

## *Hume, a Scottish Socrates?*

### Critical Notice

TERENCE PENELHUM, *Themes in Hume: The Self, The Will, Religion*.  
Oxford: Clarendon 2000. Pp. xix + 294.

Most of Terence Penelhum's essays collected in his *Themes in Hume*<sup>1</sup> are already recognized as classics in Hume scholarship. Bringing them together only reinforces their strengths: clarity and sensitivity in exposition combined with charity and acuity in criticism. Penelhum wrote them over a course of almost fifty years, and we can see in them the evolution in his attitude towards Hume. In the earliest essay — the 1955 'Hume on Personal Identity' — Penelhum offers a quick and local diagnosis of Hume's errors: he has mistakenly assumed that an object must be unchanging for it to be identical through time. But in the later essays, especially the three new ones, Penelhum recognizes that his earlier local insights must be balanced by a wider reading of Hume. After all, he does not, for example, talk about the self only to say that it is a bundle of perceptions; it is also crucial to his treatment of the passions, especially the indirect, person-oriented passions (pride, humility, love, and hatred), and is an essential component in his explanation of sympathy, the ultimate source of our moral judgments. Moreover, as Penelhum notes, seeing the self as constituted out of its perceptions, rather than standing over them so as to judge their legitimacy as guides to action or knowledge, is what allows Hume to attempt a 'science of man' — a quasi-Newtonian project of discovering the principles governing the perceptions in the mind-bundle (102-3, 151).

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1 There are thirteen in total, three of which have not previously appeared elsewhere.

So Penelhum has come to see that Hume must be read as a *systematic* philosopher. Along with a few others (notably Páll Ardál and Annette Baier<sup>2</sup>), Penelhum has been the leader in turning us from the tendency to read in isolation only those bits of text that supported whatever picture of Hume we favored (Hume the proto-positivist, Hume the reducer of empiricism to skeptical absurdity, Hume the non-cognitivist about morals), to the more fruitful practice of looking at the complexities of his attempt to account for what he calls our *common life* — our cognitive capacities, our emotional lives, and our social and moral practices. Penelhum concludes from his systematic reading of Hume that he should be seen as a Socratic philosopher (vii, 129, 159, 223, 272).<sup>3</sup>

Although Penelhum develops this Socratic suggestion in a little less detail than one might like — it is not the focus of any the essays collected here — it is a motif that appears in many of them. The general idea seems to run as follows. Socrates thought that we all face the question of how to live well, and that an answer to it requires us to philosophize. For in order to be happy, we must acquire virtue, and virtue involves a kind of knowledge that can only be reached by philosophizing. This view makes philosophy *continuous* with our concerns of everyday life in that what we care most about requires each of us to wrestle with some of the deepest problems of philosophy. So, in calling Hume a Socratic philosopher, Penelhum must mean that he too thinks that philosophy is continuous with our concerns of everyday life. Hume's project of uncovering the laws governing our minds is a way of making peace with our nature, and thus coming to have a happy life. As Penelhum puts it: '[Hume] is in the Socratic traditions because he sees philosophy as a source of liberating self-knowledge' (vii; see also 159); '[he] believes that in order to avoid being plagued by anxiety, we must achieve self-knowledge' (129).

In §§II-III, below, I will look directly at these claims, first by considering some of Penelhum's comments on Hume's two treatments of the self and the relation between them, and then by examining what the effects

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2 Páll S. Ardál, *Passion and Value in Hume's Treatise*, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 1989); Annette Baier, *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1991)

3 Penelhum is clear that by 'Socratic' he means the Hellenistic Socrates, not Plato's version of him (vii, 8, 154, 272). But both the earlier and later portrayals of Socrates share a view of him in which our active confrontation with our nature is necessary for living well — even if, as the Pyrrhonists hold, we must engage in this confrontation only to recognize the impossibility of reaching a proper conclusion. (I owe thanks to Doug Hutchinson for some very helpful conversations on this point.)

of self-knowledge would be in each case. But before I examine Penelhum's Socratic claims directly, I will raise some doubts about them indirectly, by considering in §I his criticism of Hume's leveling of the moral worth of talents and virtues. My suggestion will be that Hume's position stems from his rejecting the Socratic idea that philosophy should guide us in our practical endeavors. In fact, for Hume, the best life might well be an unexamined life. This is not to say that philosophy has nothing to offer us. But its role is primarily descriptive, not practical. And, while discovering how our minds work might prove useful to us in our everyday pursuits, my view is that Hume thinks that turning to philosophy in this way is wholly optional. Indeed, it is a dangerous option, since he also thinks that philosophy contains within it certain temptations that, if pursued, can be destructive.

