln: Kiepernheuer & Witsch 1973) 77-115; A. McBeath, 'Kant on Moral Feeling,' *Kant Studien* 64 (1973) 283-314; C. Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996), 77-105; S. Sedgwick, 'On the Relation of Pure Reason to Content: A Reply to Hegel's Critique of Formalism in Kant's Ethics,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 49 (1988) 59-80; A. Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999), 40-49.

4 See, e.g., L. Blum, 'Moral Perception and Particularity,' *Ethics* 101 (1991) 701-25; S. Buss, 'Respect for Persons,' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 29 (1999) 517-50; L. Code, 'Persons and Others,' in *Power, Gender, and Values*, J. Genova, ed. (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing 1987) 143-61; C. Cranor, 'On Respecting Human

taken account of agency. Her point is that since respect, as Kant understands it, is not directed to individuals but to 'the universal reason in their breasts,' it cannot adequately express mutual recognition (I. Murdoch, *Existentialists and Mystics*, P. Conradi, ed. (London: Penguin 1997), 215). To repossess the ability to express and value mutual recognition, she urges us to abandon Kant's conception of agency and deliberation, and embrace the language of love. My contention in this paper is that there is much to gain in taking seriously Murdoch's plea for a more varied moral vocabulary to express the complexity of the ways we experience morality and value others. However, contrary to Murdoch, I will argue that we would be in a better position to do so once we appreciate Kant's insights about agency.

I begin in section I with an overview of Kant's account of the experience of morality. In section II I outline Murdoch's critique of Kant's conception of agency. In section III, I respond to this critique by elucidating Kant's claim that respect is the subjective expression of autonomy because it qualifies as the sole and undoubted moral incentive. Focus on the function of respect as the moral incentive allows me to rebut a further charge moved against Kant's theory of rational agency, which is that it conceals change and difference in character. My task in section IV is to show that this objection mistakes Kant's conception of action exactly because it overlooks the role of respect as a moral incentive. These sections are meant to counter the contention that respect is merely 'a byproduct of our status as dignified rational beings' (Murdoch, 367). In the rest of the paper, I consider whether the concept of respect appropriately and fully expresses mutual recognition. In section V, I reply to the objection that respect fails to adequately express mutual recognition because its object is abstract. In section VI, I show that Kant's respect and Murdoch's loving attention exhibit a similar phenomenology and work

Beings as Persons,' *Journal of Value Inquiry* 17 (1983) 103-17; R. Dillon, 'Respect and Care: Toward Moral Integration,' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 22 (1999) 105-32; MacIntyre, 1982; M. Newman, 'Did Kant Respect Persons?' *Res Publica* 6 (2000) 285-99; R. Noggle, 'Kant, Respect, and Particular Persons,' *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 29 (1999) 449-78, at 452-6; E. Spelman, 'On Treating Persons as Persons,' *Ethics* 88 (1977) 150-61; B. Williams, 'Persons, Character, and Morality,' reprinted in *Moral Luck* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1981) 1-19. Philosophers more sympathetic to Kantian ethics also show to be sensitive to the kinds of concern raised by Murdoch, and attempt to revise Kant's conception of respect accordingly, see e.g. B. Herman, *The Practice of Moral Judgment* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993); T. Hill, *Respect, Pluralism, and Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press 2000); N. Sherman, 'Concrete Kantian Respect,' *Social Philosophy and Policy* 51 (1998) 119-48; J. Raz, *Value, Respect, and Attachment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000).

likewise, as constraints on deliberation. I argue that both these concepts signal the awareness of agential boundaries, and rest on the same picture of moral deliberation. Insistence on the similarity between respect and loving attention does not impoverish the vocabulary of mutual recognition; rather, it allows us to restore love as a distinct concept. In section VII, I show how love and respect differ: while the first 'bids an approach, the other demands that we halt at a suitable distance from one another' (Kant, *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, in J. Ellington, trans. and ed., *Immanuel Kant's Practical Philosophy* [Indianapolis: Hackett 1983], 470). Although respect and love may concur in the practice of morality and concurrently inform our interactions, they are distinct functions of our moral sensibility and govern our relations in different manners. To confound them, or to opt for one of them at the exclusion of the other, is to deplete the basis of our normative model of personal relations. Despite arguments to the contrary, this is a significant yet neglected part of Kant's legacy that we should reclaim.

I Kant's Conception of Respect and the Experience of Morality

On Kant's view, we are not simply rational beings, but animals endowed with reason. Unlike brutes, we are capable of assessing our natural desires, and act on the basis of our representation of the end we endorse. Rather than being determined by our natural drives, we undertake action on the basis of reasons. Unlike fully rational beings, however, we are sensitive creatures both tempted by our inclinations and susceptible to incentives. While for fully rational beings moral actions arise spontaneously, we experience morality as constraint and obligation.⁵ We act autonomously only when we act out of necessitation (*Nötigung*), bound by the representation of the moral law. The standard of full rationality and freedom represents for us only an ideal to undertake.⁶

5 This is established by the argument from spontaneity, according to which 'a free will and a will under moral laws are identical' (Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, in J. Ellington, 447). For an illuminating account of this argument, see Korsgaard, 159-187. All references to Kant's work are given in Prussian Academy pages.

6 It is important to stress that morality is experienced in this manner, as a constraint and a kind of necessitation, which requires us a sustained effort. 'All duties contain the concept of constraint by law' (Kant, *Virtue*, 394). Compare B. Herman, 'On the Value of Acting for the Motive of Duty,' *Philosophical Review* 90 (1981) 359-82, at

Although the moral law is an idea of reason, which we cannot fully realize, we can approximate it by conceiving our action in the light of the principles of pure practical reason. To be moved by such a conception, we have to endorse a moral incentive. Respect is counted as 'the sole and undoubted moral incentive' (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, M. Gregor, trans. and ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997], 78), which arises directly and immediately from the contemplation of the moral law.

This moral feeling distinguishes us both from brutes and from purely rational wills, and marks a distinct kind of agency. Caused by the representation of the moral law, respect is the feeling of being bound by the requirements of reason in deliberating about what to do. It prevents the inclinations from having a direct influence on the will, and checks self-centered maxims (such as maxims of arrogance and self-love). In exposing the unwarranted pretenses of self-centered maxims, respect removes the obstacles to deliberation, and thus indirectly contributes to deliberation.⁷ By setting off and thwarting the inclinations, the representation of the moral law 'exerts an effect on feeling' that is painful.⁸ This pain is caused not only by the frustration of the inclinations and interests we have, but also by the mortification and humiliation of what we are.⁹ To act rationally is to act on the basis of a certain conception of ourselves under the representation of the moral law. In acting on this conception, we become aware that we cannot accomplish the full realization of the moral law. Respect is therefore 'the feeling of an incapacity to attain to an idea that is a law for us' (Kant, *ibid.*, 57); it is the experience of a pain that derives from understanding our limitations.

176ff.; R. Sullivan, *Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989), 121. In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, 'duty of constraint' (*Zwangspflicht*) to 'duty' (*Plifcht*) in the second edition, Kant, *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, 381.

- 7 'This dislodgement of an obstacle is, in the judgment of reason, equally esteemed as a positive assistance to its causality' (Kant, *Practical Reason*, 75). 'For any diminution of obstacles to an activity furthers the activity itself' (*ibid.*, 79).
- 8 This is because all the inclinations and natural impulses are grounded on feelings. The effect on a sentiment is still a feeling: so the effect of the representation of the moral law is a feeling, see Kant, *Practical Reason*, 81.
- 9 'If anything checks our self-conceit in our judgment, it humiliates,' Kant, *Practical Reason*, 75. 'First, the moral law determines the will objectively and immediately in the judgment of reason; but freedom, the causality of which is determined only through the law, consists just in this: that it restricts all the inclinations, and consequently the esteem of the person himself, to the condition of compliance with pure law. This restriction now has an effect on feeling and produces the feeling of displeasure which can be cognized a priori from the moral law' (Kant, *ibid.*, 78).

However, the experience of respect also reveals something pleasantly reassuring about us: that we can overcome our limitations, and thus consider ourselves free. A new moral ranking of maxims arises from the devaluation of the self-centered maxims. It is by undertaking the moral incentive that agents make themselves free; hence, respect is the feeling of enhanced self-esteem or elevation (Kant, *ibid.*, 78-9).¹⁰

Respect is a peculiar moral feeling because it is generated by the mere contemplation of the moral law, and is directed to no object in particular (Kant, *ibid.*, 75). Feeling reverence for the law is tantamount to feeling respect for the capacity of self-legislation, Kant argues. The most distinctive feature of rational beings, in contrast to brutes, is that they are capable of setting ends for themselves. Ends are set by practical reason, which operates in a lawlike manner. The capacity to set ends for ourselves is not simply the capacity to act on universalizable maxims, but the capacity to legislate. In his view, rational agency is characterized by a universally legislating will, a will capable of law-making (Kant, *Groundwork*, 431). It is the contemplation of this kind of agency which Kant calls reverence for the law. Reverence for the law arises from the mere contemplation of the law: it is a feeling that is characteristic of an agent that reflects on the nature of her own agency, and the quality of her will. Rational beings conceive themselves as capable of autonomy, that is, self-legislation, self-mastery and self-determination, and act upon this conception. Because of this self-representation, rational beings take an interest in acting on the categorical imperative rather than on the basis of mere impulses (which provide only hypothetical imperatives). The conception of ourselves and of others as capable of self-legislation is thus necessary to explain the authority of morality over beings who have empirical interests. It is because we unconditionally value the capacity for self-legislation that we value ourselves and any other beings capable of self-legislation. Thus, the value of legislating explains why we are to value persons as ends in themselves.¹¹ Persons qualify as the proper object of respect insofar as they are capable of legislation (*Gesetzgebung*).

10 'But the same law is yet objectively — that is, in the representation of pure reason — an immediately ground of the will, so that this humiliation takes place only relatively to the purity of the law; accordingly, the lowering of pretensions to moral self-esteem — that is, humiliation on the sensible side — is an elevation of the moral — that is, practical — esteem for the law itself on the intellectual side; in a word, it is respect for the law, and so also a feeling that is positive in its intellectual cause' (Kant, *ibid.*, 78-9).

11 On the reading I am offering here, drawing from Paul Guyer, the link between reverence of the law and respect for persons is provided by the principle of

Kant's view is not that respect of persons depends on and is derivative from reverence for the law. Respect is not merely an extension of reverence for the law to another object.¹² Rather, reverence for the law is equivalent to respect for persons: 'The dignity of a person *consists* precisely in this capacity to make universal laws' (Kant, *Groundwork*, 440). By attributing the capacity for self-legislation, one attributes personality and dignity. Dignity marks a distinctive value-category, which includes persons, that is, beings that are capable of self-legislation and therefore qualify as sources of values). We are sources of value because we are capable of setting ends (Kant, *Virtue*, 392, 395). This capacity is what makes persons ends in themselves. That we ought to respect persons as ends in themselves is perhaps the most important statement of respect for persons. Respect is therefore the evaluative attitude that is appropriately elicited by the recognition of others as having dignity, as ends in themselves, or as sources of value. It is the concept that chiefly expresses mutual recognition and grounds the maxims that concern others.

II Murdoch's Critique of Kant's Model of Agency

Murdoch characterizes respect as 'a kind of suffering pride which accompanies, though it does not motivate, the recognition of duty.... [A] rather painful thrill which is a by-product of our status as dignified rational beings' (Murdoch, 366-7). She takes respect to be an actual experience of freedom, or the '*experience* of our freedom — our freedom, as it were, biting into our phenomenal being' (Murdoch, 262).

Murdoch's point is that Kant's conception of respect expresses a mistaken conception of freedom, and consequently grounds an inadequate account of agency and deliberation. She claims that by conceiving

autonomy, that is, 'the idea of the will of every rational being as universal legislating will,' Kant, *Groundwork*, 431; this idea yields the imperative 'do everything from the maxims of one's will as one that can at the same time regard itself as universally legislating,' Kant, *Groundwork*, 432. See Guyer, 'The Possibility of Categorical Imperative,' in *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays*, P. Guyer, ed. (New York: Rowman and Littlefield 1998) 215-18 and 234-9. I would like to thank an anonymous referee of this journal for pressing me on this point. I come back to this issue in section V.

12 To this extent, Raz's interpretation is misleading, and his objection misplaced: 'It is true that Kant is happy to extend it to objects other than the moral law itself, but when used in this way respect derives from respect from the moral law' (Raz, 134). The same mistake is to be found in Noggle, 455.

freedom in terms of the workings of the will, Kant's account is bound to impoverish the notion of agency.¹³ By this standard, moral activity is reduced to an outward performance, confined to the moment of decision, and separated from anything that precedes or follows it. Moral agency becomes 'the making of sensible choices and the giving of sensible and simple reasons. It is not seen as the activity of theorizing, imagining, or seeking for deeper insight' (Murdoch, 177).

According to Murdoch, several other misconceptions follow from this narrow understanding of moral activity. First, the role of emotions in practical rationality is misunderstood. Emotions are considered either disturbances, which undermine practical rationality, or merely auxiliary to action; but they are not recognized as distinctive modes of moral discernment (Murdoch, 366, 177). Second, there is no obvious account of how agents are motivated because moral choice has become a mysterious and isolated act of will (Murdoch, 195). Third, the agent's inner moral life is simply silenced in between the occurrence of discrete acts of will. The agent's thoughts, the working of her imagination, her deeper attitudes and emotions do not find room in this picture of the agent as a mere performer. Kant leaves us with a rather depleted account of what it takes to be a moral agent: a giddy, empty will.

Murdoch vividly illustrates her case with the famous example of the mother-in-law. Margaret, a sensitive, reflective and imaginative lady, finds her daughter-in-law Daisy good-hearted yet unpolished and tiresomely juvenile. Margaret reflects deliberately about her own feelings towards Daisy, 'until gradually her vision of Daisy alters' (Murdoch, 313). Margaret has changed her mind about Daisy who is now regarded as refreshingly simple and delightfully youthful. Since no outward alteration corresponds to this change in view, Margaret is pictured 'from the outside in,' Murdoch claims, and this picture prevents us from understanding Margaret as continually active, focusing her attention onto Daisy, being reflective, and making progress through deliberation. On this picture, which focuses on actions as external movements, the agent's thoughts and inner acts are not seen as 'forming a continuous fabric of being' (Murdoch, 316). In fact, on this picture we lack the very metaphor of a continuous fabric of being; or rather, such metaphor has become dispensable. Murdoch's contention is that this is a serious conceptual loss that precludes our comprehension of moral activity and agency.

13 This objection is extended to various forms of contemporary ethics, which Murdoch claims to be Kantian in spirit, see R. Moran, 'Vision, Choice, and Existentialism,' *Notizie di Politeia* 66 (2002) 88-101.

III Respect as the Moral Incentive and Ground for Moral Change

On Murdoch's account, it is not altogether apparent whether respect plays any role at all in Kant's conception of agency. Its occurrence seems rather gratuitous: it merely accompanies the recognition of duty, and it is qualified as 'a by-product of our status as dignified rational beings' (Murdoch, 367).¹⁴ However, on Kant's view, the concept of respect is neither ancillary nor subordinate to rational agency: it *is* the subjective experience of rational agency.

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, on which Murdoch bases her critique,¹⁵ respect marks morally worthy actions. The presence of respect is a warrant that the agent acts out of duty, that is, independently of inclinations. While the role of respect as a moral incentive is already apparent in the *Groundwork*, it becomes of more consequence in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, where it accounts for moral motivation, and it thereby shows that we are capable of autonomy. Having renounced the deduction of transcendental freedom attempted in the *Groundwork*, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant claims that autonomy is inextricably bound up with the consciousness of freedom, which constitutes the fact of reason (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 42-3, 46-8). The agent perceives her freedom as a given, a fact that she cannot derive from higher principles or by further reflection on the nature of agency (Kant, *ibid.*, 31). She is simply aware that she can act out of duty, and this awareness is felt in the guise of respect.¹⁶ This awareness is the fact of reason.

14 Kant argues that although we cannot show how pure reason can be sufficient to determine the will, we can nevertheless consider what effect reason has on our sensibility insofar as it is regarded as an incentive: 'For how a law in itself can be the direct determining ground of the will (which is the essence of morality) is an insoluble problem for human reason. It is identical with the problem of how a free will is possible. Therefore, we shall not have to show a priori why the moral law supplies and incentive, but rather what it effects (or, better, must effect in the mind), so far as it is an incentive' (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 75).

15 This (partly) explains the apparent inaccuracy of remarks such as: '[Kant] did not officially recognize the emotions as part of the structure of morality.... However, in a footnote in the *Grundlegung*, he allows a subordinate place to a particular emotion, that of *Achtung*, or respect for the moral law' (Murdoch, 366).

16 Kant, *ibid.*, 27-9, 46ff. To this extent, respect is the subjective part of the fact of reason. The fact of reason has subjective and objective aspects; see L. Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1960), 166-75; L. Beck, *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant* (Indianapolis: Hackett 1965), 200-14;

What I want to emphasize here is that respect is a significant part of the fact of reason.¹⁷ It is the subjective expression of morality (and thus shows that we are capable of freedom in the practical sense) insofar as it qualifies as the 'sole and undoubted moral incentive' (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 78). Respect is a certainty, a given in the sense that it is the way we are aware that a pure idea of reason, the moral law, has a foothold in our character.¹⁸ An investigation of the role of respect as a moral incentive is, thus, crucial in order to provide an effective reply to Murdoch. Let me then explain Kant's theory of the incentives.