## I Virtues and Natural Abilities

Hume famously endorses the compatibilist position on the will, in that he holds both that all of our behavior is the result of prior natural causes, and that this conclusion does not make a difference to our moral practices. In both of the essays discussing this 'theme in Hume,' Penelhum worries that Hume is mistaken to think his determinism does not distort our moral practices, particularly when he draws the conclusion that the voluntariness of behavior is irrelevant to its moral salience, so long as it springs from mental as opposed to physical causes. This would mean — as Hume openly admits<sup>4</sup> — that there is no difference in kind between virtues, such as generosity, justice, or temperance, and natural abilities or talents, such as intelligence, good nature, patience, or even musical talent.

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4 *A Treatise of Human Nature*, David F. Norton and Mary J. Norton, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000); and *A Treatise of Human Nature*, L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed.; 2nd ed., P.H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978), Book 3, Part 3, Sections 4-5. Hereafter I will refer to the *Treatise* parenthetically as 'T' followed by Book, Part, Section and paragraph numbers as given in the Norton and Norton edition, followed by 'SBN' and the page number as given in the Selby-Bigge and Nidditch edition.

See also Appendix 4 of *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, in *Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed.; 3rd ed., P.H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1975); and *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals: A Critical Edition*, Tom Beauchamp, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2000).

Penelhum raises three objections to this view. First, he suggests that Hume has overlooked the way in which we treat virtues and talents differently: 'Natural abilities can be exercised both well and badly by those who have them, whereas virtue cannot. Wit, grace, or physical beauty, can be used to make cruel jokes, entrap innocent victims, or distract attention from evil purposes, and when these things happen the resulting actions are vicious not virtuous. No one can similarly misuse his or her own virtues' (175, see also 148). Second, Penelhum raises a more general problem for Hume's view that durable dispositions — character traits or talents — are the focus of our moral evaluations, worrying that this downplays the significance both of our displaying the regularities in behavior that signify the presence of a character trait, and of our capacity to break from such regularities by acting out of character. Penelhum writes:

I submit that we cannot make sense of this dual fact, that both regular and irregular good acts may be praised, without introducing the libertarian judgment that what makes both the predictability and the surprisingness praiseworthy is the fact that in either case the agent has had the power to act otherwise, and that when the virtue is manifested that power has not been exercised, and when a good but unexpected action has been done, it has been. A virtue is a regular disposition to perform good actions that one might well not perform. Hume thinks that the notion of an unexercised power is without foundation; but it is essential to the concept of virtue. I believe, therefore, that Hume's views on freedom do not allow for a fundamental condition of the very moral evaluations he is at such pains to describe. (176)

Third, Penelhum worries that it is *unfair* to blame someone for behavior that she has no control over; similarly, he suggests that a precondition for moral praise is the possibility that the agent could have done otherwise (148, 176).<sup>5</sup>

Penelhum, in these objections, means to be making an internal criticism: Hume has failed in his attempt to capture our 'common moral judgments and distinctions' (174). I will address these objections in turn, suggesting that there are important elements in our ethical practices that would allow Hume to defend himself against Penelhum. But I do think that his criticisms would hit their target if Hume's project were Socratic; thus the response I present on Hume's behalf will help us to see how his philosophy, though systematic, is best understood to embody a different overall orientation from the one Penelhum finds there.

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5 See James Fieser, 'Hume's Wide View of the Virtues: An Analysis of his Early Critics,' *Hume Studies* 24 (1998) 295-311, for a discussion of how Hume's contemporaries responded to Hume's leveling of virtues and natural abilities, often for reasons quite similar to those Penelhum provides.

The argument-from-misuse against the moral worth of talents and natural abilities has a long heritage, going back at least as far as the Socratic version found in Plato's *Euthydemus*,<sup>6</sup> but the most famous presentation of it must be Kant's in the first Section of the *Grundlegung* where he argues that a good will is the only good without qualification because other putative goods, including talents and abilities ('gifts of nature'), are subject to possible misuse.<sup>7</sup> The argument has at least two components: first, that talents are open to use or abuse by their possessors, while virtues are not; and second, that the misuse of a talent disqualifies it from being an unqualified object of praise. Both components are open to doubt.

For in what sense does someone *use* her talent? Surely a talented person can *manifest* a talent without *using* it, for 'use' connotes the adoption of a self-conscious attitude towards it, combined with a deliberate plan to do something with it. Consider a woman with natural musical ability. She would *manifest* this talent by playing a tune on the piano after having heard it only once before, or by spontaneously singing the harmonies to the national anthem. Of course, she could also *use* her talent by, say, pursuing a career as a pianist. She would first have to develop it through extensive training, and she then would have to work hard to find an audience for her performances. So she could show such virtues as diligence and self-discipline in her use of her talent, or she might instead be lazy or complacent if she did not put the necessary hard work into her career.

As I see it, Hume's point is that we would take a disinterested pleasure in this woman's musical talent whether or not she self-consciously decided to use it. The spontaneous displays of musicality that spring from the talent are immediately agreeable. If she does try to develop her talent, we can make further assessments of how she goes about it. We could praise her industriousness or condemn her sloth, but in either case it seems to me that we still take pleasure in the mere fact of her talent. Even if she uses her talent for evil ends — playing charity concerts for a racist organization — we still admire her talent (think of our attitude towards Leni Riefenstahl). In contrast, were someone who is not talented to work just as hard at his musical career as the industrious version of our talented musician, we would no longer find his hard work admira-

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6 279e-281e. Penelhum (148, 175) points to Aquinas's formulation of it at *Summa Theologiae*, Ia-IIae, q. 55, 4.

7 *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, 3rd ed., James W. Ellington, trans. (Indianapolis: Hackett 1993); see 393-4 in the *Akademie* edition.

ble, instead feeling that he was wasting his time (Hume would say that it is vicious, in that it is in this case harmful to himself). So unlike Penelhum, I think there is something in a talent that pleases us, regardless of how it is used; and when it is self-consciously used, rather than merely manifested, the manner of its use is an object of a *separate* evaluation, not a qualification of the initial approval.

Moreover, I think that the same thing holds true of the standard virtues, such as generosity. Recall that Hume thinks that natural virtues are spontaneously manifested in their possessor's behavior (T 3.2.1). The generous person is just doing what comes naturally when he volunteers his time at the homeless shelter, helps his neighbor with her gardening, contributes a bit more than everyone else to the departmental gift for a departing secretary. Penelhum, in his second criticism of Hume's compatibilism, worries that this conception of natural virtue underestimates the significance of our acting in character and of our capacity to act out of character. But for Hume acting in character is not something that we set out to *do*: it is something that *happens*, that our behavior cannot but *manifest*. It is a brute fact about human life that we find patterns in one another's actions, reactions, emotions, and the like, even while the person in question might be ignorant of what these patterns are. I take Hume here to have had an insight into a feature of the phenomenology of social interaction that is often overlooked. Most moral philosophers tend to focus on the reasons that agents should recognize in their deliberations about *action*, to the exclusion of a consideration of how our moral *reactions* to one another are keyed to patterns of behavior that go well beyond our deliberate choices.

Now Hume does not deny that we are, on occasion, deliberating agents. And this is what stands behind the capacity to act out of character. But if someone's uncharacteristic action does not fall into *some* kind of pattern with the rest of the behavior she displays, I think Hume might be right that we do not take that action to make a difference to how we understand her, for it would be wholly disconnected from her (T 2.3.2.6-7, SBN 411-12). (What gets tricky is that sometimes a single action can by itself constitute a notable pattern of behavior, if it is of the right sort — say, the hero's rushing into the chilly water in order to save the drowning child.) Most of what gets called uncharacteristic action, however, is not like this; rather it is something that draws our attention to patterns of behavior by the person in question that we had not previously noticed. The person we thought was generous turns out to have been vain all along, in that her spiteful comments about the winner of the good-citizenship award all of a sudden makes her volunteering appear to us in a new light.