Because we are animals, we are subject to inclinations and desires. Because we are endowed with reason, we are capable of assessing those desires. In order to engage in action, we have to represent our action as done for the sake of something. It is a fact about our psychology that we need to imagine an end in order to have our interest in action aroused. An incentive is something in virtue of which we become interested in acting. Incentives provide grounds for reasons for action, but do not determine choice directly. It is the agent who elects and adopts the incentive as a maxim of action, and thus transforms it into a motive (*Bewegungsgrund*). This transformation is attended by the principle of volition, which can be provided by morality or self-love. A motive is, thus, an incentive regarded as a reason from the point of view of the principle of volition.

A crucial issue arises at this point: how is it that we can take interest in morality given that we are susceptible to inclinations? To respond to this question, Kant argues that we are capable of undertaking morality

Allison, 232. Objectively, it establishes the validity of the moral law and thus it proves the autonomy of the will, see Kant, *Practical Reason*, 55-7. Subjectively, it is the consciousness that the moral law is binding, and this is shown by respect. This subjective aspect indicates our consciousness of moral constraints on our deliberation and our capacity to act for the sake of morality. The analysis of respect presupposes the validity of the moral law, that is, the doctrine of the fact of reason in its objective aspect. However, respect is crucial in the presentation of the fact of reason from a subjective perspective: respect shows that we are capable of purely moral motivation and that the idea of the moral law is immediately binding. See Allison, 230-49; Korsgaard, 159-87; J. Rawls, *Lectures in History of Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2000), 253-71.

17 Henrich insists that this conception of respect poses a problem for Kant in that it is grounded on two different faculties (Henrich, 109, 112-13); see also McBeath, 287. I am proposing a more positive view, inspired by Allison's reconstruction, see Allison, part II; see also G.F. Muenzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1997), 103; Rawls, 206-7, 322-5.

18 See Korsgaard, 159-88; A. Reath, 'Kant's Theory of Moral Sensibility,' *Kant Studien* 80 (1980) 284-302, at 295; Rawls, 291-308.

as a subjective motive, that is, to act for the sake of duty rather than out of inclination. The feeling of respect is elicited when we contemplate the moral law, and thus its presence shows that the mere idea of the moral law can affect our sensibility:

Respect for the law is *not the incentive* to morality, but morality itself regarded as an *incentive*, inasmuch as pure practical reason, by rejecting all rival claims of self-love, gives authority and absolute sovereignty to the law. (Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, 76)

Respect is not produced by reason as an intermediate device to coerce inclinations, but serves the purpose of expressing reason in action. To this extent, respect is the mark of moral agency.¹⁹ It does not indicate our receptivity to some desirable feature of the object we want to obtain through action, like pathological feelings do. When the will conforms to the moral law in virtue of the mediation of a feeling, it means that morality itself is not enough to determine the will. In this case, there is legality (*Legalität*), but not morality.²⁰

The distinction in the legislation underlying dutiful actions provides us with the resources to account for Murdoch's example of the mother in law. This case is devised to show that one can be morally active while doing nothing. Murdoch thinks that this case represents an objection to Kant because he takes action to be the paradigm of moral activity. Margaret's moral change does not affect her outward performance, and thus it cannot be observed or narrated from outside. It is, as Murdoch

19 Frankfurt puts it differently: 'The moral law can influence a person's conduct, Kant believes, only through the mediation of respect' (H. Frankfurt, 'Autonomy, Necessity, and Love,' in *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988) 129-41, at 141. This suggests that whether the agent eventually acts for the sake of morality depends on whether respect is sufficiently strong to overcome the competing inclinations. For reasons I provide in this paragraph, Frankfurt's suggestion is misleading.

20 In the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*, the distinction in the kind of legislation grounds two kinds of duties: duties of virtues and of right. While duties of right are externally sanctioned and enforced by an outer legislation, duties of virtue are self-imposed and enforced by an inner legislation; see Kant, *Virtue*, 389, 393, 397, 404, 408-9. The presence of respect shows that our action is principled and undertaken through an inner legislation. The account given in *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* is more complicated than the one offered in the *Groundwork*, and I am not suggesting that the distinction between duties of right and of virtue maps onto the distinction between acting according to duty and acting for the sake of duty. Rather, I am simply pointing out that Kant is interested in drawing a distinction between external and internal correctness of actions, which is a distinction in the kind of legislation and motivation, see e.g. M. Baron, 'Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 36 (1997) 29-44, at 37-8.

remarks, a change in mind: a private event, prompted by the agent's own reflection, which is neither a revision of beliefs nor a mere change of heart.²¹ Margaret is depicted as acting impeccably before and after her change; nobody could have guessed her hostility toward Daisy.

Since Kant privileges action as the only kind of moral activity, he cannot make this change intelligible, Murdoch objects. In fact, Kant's distinction between legality and morality proves very able to capture the nature of Margaret's moral change. Adopting Kant's distinction, we shall say that while at first Margaret acted according to duty (driven by inclination), after the moral change she acted for the sake of duty (motivated by respect). This account has several merits. First, it makes it apparent that Margaret's change is neither a revision of beliefs, nor a change of heart. It is a change in mind, and more precisely a change in motivation. Second, using this distinction, we can explain why this kind of moral change can be prompted only by the agent's own reflection. Respect is precisely the kind of feeling that arises out of the agent's reflection on her own nature, and it goes with a loss of innocence. It is characteristic of beings endowed with reason, capable of self-representation and therefore susceptible to self-conceit as well as to self-esteem (Kant, *Groundwork*, 401).²² Finally, on the basis of this distinction we can account for Margaret's behavior as 'externally correct,' although not morally worthy. According to the *Groundwork*, the moral worth of actions depend on the agent's being motivated by the moral feeling of respect. Those actions that are not so motivated do not necessarily violate duty; they may be in accord with duty and nonetheless lack moral worth.²³

21 Not all alterations of mind qualify as a change in mind. To be a change in mind, an alteration must be neither imposed on the agent nor prompted by the circumstances, see A. Baier, 'Mind and Change in Mind,' in *Postures of the Mind* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1985) 51-73.

22 As Wood eloquently puts it: 'The *innocent* will *can* respect nothing, because it lacks the self-reflection presupposed by both self-esteem and self-conceit. It *does not need* to respect anything because its inclinations, which are in a natural (if fragile) harmony with the good, do not yet need to be checked by reason. The innocent will needs no law' (Wood, *Kant's Ethical Thought*, 47).

23 There is scholarly disagreement as to whether dutiful actions always fulfill duties of respect. For example, Baron suggests that lack of respect as a moral feeling not only deprives actions of moral worth, but also makes them wrong; see Baron, and compare A. Wood, 'Humanity as End in Itself,' in P. Guyer, ed., 165-88. I do not address this issue here because it is not the kind of worry that Murdoch raises. My point is simply that the distinction between legality and morality is sufficient to respond to Murdoch's objection about the intelligibility of internal change in Kant's ethics.

Margaret appears to be acting dutifully. She does not treat Daisy badly or without respect; in fact, the whole point of Murdoch's example is that Margaret acts so decently and respectfully that her change from hostility to kind regard is not visible to a bystander. Exploiting Kant's distinction between legality and morality, Margaret's moral change becomes perfectly intelligible.

Murdoch's reservations arise because of a fundamental concern about Kant's account of action. She argues that on Kant's view actions are the sole indicators of moral activity. In a way, this is correct. Kant holds that activity consists in action. But for Kant, action is not a mere outward performance, like a bodily movement. For Kant bodily movements count as actions only insofar as they are undertaken on the basis of a reason (that is, an incentive that has been elected as a motive).²⁴ The notion of maxim is crucial in this account of action because it expresses the reason in virtue of which the action is performed (e.g. 'I will spend more time with my daughter in law in order to know her better'). What Kant calls action is something that necessarily includes its representation in terms of the agent's maxim. Since actions are not simply outward and visible performances, a moral change cannot be represented merely as an overt change of behavior. Rather, to account for a moral change, we have to take into consideration the maxims that underlie and justify the actions in question. Thus, on Kant's view, reference to the moral life of the agent, her vision of the situation and deliberation about it, is just unavoidable.²⁵ Moral life is expressed in the language of maxims, which state the agent's end, and account for her interest in action. It is by appreciating the importance of subjective maxims that we can capture Kant's insight about agency: What is distinctive about agents is that they act on the basis of their own representation of the law. Such subjective representation is expressed by subjective maxims.

It is remarkable that for Kant the question as to how to track a moral change from the outside, that is, from the point of view of an evaluator, would never arise. Speculation on the content of the maxim that we can plausibly attribute to ourselves or to others is always beside the point.

24 In fact, they might not have an outward performance at all. They might not consist in any visible movement to track from the outside.

25 In the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue* we read: 'The faculty of desire is the faculty to be by means of one's representations the cause of the objects of these representations. The faculty of a being to act in accordance with its representations is called *life*' (Kant, *Virtue*, 211).

Because of the opacity of the maxims this question is unanswerable,²⁶ but it is also uninteresting because what matters is the practical question: we search for the conditions for Margaret's change in attitude. Kant's story is told from the agent's point of view. From this point of view, actions are answers to the question 'What should I do?' That is, actions are not there for an observer to register, but for an agent to resolve a deliberative question. By choosing the incentive and undertaking action, the agent expresses her personality. Humans act for the sake of ends; that is, they conceive of actions as done for the sake of something. To be motivated by the representation of the moral law they need the concurring effect of respect, which is aroused in the imagination of the ends. Ends are chosen, and to this extent, they are the expression of our rationality. The predisposition to 'personality is the capacity for respect for the moral law as in itself a sufficient incentive of the will' (Kant, *Religion*, 23; see 27-9).

Kant's account of agency and incentives allows us to focus on a crucial issue: What stake does Margaret have in changing her view about Daisy? What's her end? Murdoch's insistence that Margaret's behavior is stable, before and after the change, hides this very issue. For Kant, the condition for undergoing a moral change is that we undertake the moral incentive, that we represent morality as our subjective purpose. In Margaret's case, we have to account for her moral change as a change in the grounds that underlie her action. Margaret's problem is how to relate to Daisy. A change in attitude is the result of having resolved this practical issue. Margaret's behavior after the moral change is apparently the same as it was before, but the ground for such a behavior is now different. Before she acted nicely out of decency and etiquette, now she acts nicely out of duty. She eventually recognizes that Daisy has moral status, and her moral achievement lies in this recognition. Her relation to Daisy is now

26 The claim about the opacity of maxims is pervasive, see Kant, *Groundwork*, 407; Kant, *Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone*, T. Green and J. Silber, trans. and eds. (New York: Harper Torchbooks 1960), 77; Kant, *Virtue*, 392; 447, Kant, *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, M. Gregor, trans. (The Hague: Nijhoff 1974), 121. Daniel Weinstock has pointed out to me that one solution is to claim that moral evaluation is essentially a *retrospective* practice: although we cannot know which maxims will really inform our future action, we can, nonetheless infer what our past maxims have been by a process of induction over classes of our previous actions (see e.g. Kant, *Religion*, 77). I take Kant's ethics to be practical and built into a first-person conception of oneself, and thus my strategy is to emphasize that the retrospective perspective of the evaluator is beside the point; on the merits of this strategy, see O. O'Neill, 'Kant's Virtues,' in *How Should One Live?* R. Crisp, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 1996); Allison, 195. Respect is a check against self-deception in that being regarded as the 'undoubted' moral incentive, it reassures us of the moral content of our maxims.

grounded on respect. The thoughts that motivate her actions before and after the change are informed by different maxims. At first, Margaret undertakes the action as informed by thoughts such as 'I will be nice to my daughter-in-law in order to please my son' or 'I will be nice to my daughter-in-law in order to abide by the rules of etiquette, which I was brought up to observe.' After moral deliberation, she resolves to endorse the maxim 'I will be nice to my daughter-in-law out of respect.'²⁷ These maxims originate two different actions. Margaret's outward performance before and after the moral change is issued by different principles of justification. Thus, on Kant's account, Margaret's actions are not stable after all, although they might appear stable to an observer preoccupied with registering a change in her outward performance.

Undergoing a change can be explained as performing an internal action, and equated to adopting an end, which is expressed in a maxim. This change concerns the agent's beliefs and attitudes. Because Margaret adopts a new end, that of appreciating Daisy for who she is, she becomes sensitive to the facts or details that are relevant to the realization of that end. This transformation amounts to adopting an incentive. When the incentive comes from the inclinations, the change in our sensitivity comes naturally. When the incentive is moral, instead, it is prompted by reason and requires a *radical change*, a sort of revolution in our dispositions. According to Kant, this re-orientation is necessary because of our propensity to evil, which is original, hence inextirpable and such that we have to incessantly counteract it. This counteraction starts with the firm resolution to adopt maxims of morality, and amounts to adopting the pursuit of purity of the will as an end. This revolution is governed by the feeling of respect, and is by no means a mere change in one's habits, outward performances, or unreflective practices (*Sitten*), but rather in one's intentions (*Gesinnung*) (Kant, *Religion*, 46-7, 51; Kant, *Virtue*, 446, 477). Change in one's intentions is what renders moral a change in the practices.

However, this view should not be taken to imply that our practices are irrelevant. On the contrary, as I will clarify in section VII, practice is necessary to stabilize moral motivation and maintain our intention over time. The radical change or re-orientation does not come easily and once and for all; it is a painful and incessant struggle to endure. It takes moral

27 In presenting this example, I follow Korsgaard's formulation of the maxim as exhibiting the structure 'to-do-this-act-for-the-sake-of-this-end.' One could also formulate the maxim in terms of reasons of justification; in this case, one would say that Margaret first justifies her action by endorsing the maxim 'I will be nice to my daughter-in-law because I want to please my son' or 'because I want to abide by the rules of etiquette,' and eventually she resolves to act because she respects Daisy.

deliberation for Margaret to re-describe Daisy lovingly and it takes strength to maintain this loving attitude. Quite possibly, Margaret tends to yield to her wish that Daisy be otherwise. The point I am making here is that such a struggle is staged in the agent's mind, and Kant sees it this way. To this extent, Murdoch and Kant agree on the account of moral change.

IV Respect as a Ground for Character

To account for Margaret's moral change, it had seemed enough to account for the grounds of her actions. But Murdoch's example is devised to show not so much that Kant cannot make sense of moral change as that on his explanation the links between inner thoughts and outward actions are severed. Such links constitute the fabric of character. One may doubt that Kant's view supports a stable conception of character.²⁸ In fact, his insistence on the necessity of a radical change or re-orientation, and his claim that we cannot resolve but only endure such a painful internal struggle may suggest that there is neither room nor need in Kant's theory for a firm and stable character. If we agree that moral personality is guaranteed by separate acts of will, we may well drop the metaphor of a 'continuous fabric of being.'²⁹

Murdoch's point is that in fact this metaphor is not dispensable: we need it in order to represent moral activity correctly. In disposing of this metaphor, we incur a serious conceptual loss: we become incapable of appreciating the continuity between one's thoughts and acts, the fabric of character (Murdoch, 316). What is involved in having a character, she argues, is that we are endowed with a peculiar cast of character traits, history, habits, projects, and desires in the light of which our choices make sense. It is our distinctive fabric of character, the peculiar way in which our actions are linked to our inner thoughts that makes us individuals.³⁰ Failure to account for character is tantamount to failure to accommodate differences among individuals.

28 Doubts about Kant's conception of character have been fostered also by the metaphysical interpretation of the distinction between intelligible and phenomenal character; see A. McIntyre, 'Why Moral Agents Became Ghosts,' *Synthese* (1982) 295-312, and Williams. I put aside discussion of this issue, and endorse Allison's replies based on the practical interpretation of the distinction, see Allison.

29 On this interpretation, Kant's act of will is equated to Sartre's decision. Murdoch attacks Sartre insofar as he holds a Kantian conception of agency and freedom, see Murdoch, 133-6. For a forceful reply on Sartre's behalf, see Moran.

To have a character is for Kant to endorse a principle and enjoy the capacity for self-legislation. Thus, the notion of having a character is incompatible with being erratic; to be giddy is just not to have a character. Nonetheless, this conception is formal enough that the question arises as to whether it captures our commonsensical view of character, and whether it suffices to ground individuality and difference in personalities and outlooks. I believe there are resources to avert this worry.

To begin with, we need to distinguish between the claim of individuality and the claim of difference. Individuality does not imply difference, while difference requires individuality. Individuals are distinct units of agency, and to this extent, they are mutually irreplaceable.³¹ The previous objection rests on the presumption that both difference and individuality depend solely on what Kant calls 'phenomenal character,' that is, the subjective experience of the causality of reason (Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, N. Kemp Smith, trans. (New York: St. Martin's 1965), A549/B577).³² Phenomenal character is not the result of the exercise of practical reason alone, and Kant insists that we do not know to

30 In this vein, Frankfurt remarks: 'Now this pure will is a very peculiar and unlikely place in which to locate an indispensable condition of individual autonomy. After all, its purity consists precisely in the fact that it is wholly untouched by any of the contingent features that make people distinctive and that characterize their specific identities.... The pure will has no individuality whatsoever' (Frankfurt, 132). Williams moves a similar objection to Kant: 'My overriding aim is to emphasize the basic importance for our thought of the ordinary idea of a self or person which undergoes changes of character; when we reflect on these issues we discover that the Kantian view contains an important misrepresentation' (Williams, 5). 'Once one thinks what is involved in having a character, one can see that Kantians' omission of character is a condition of their ultimate insistence on the demands of impartial morality, just as it is a reason for finding inadequate their account of the individual' (Williams, 14). Williams' objection moves from a conception of agency that represents a genuine alternative to Kant.

31 They are replaceable under specific capacities, e.g. person A can substitute person B in the specific capacity of teacher, but not in the generic capacity of agent. In terms of generic agency, it matters whether it is A or B to perform the activity of teaching. Although A and B are intersubstitutable as teachers, it matters whether either of them is eliminated, and therefore they are not mutually replaceable as agents.

32 Murdoch, 215. This presumption is widely shared among Kant's detractors: see S. Blackburn, *Ruling Passions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1998), 252-9; Dillon; McIntyre; Williams, 5, 14-15. See also Frankfurt, 132. For an illuminating account of the complications that arise about the relation between intelligible and phenomenal character, see Allison, 32-3. I believe that discussion of such complications can be put aside for the purpose of this paper.

what extent what we are is ascribable to mere nature (Kant, *Pure Reason*, B580).

Kant might agree that phenomenal character is the vehicle of difference. But the condition of such difference is personality, that is, the imputability of actions. Projects, desires, and traits of character show the personality of an individual insofar as they can be imputed to her. Kant refers to this fundamental choice of character as the 'intelligible act,' that of which we are ultimately responsible and that makes us accountable for our phenomenal actions.³³ This view does not imply that agency is located only in voluntary performances, but rather that the locus of agency resides in *any* activity that the agent can conceive as authored or justified on the basis of reasons.

The condition of personality, hence authorship, is that we endorse the pure will as a normative standard of self-representation. But this perspective does not force us to give up our individual projects, desires, or needs. Rather it requires us to critically survey them on the basis of the standard of rationality. This is not to discount the importance of the environment, traditions, habits and traits that we cannot voluntarily discard, but to open the possibility to assess these elements critically and reflectively.

Objecting that Kant's ethics does not make room for discrepancies in moral outlooks is different from objecting that it fails to express mutual recognition. Mutual recognition requires that we acknowledge others as distinct units of agency. To be a unit of agency is for Kant to be able to endorse principles of actions, and act on the basis of reasons. For Kant, principled agency is tantamount to moral life. People differ as to the specific principles that they happen to endorse in particular situations, but what makes them into persons is that they are capable of leading a principled life. To what extent people may differ in the content of their principles is a separate issue, which does not affect the possibility of mutual recognition. In the next section, I will consider and rebut the claim that Kant's account of agency forces upon us the idea that rational agents endorse homogeneous moral outlooks. My aim here is to elucidate the purpose of distinguishing between intelligible and phenomenal character. My contention is that this distinction fulfills a practical purpose, which Murdoch can in fact applaud.

In representing ourselves as endowed with an intelligible character, we conceive of our activities as ours, as authored and imputable, rather than as the outcome of causal processes.³⁴ We thereby assume the possi-

33 Kant, *Religion*, 31-2. See Sullivan, chs. 9-10, esp. 126-7.

bility of constructing and creating our character.³⁵ The distinction between phenomenal and intelligible character allows for self-representation. It is a device that enables us to illustrate what it is for us to undertake the moral ideal. Although we act in time, when we regard ourselves *qua* agents we think of ourselves as citizen of a 'moral world, in the concept of which we leave out of account all the hindrances to morality' (Kant, *Pure Reason*, A 809/B837). Likewise, to consider our actions as such, we regard them as temporally unconditioned, as if nothing determined them. We are justified in thinking of ourselves under this representation because we are capable of respect. Respect shows that we can be inspired and sparked by the moral ideal, although there is a discrepancy between this ideal and the life we live. Although one cannot be self-assured to have established one's character, 'one must be able to hope that through one's own efforts one is able to get on the path leading thereto' (Kant, *Religion*, 51).³⁶

Interestingly, Murdoch agrees with Kant about the importance for moral philosophy to indicate a moral ideal (Murdoch, 364). Therefore, hers is a substantive critique: she does not mind the acknowledgment of the gap between an ideal of moral agency and our imperfect agency. Rather, she objects to Kant's construal of the moral ideal and of the hindrances to morality.

V Reverence for the Law as Respect for Persons

Murdoch's ultimate contention is that the concept of respect does not appropriately express mutual recognition because it is based on a misconceived account of the moral ideal and perfect agency. This objection

34 As Allison explains: 'So interpreted, the conception of intelligible character really reduces to the thought of practical spontaneity, which functions regulatively in the conception of ourselves as rational agents with empirical character' (138).

35 'The same subject is conscious also of his existence as a thing in itself determinable only by laws, which he gives to himself through reason. In this existence, nothing is antecedent to the determination of his will. Every action, and even the entire history of his existence as sensuous being is seen as the consequence of his causality as a noumenon. From this point of view, a rational being can rightly say of any unlawful action which he has done that is could have left it undone, even if as an appearance it was inescapably necessary. For this action and everything in the past which determined it belong to a single phenomenon of his character, which he himself creates' (Kant, *Practical Reason*, 98-9).

36 For a thorough account of the implications of this thesis for moral education, see G.F. Muenzel.

calls into question Kant's argument that reverence for the law is equivalent to respecting persons. Contemporary accounts of respect have drifted away from Kant out of discontent with this argument.³⁷ However, Murdoch's critique is somewhat peculiar in that it does not take up the issue as to whether Kant offers a complete and adequate normative account of what we owe to each other, but it targets respect as a moral attitude.³⁸

Kant argues that respect is the moral attitude of mutual recognition and represents our subjective appreciation of a distinctive category of value. We respect people because of their dignity, and we trade things in virtue of their price. To put a price on something is to regard it as commensurable and intersubstitutable. To recognize that persons have

37 A clear example of this phenomenon is Raz's recent proposal. He writes: 'It appears that Kantian respect has little to do with contemporary thinking about respecting people. The moral law, rather than people, is the object of respect. And there are no duties or requirements to respect anyone or anything. Rather, (a feeling of) respect arises in us as the moral law determines our will. Contemporary discussions of respect for persons strive to articulate and defend a particular moral principle of doctrine, that is, one is saying in brief, that we must respect people. That principle has little to do with Kant's doctrine of respect, which, to repeat, does not add to the content of morality, but says that whenever we perform an action because we rationally believe that it is our moral duty to do so we act out of respect for the moral law. It is true that Kant is happy to extend to objects other than the moral law itself, but when used in this way respect derives from respect from the moral law' (Raz, 134).

38 I leave aside the objection that reverence for the law describes or encourages the despicable attitude of following a rule. On this issue, see H. Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: Report on the Banality of Evil* (London: Penguin 1963), 134-8; Herman, 'On the Value.' The objection rests on a misconception of the object of the reverence for the law. Reverence for the law signifies reverence for self-governance and authority, that is, what is most remote from simply following a given rule whose normative source resides outside the agent, and which is the portrait of a heteronomous will. The way we express reverence is by representing and rationally endorsing the objective moral law as a principle of action, that is, by accepting rational constraints on our deliberation. See Kant, *Groundwork*, 429, 403. As Velleman explains in commenting this passage, the object of respect is the capacity for legislation (*Gesetzgebung*) not a given law (*Gesetz*); see D. Velleman, 'Love as a Moral Emotion,' *Ethics* 109 (1999) 338-74, at 346. But this objection also mistakes the object and the nature of the attitude that reverence for the law expresses. That is, reverence for the law must also be distinguished from the ground that motivates the agent to act according to a duty. Reverence for the law is the attitude that is distinctive and peculiar to the agent that performs his duty for its own sake, that is, the agents that understand and value autonomy and acts autonomously. Since in this sense autonomy is a qualification of the will, one cannot act out of reverence for the law when she merely follows a given rule.

dignity is to consider them as distinct and separate sources of value, incommensurable, and mutually irreplaceable. Respect expresses the subjective acknowledgment that the dignity of others represents a significant constraint on our deliberation. To relate to another as a person is to recognize their dignity. As a famous passage of the *Groundwork* reads:

The object of respect is the law alone — that law which we impose on ourselves but yet as necessary in itself. All respect that is for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty and so on) of which that person gives the example. (Kant, *Groundwork*, 402)

The morally significant feature of persons is their capacity for legislating. In virtue of this capacity, Kant argues, we are able to set ends for ourselves, regardless of natural inclinations and instincts. This capacity explains how morality can be authoritative for us, beings endowed with reason, and how we can be subjectively bound by the mere contemplation of the moral law. Morality is authoritative because we are capable of making laws for ourselves, and thus taking an interest in morality, despite and against the pressure of empirical incentives. We are capable of being so motivated because we conceive ourselves as capable of self-mastery and authorship, of being determined by practical reason rather than instinct (Kant, *Groundwork*, 432). The possibility of being bound by morality resides in the possibility of setting ends (Kant, *Groundwork*, 437; Kant, *Virtue*, 392, 395; Kant, *Religion*, 27-8). Reverence for law arises out of reflection about the kinds of agent we are, and it is the appreciation that self-legislation is something of unconditionally valuable. When we think of our choices, we conceive ourselves as authors of what we do: we set our own ends, and confer value to what we pursue. But value is not the product of our personal preference, rather it is conferred by a lawlike activity.³⁹ We are sources of values not because we can attach value at a whim, but because we are capable of rationally determining our ends. Since the rational determination of ends is a lawlike activity, what we value is, ultimately, law. This recognition makes humanity, that is, the capacity for the rational determination of ends, an absolute end in ourselves as well as in others. Hence, reverence for the law is also the basis of mutual recognition in that autonomy and

39 Kant writes, 'rational nature exists as an end in itself. We necessarily think of our own existence in this way; thus far it is a subjective principle of human actions' (Kant, *Groundwork*, 429).

self-determination are not the object of self-love, but the 'ground of the dignity of human and of every rational nature' (Kant, *Groundwork*, 436).⁴⁰

The argument about the equivalence between reverence of the law and respect for people establishes that dignity is ultimately attributed on the basis of the capacity for authorship and self-legislation. In this sense, respect is not directed to anybody or any object in particular, except on the basis of reverence for the law. Murdoch thinks that because of this claim Kant's conception of respect fails to appropriately express mutual recognition:

Kant does not tell us to respect whole particular tangled-up individuals, but to respect the universal reason in their breasts. In so far as we are rational and moral we are all the same, and in some mysterious sense transcendent to history. (Murdoch, 215)

Murdoch's thought is that respect cannot be a discerning emotion because its object is abstract.⁴¹ Respect addresses a universal feature of humans, rather than addressing individuals. Moreover, it fails to ground the differences among individuals because it commends homogeneity. The presumption is that individuals are adequately recognized only when their phenomenal differences are taken seriously. To this extent, to acknowledge others as formal units of agency is to fail to acknowledge their singularity as individuals.

However, it is not obvious that mutual recognition requires acknowledgment of difference; nor is it obvious that on Kant's account 'we are all the same' insofar as we are rational. An ideal world of pure wills would indeed be harmonious, but harmony does not require homogeneity. Rather, it demands action in concert. Being devoid of hindrances of morality is tantamount to being fully determined to mutual support and cooperation. However, cooperative interaction is compatible with

40 See Korsgaard, 110-14. As Korsgaard writes, 'If you view yourself as having a value-conferring status in virtue of the power of rational choice, you must view anyone who has the power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value-conferring status' (123). See also Guyer, 237 and Wood, 'Humanity,' 166-73.

41 Murdoch holds that 'the shortcomings of Kant's aesthetics are the same as the shortcomings of his ethics. He is afraid of the particular, he is afraid of history' (Murdoch, 214). In a similar vein, Dillon argues that to accept Kant's claim about the equivalence between reverence for the law and respect for people is to say that humans are in some important sense they are inter-substitutable, see Dillon, 121. For a reply, which I fully endorse, see Velleman, 367. This dispute echoes Hegel's critique of Kant's categorical imperative, but emphasizes the effect on the issue on mutual recognition. See Ameriks; Allison, 180-200.

differentiation, and therefore to envision a moral world of pure wills is not to commend homogeneity.

Admittedly, for Kant the object of respect is negative and abstract. It is negative insofar as it works mainly as a limiting condition or as constraint on other possible objects of the will. It is abstract in that it is a mere representation of the law of reason. The proper object of respect is the capacity for (self-)legislation (*Gesetzgebung*), that is, 'a possible enactment of the universal law,' and certainly not a given law (*Gesetz*) or a given code of moral rules.⁴² This capacity is what makes persons the legitimate sources of value, and this is what establishes that respect for the law (legislation) is equivalent to respect for the source of the law. Persons confer value by setting ends, making their own laws, by lawfully guiding their own will, and leading a principled life.

Thus, to claim that respect means reverence for the law is to claim that it is the proper attitude due to persons on the basis and in virtue of their capacity for self-legislation. To this extent, respect is the appropriate evaluative attitude to indicate the recognition of another as a person. It is the awareness that the dignity of others puts some ineludible limitations on our attitudes and actions. It is the awareness of a boundary, the perception of separateness, of bounds we ought not to trespass. The perception of boundaries is an essential part of recognizing others as distinct, separate, and autonomous sources of value. This recognition has a claim on us: It is a binding constraint on our deliberation.

VI Respect and Loving Attention

Appreciation of the individuality of others is for Murdoch the very business of morality. A moral vision of the world is characterized by the way we relate to each other and we engage others as individuals. This thought does not mark a difference with Kant. However, Murdoch holds that we cannot relate to others correctly simply by regarding them as abstract units of agency. To appreciate them morally, that is, as individuals, we must be able to look at them lovingly rather than respectfully. For Murdoch, love is a form of attention; and it is used interchangeably with the concepts of loving gaze, loving attention, and realistic compassion. Love is a form of moral discernment of others as individuals, which is characterized by three features.

⁴² This is established in Kant, *Practical Reason*, 79.

First, 'love is the extremely difficult realization that something other than oneself is real' (Murdoch, 215). In the example, Margaret finally perceives Daisy lovingly insofar as she finally perceives her daughter-in-law as she is, that is, independently of how Margaret would like her to be. To gain a clear vision of others means to be able to respect others' bounds, and appreciate the manifestation of their personalities. The recognition of others is cast in terms of the distance that the agent achieves in the way she looks at them, away from herself. In this sense, loving attention drives away (at a suitable distance) rather than attracting; and yet it is not dispassionate. Margaret's final attitude is both loving and detached. It is a realistic, unsentimental but compassionate and clear vision of things. To achieve such 'realism of compassion,' we must envision reality as undistorted by our selfish and arrogant desires (Murdoch, 353-4). This envisioning is not only a cognitive achievement since it qualifies a mode of our sensibility.

This detached yet loving look is the upshot of a difficult moral journey, an 'extremely difficult realization': It is a goal and (only sometimes) an achievement (Murdoch, 215). It commits the agent to a struggle that cannot be won but only endured (Murdoch, 317). The metaphor of the struggle invites the metaphor of the obstacles to overcome, and this is the second feature of Murdoch's account of love that I want to emphasize. The obstacles to love are internal: they reside within ourselves and are to be identify with a 'personal fantasy: the tissue of self-aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside one' (Murdoch, 348). The difficulty in achieving love depends on the fact that we are self-absorbed and self-interested animals, and to correctly relate to others we have constantly to re-orient and re-position ourselves. We are prone to mistake the fire for the sun, the illusions of the ego for genuine reality.

Third, love (as loving attention) is the outcome of an exercise of imagination through which we free ourselves from the chains of our self-indulgent fantasies, finally grasping the independent reality, seeing people for what they are (Murdoch, 216). Margaret's detached and loving look over her daughter-in-law is a deliberate attitude. The object of her deliberation was the desire that Daisy behaved as she would have liked. Deliberation has exposed this desire as unjustified and prompted a different attitude, that of love, which is the ground for a renovated relation.

Because of these three features, Murdoch's account of (love as) loving attention is significantly analogous to Kant's account of respect. On Kant's view, respect allows us to reconsider the claims of our desires via an humbling exercise in self-representation. Deliberation amounts to this: we represent ourselves as free from the causal determination of our current desires, and proceed to examine their legitimacy. This exercise

has a significant impact on our self-regarding maxims. It destroys maxims of arrogance (*Eigendiinkel*), and constraints maxims of self-love (*Eigenliebe*). Rational maxims of self-love alone survive this scrutiny. Self-love can be regulated, put under the constraint of morality, and so transformed into rational self-love (Kant, *Practical Reason*, 73). But arrogance prevents the recognition of the dignity of other persons as sources of esteem and value, and therefore it must be struck down (Kant, *ibid.*, 78). Likewise, for Murdoch, loving attention engages the agent in a humbling checking procedure (Murdoch, 320). Mutual recognition emerges from an act of humility by which one curbs one's selfish tendencies (Murdoch, 373). Neither respect nor loving attention is a conative attitude; rather, they are practical. Respect is the ground for maxims of action, but it is also cast as reverence for the law, and may consist in the mere contemplation of a moral world (Kant, *Virtue*, 397). It requires us to be perceptive of their needs and qualities, and capable of acting on that perception. Thus, respect (like loving attention) is a way of looking at and attending to others, not being distracted by our own selfish tendencies. In this sense, moral progress resides in not overestimating our own interests, needs, and viewpoints. As we become less self-absorbed, we grow more attentive, perceptive of and sensitive to the claims that others have on us.

To some extent, Murdoch is aware of the similarity between loving gaze and Kant's respect.⁴³ She describes love as a kind of respect: 'Love is this imaginative recognition of, that is respect for, this otherness' (Murdoch, 216). She notices that in the experience of respect (*Achtung*), 'dismay at frailty of the will is combined with an inspiring awareness of the reality which the will is drawn by (despair at the sensuous will, joy in the rational will)' (Murdoch, 331). Likewise, love is both exhilarating and painful,⁴⁴ an exercise of imagination directed to overcoming one's self; and she remarks: 'It is very like *Achtung*. Kant was marvelously near the mark' (Murdoch, 216). Nevertheless, she continues to hold that her conception of love expresses a conception of moral agency different from Kant's respect. This is what I deny. Not only do respect and loving attention work likewise and exhibit a similar phenomenology, they also rest on a common conception of moral deliberation.

43 In fact, Murdoch is more aware of this similarity than contemporary readers are; compare L. Blum, 'Iris Murdoch and the Domain of the Moral,' *Philosophical Studies* 50 (1986) 343-67 and L. Blum, 'Moral Perception.'

44 'The exercise of overcoming one's self, of the expulsion of fantasy and convention, which attends for example the reading of *King Lear* is indeed exhilarating. It is also, if we do it properly which we hardly ever do, painful' (Murdoch, 216).

As I have shown in section IV, Kant accounts for moral change as the result of an internal struggle, and gives voice to the agent's moral life through the language of maxims and ends. Murdoch's objection here is that his representation is inadequate. On her view, Kantian agency is marked by a 'non-tragic' conception of freedom, which allegedly assumes that we would all agree about moral matters, if we were not faced with our limitations and hindrances. Supposedly, Kant focuses on humans' shortcomings, and makes the moral ideal a trivial achievement:

But he [Kant] thought of freedom as the aspiration to a universal order consisting of a prefabricated harmony. It was not tragic freedom. The tragic freedom implied by love is this: that we all have an indefinitely extended capacity to imagine the being of others. Tragic, because there is no prefabricated harmony, and others are, to an extent we never cease discovering, different from ourselves. (Murdoch, 216)

Tragic is 'the attempt to overcome the defeat which human beings suffer in the practical world' (Murdoch, 220). In this sense, tragic is for Murdoch a view that proposes a moral ideal of self-representation for individuals. Her dissatisfaction concerns Kant's conception of freedom as consisting in a sequence of single acts of resolutions, sudden decisions of the giddy will (Murdoch, 328). Her views that moral achievement is slow and patient, progressive and yet susceptible to backsliding, both exulting and painful, consisting in particular and continuous acts of attention are proposed as the preferable alternative (Murdoch, 329-34). However, this alternative is nothing but a rewording of Kant's conception of virtue. My contention is that once we unfold Kant's conception of virtue, it becomes apparent that respect and loving attention express the same conception of moral agency.

Even if we admitted, for the sake of the argument, that pure wills enjoy a prefabricated harmony, this claim would be certainly incorrect about us, animals endowed with reason. For us, freedom takes the form of virtue, that is, of a sustained effort (*Bestrebung*) to live up the moral ideal. Kant recurrently remarks that for finite and sensitive beings the experience of the moral law presupposes a conflict and an internal obstacle (*inneres Hindernis*), and involves sacrifice and self-containment (*Selbstzwang*). Because we are finite and sensible beings, morality is adopted through ends and thus through the gradual progression of virtue.⁴⁵ This commits the agent to endure the competition between moral and non-moral ends. Non-moral ends should be completely sub-

45 See R. Louden, 'Kant's Virtue Ethics,' *Philosophy* 61 (1986) 473-89; O. O'Neill, 'Kant After Virtue,' *Inquiry* 26 (1983) 387-405; O. O'Neill, 'Kant's Virtues'; A. Wood, 'Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy,' *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 36 (1997) 1-21.

ordinated to morality, but this subordination is not reached once and for all because we have a natural propensity to evil. To make a firm resolution to pursue the purity of the will is therefore a necessary condition of virtue, but does not yet make us virtuous. To be virtuous is to be able to adopt moral maxims in time, and this requires continuous and particular efforts of self-control and self-education:

One may indeed say that man is obligated to be virtuous (to have moral strength). For although the capacity (*facultas*) to overcome all opposing sensible impulses can and must be presupposed on behalf of freedom, yet this capacity as strength (*robur*) is something that must be acquired by upholding the moral incentive (the representation of the law) both through contemplating the dignity of the pure law of reason within us and at the same time through exercise (*exercitio*). (Kant, *Virtue*, 397)

The practice of virtue takes place in time, and concerns particular acts of will. Since imperfect beings are required to practice self-constraint and contemplate the moral law, for them freedom is neither sudden nor easy. Most importantly, freedom is not only a precondition to morality (as *facultas*), but also a moral achievement (as *robur*).⁴⁶ We may say that on Kant's view, imperfect beings reach freedom by being virtuous. For them, freedom is the practice of virtue.

It seems to me that Kant's conception of freedom as virtue, and virtue as committing the agent to endure a struggle with herself, is a tragic view in the very same sense in which love is tragic for Murdoch. The experience of morality for finite and embodied agents matches the tragic picture of 'human spirit mourning and yet exulting in its strength' (Murdoch, 220). In fact, Murdoch happens to lean over this tragic feature of Kant's account exactly when she attacks its foundation:

I do not agree that only practical love can be commanded, and I cannot think why Kant, who attributes such majesty to the human soul, should hold that any aversion was strictly "unconquerable." Pathological love can be commanded too, and indeed if love is a purification of the imagination, must be commanded. (Murdoch, 219-20)

Murdoch here rejects the very distinction between pathological and practical feelings. Her aim is to stress that even the emotion occasioned by the concrete presence of a person is moral, rather than by a mere idea of reason. She regards Kant's distinction as based on a rather bleak picture of humanity driven by uncontrollable and ineradicable forces.

⁴⁶ Freedom is itself a moral concept, not just the precondition of morality (Murdoch, 330). Murdoch conceives freedom as a moral achievement, that is, the achievement of a purified vision (Murdoch, 354). This is exactly what I take Kant to hold.

To claim that even pathological feelings can be commanded is to say that emotions should not be regarded as insuperable obstacles to morality. To the extent that they are subject to moral deliberation and result from the purification of the imagination, they constitute modes of moral discernment.

However, Kant's distinction between pathological and practical feelings is meant to make room exactly for the conception of moral sensibility toward which Murdoch gestures. Kant does not hold that emotions are unconquerable hindrances to morality, although he regards them as original and thus inextirpable. What makes them into obstructions to morality is our capacity to undertake them as motives regardless of moral constraints.⁴⁷ The point of the distinction is to press the idea that sensibility is a form of moral discernment when it is reflective and deliberate.⁴⁸ In this sense, one cannot consistently hold both that love is the purification of imagination and that it is pathological. To conceive of love as a purification of imagination is already to grant it a practical status: it is not an unreflective emotion, a mere reaction to stimuli, but a deliberate attitude, which results from the enduring effort to humiliate our arrogance and vanity.

My conclusion is that Kant and Murdoch share the same view about moral sensibility and agency. Their insight is that moral philosophy addresses animals endowed with reason, and is concerned with offering a moral ideal of self-representation that can be a source of inspiration for them. By endorsing the moral ideal of self-representation, they become less vulnerable to their selfishness, more appreciative of others and disposed to act in concert: they relate to each other respectfully or attentively. Their attitude is concerned and considerate, humble, and mindful.

In emphasizing the structural similarities between respect and loving attention, I want to contrast the current tendency to simplify the relation between Murdoch's and Kant's ethics as if it were one of mere opposition (Blum, 'Iris Murdoch' and 'Moral Perception'). However, it might be objected that my argument has robbed us of a significant alternative perspective about moral agency, and thereby contributed to the impoverishment of our moral vocabulary that Murdoch blames. My point is that Murdoch's view of deliberation is not a genuine alternative to

47 Differently from the Stoics, Kant believes that the source of evil resides in our ranking of maxims, not in the inclinations. They are neither good nor bad, although they represent a constant *source* of obstacles to morality. This is not to say, however, that inclinations or emotions are unconquerable forces.

48 As I explain in the next section, love and respect are deliberate in different senses.

Kant's, and thus I do not have deprived us of an alternative option but disposed of a false one. In the next and final section, I will show that in fact my argument allows us to restore another moral concept for valuing others to our moral vocabulary.

VII Respect and Love

I have established that respect and loving attention are both perceptions of boundaries between different units of agency, and to this extent, they are essential to express the value of mutual recognition. The question remains whether respect is indeed the only moral attitude appropriate toward persons. Murdoch's account of love as loving attention blurs an important distinction between two moral concepts that Kant keeps apart: love and respect. My suggestion is that we can regain a richer moral vocabulary for valuing others by revisiting Kant's account of moral sensibility.⁴⁹

It is generally agreed that for Kant respect is the only moral attitude of mutual recognition insofar as it is based on the dichotomy in value.⁵⁰ However, Kant's dichotomy of value does not correspond to a dichotomous way of subjectively valuing people. In fact, Kant provides us with a complicated account of the phenomenology of mutual recognition.⁵¹ To begin with, Kant often deploys the concept of humiliation to illustrate the phenomenology of respect. Recognizing the claims of others is a humbling exercise.⁵² Humility is praised as a way of accepting, perceiving and respecting the dignity of others, and therefore it has a legitimate claim to enter the vocabulary of mutual recognition. Since this phenome-

49 Murdoch warns us: 'We need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by philosophers, can once again be made central' (Murdoch, 337).

50 For example, Anderson writes: 'We can see that Kantian ethics is hampered by the fact that it recognizes only two ways of valuing things, use and respect. These two modes of evaluations are not enough to account for the richness of our experience of value and our practices' (Elizabeth Anderson, *Value in Ethics and Economics* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1993], 9).

51 It is fair to say that through his account of respect, Kant provides us with an aesthetic of pure practical reason, that is, a phenomenological investigation of the array of moral attitudes that constitute the experience of morality, ranging from humility to self-esteem, from frustration to self-contentment, from humiliation to elevation.

52 'If anything checks our self-conceit in our judgment, it humiliates' (Kant, *Practical Reason*, 75; see also Kant, *ibid.*, 78-9).

non has been discussed as a component of respect and is so akin to loving attention, I will not dwell on it any longer.

Kant pairs respect for persons with love of mankind, as attitudes that have humanity as their object. They are both moral feelings and to this extent, they govern the configuration of the will and are reflective or deliberate.⁵³ However, they are deliberate in two distinct senses. Respect is deliberate in the sense that it is the essential mark of rational agency, but not in the sense that it is the result of a process of moral deliberation. Respect functions as constraint on deliberation, and attends the critical survey of the agent's subjective maxims. It makes moral deliberation possible, but it is not itself the product of deliberation: it originates in the representation of the moral law and is the expression of undertaking the moral ideal. Kant consistently insists on these features throughout his writings.

Love as a moral feeling appears as one of the four sensitive basic concepts in the *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*. Like the other sensitive basic concepts, love is cardinal to moral agency; without these concepts, we would be 'morally dead,' that is, unsusceptible to morality (Kant, *Virtue*, 400). As Kant explains love, it seems that a pathological sensibility is necessary to have moral sensibility (Kant, *ibid.*, 453, 457). Our natural susceptibility to rejoice with others or to feel pity for them is a sort of contagious inclination, whose basis is sensitive, thus not free (*communio illiberalis, servilis*). However, to make use of such susceptibility for furthering active and rational benevolence is dutiful (Kant, *ibid.*, 457). This genuine compassion is grounded on our natural inclination to sympathize with others, but it is deliberate, and thus counts as a moral activity (*communio sentiendi liberalis*).

No form of moral feelings is conative in the sense in which pathological feelings can be, that is, as compelling drives. Love ought to be distinguished from unreflective and unconstrained forms of attachment, but its phenomenology is different from respect. The case that shows best this difference is Kant's discussion of friendship. Genuine friendship consists in a delicate and rare balance of love and respect, where 'love can be regarded as attracting and respect as repelling; and if the principle

53 Velleman argues that love is very much like respect; his purpose is to re-establish love as a moral emotion. Frankfurt objects that Kant is wrong in considering love as adventitious, and protests that it is instead a configuration of the will, that is, neither affective nor conative, but volitional (see Frankfurt, 132, 135). These philosophers address and criticize Kant's account of love as a pathological emotion, but their proposals do not constitute a genuine alternative to Kant's account of love as a moral emotion.

of the first bids an approach, that of the second demands that friend halt at suitable distance from one another,' (Kant, *Virtue*, 470). While love is the source of attraction,⁵⁴ respect brings concern with keeping at a distance; it is the experience of limitation, of a boundary not to be trespassed. If intimacy is the loss of perception of boundaries, then respect is a constraint on intimacy. But it is not a constraint on openness toward one another. On the contrary, Kant emphasizes that when friendship is regulated by respect, it 'is the complete confidence of two persons in the mutual openness of their private judgments and sensations' (Kant, *Virtue*, 471). Friends share the same projects, and depend on each other for the fulfillment of their ends. This mutual dependence is grounded in reciprocity, which pertains both to love and respect.⁵⁵ More generally, as a moral maxim, love grounds actions of benevolence. Recognizing the dignity of others requires that we appreciate their rationality, and the rationality of their ends. On some occasions, this requires that we help them in the pursuit of their ends: this is a form of love of humanity.

To be sure, Murdoch and Murdochians would object that this kind of love has little to do with people, but (like respect) it has to do 'with rationality in their breasts' (Murdoch, 215). Not surprisingly, my rejoinder is that this objection fails against Kant's account of love for the same reasons why it fails against Kant's account of respect.

The difference between love and respect is reflected in the nature of duties that they respectively ground. The duty of respect is merely negative; it amounts to a duty to have one's self-esteem constrained by the acknowledgment of the dignity of others. It is thus to be regarded as a strict duty, contrary to duties of love, which are broad.⁵⁶ Despite the

54 Practical love may require distance. You may realize that your friend needs to concentrate on her work tonight, that your presence is distracting, and so out of love you keep at a distance. But this is to say that distance is commanded by practical love, not that practical love is the perception of distance (as respect is).

55 Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, L. Infeld, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett 1980), 202-3. That on Kant's view friendship requires maximum reciprocity of love is rarely noticed; an exception is Korsgaard, *Self-Constitution: Locke Lectures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002).

56 I leave aside the analysis of these claims since I am concerned here with love and respect as moral attitudes, not as grounds for duties; see Wood, 'Final Form.' Dillon makes a similar move in her response to the objection that the concept of respect does not tell us precisely what we ought to do: 'The concept of respect does not contain the resources for telling us *how* to treat persons; its function is rather to keep in the forefront of moral consciousness the attitude of valuing persons for their own sake and so to remind us *why* we should treat persons as morality obliges us to treat them' (114 n14).

difference in their phenomenology (and in the kinds of duties that they generate), Kant remarks that love and respect are generally present together. In the second part of the *Elements of Ethics*, dedicated to duties of love to others, we read:

Love and respect are the feelings which accompany the exercise of these duties toward others. These feelings can be considered separately (each on itself), and they can also exist separately, (love for one's neighbor, though he deserve little respect: also necessary respect for any man although he be judged hardly worthy of love). But they are basically, according to the law, always combined in one duty, although in such a way that sometimes one duty is joined as accessory. (Kant, *Virtue*, 448)⁵⁷

Although love and respect differ in the way they ground the duties, and each of them suffices as a motive for duty, they generally occur together. They work as concurrent attitudes, present together in the mind of the moral agent, who is therefore loving and attentive to others, respectful and caring. If the motive of action is respect, and love is an accessory,⁵⁸ we may say that the agent acts out of a loving attention. If the motive of action is love and respect is an accessory, the compound attitude is a kind of reverential love.

Kant's claim that there are different subjective modes of valuing and appreciating others has two important effects that are not registered in current debates. First, it implies that as an attitude due to persons, respect has a limited scope of competence. For this reason respect alone does not (and was not intended to) represent a complete normative model for personal relations: It can only serve as a ground for such relations (in so far as it is the ground for any moral activity). Second, it implies that there are a variety of modes of appreciating and valuing people, which may interact in several ways by informing different maxims and ground different courses of actions, therefore complicating our picture of the experience of morality and mutual recognition.

57 In this passage, Kant appears to be using two different concepts of respect. See Baron, 34-5; S. Darwall, 'Two Kinds of Respect,' *Ethics* 88 (1977) 36-49. I am solely interested in the standard sense, according to which respect is based on the dignity of the persons, and therefore everybody deserves it (independently of personal merit, role or office).

58 The term 'accessory' shows that Kant is not offering an account of over-determination. He is not arguing that a duty can be based on two sufficient grounds, but that there might be more than one ground for a duty, only one of which is sufficient, the other being an accessory.

VIII Conclusion

Murdoch claims that because of a generalized endorsement of Kant's conception of agency, contemporary philosophy has lost (or disposed of) the moral vocabulary for expressing the complexity of moral life and mutual recognition.⁵⁹ Contrary to Murdoch, I have argued that to repossess the conceptual ability to appreciate and value mutual recognition in all its forms, we are better off reclaiming Kant's conception of moral sensibility, agency, and deliberation.

Received: February 2001

Revised: November 2002

Revised: May 2003

59 Murdoch, 132; see also 68, 102-103, 267-268, 311, 339, 345, 368, 385. It can be remarked that Murdoch attacks Kant mainly as the source of Liberal morality. Although her critique of Kant's conception of agency may be extended to Liberal models of morality, it would be a mistake to focus on her critique as directed simply to Liberal morality. In fact, she often insists that the influence of Kant's conception of agency is much more pervasive, see Murdoch, 68-70. 'What haunts us is Kant' (Murdoch, 132). On the implications of Murdoch's diagnosis of this loss of moral concepts, see C. Diamond, 'Losing Your Concepts,' *Ethics* 98 (1988) 255-77.