In presenting his version of the argument-from-misuse, Penelhum suggests that a virtue, unlike a talent, could not be misused. But on

Hume's conception of natural virtue as unreflective spontaneous behavior, the generous person could, like the musically talented woman, become self-conscious about his virtue, and decide to use it in a particular manner. He might decide to restrict his activities to those relating to a favored worthy cause (the homeless) or to a cause less worthy (his crime family). And I think that just as we approve of the naturally musical despite how they use their talent (if they do decide to *use* it), so also we approve of generous people's generosity, even if they use it for bad ends. We can even approve of the gangster's generosity to his mother and to his fellow criminals at the same time as condemning him for his injustice. Compare Hume's comment in the *Treatise* where he says that someone could be benevolent and unjust, or a just miser (3.2.2.22, SBN 479). And consider especially the complex character-trait descriptions in his *History of England*, where Hume shows himself to be more than willing to ascribe to people complex sets of traits and talents, some of which we laud, others of which we condemn.<sup>8</sup>

All of this is to say that Hume, unlike Socrates, does not subscribe to the unity-of-the-virtues thesis. As he says in the *History* when describing Charles I: 'The character of this prince, as that of most men, if not all men, was mixed; but his virtues predominated extremely above his vices.'<sup>9</sup> Socrates, in contrast, argues that in order to do an act of, say, generosity, we must know that it is not at the same time also unjust, or intemperate, or cowardly, and so on. So doing something that manifests one virtue requires that an agent have a grasp of all the virtues.<sup>10</sup> Note then that Socrates, like so many philosophers who came after him, supposes that a philosophical analysis of morality should take an agent's self-conscious deliberations about what to do as its starting point. And this is what allows him to make philosophy continuous with the concerns of everyday life. A proper account of virtue will summarize the knowledge the virtuous person has of what all the virtues require. Given our own desire to live well, we should strive to acquire this knowledge for ourselves, to acquire the account of virtue that philosophy is in the business of formulating.

I have suggested that Hume's rejection of the unity-of-the-virtues thesis comes from his putting the spontaneous, unselfconscious behavior that we manifest when doing what comes naturally at the center of

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8 See Richard Dees, 'Hume on the Characters of Virtue,' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35 (1997) 45-64.

9 *History of England* (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics 1983), Vol. 5, Ch. 59, 542

10 *Laches* 198b-199d and elsewhere.

his analysis of morality. The generous person need not know that he is being generous (or even that he is acting well) when he helps his neighbor, just as the musical person need not know that she is musical when she sings well. Living virtuously need not involve living reflectively. And this means that Hume's account of virtue cannot have the Socratic aim of helping the *agent* in her attempt to live well; instead, it takes the *spectator's* evaluations of people's unselfconscious behavior as its primary explanandum.

Even here Hume does not see the spectator as needing philosophical help in order to be successful in her moral evaluations. After all, Humean moral evaluations are impressions — passive events in us, not verdicts reached as a result of self-conscious deliberation. It is true that Hume does tell us what procedures to follow in order to feel a moral sentiment rather than a prejudiced one: We are to consider the trait being evaluated 'in general,' without reference to our self-interest (T 3.1.2.4, SBN 472), and to correct for distortions brought on by our distance from the person whose trait we are evaluating (T 3.3.1.15, SBN 581-2). And he does offer us summary rules about what sorts of mental qualities will please or displease us when considered in the appropriate way. But those four categories — qualities useful or agreeable to the trait's possessor or to those who surround her (T 3.3.1) — offer little help to the spectator as he tries to decide what to make of the person he is evaluating. Agreeableness is in the eye of the beholder, and even the useful is determined by what pleases the trait's possessor or some larger social group. That is to say that we have to appeal ultimately to our feelings, not to a philosophical account of virtue, in order to reach a moral verdict.<sup>11</sup> So where Socrates sees moral philosophy through the eyes of a 'moralist,' Hume sees it through the eyes of a moral 'anatomist' (T 3.3.6.6, SBN 621). The job of the philosopher is not to help us to reach moral conclusions, but rather to understand how morality springs from our nature.

The third reason that Penelhum wants to reject Hume's leveling of talents and virtues is that it seems unfair to blame someone for being tone-deaf, or to praise her for her intelligence, given that she cannot help it either way. But, since virtues are supposed to be more voluntary than talents, it is appropriate to hold people responsible for their virtues, for their choices were what contributed to their condition. Hume, I think, rejects this intuition because he works with a different notion of responsibility than we find in the objection. In evaluating someone, we are not

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11 It is because of the non-prescriptive element of his theory that when Hume does turn to critique — say, when he rejects the monkish virtues in Part 1 of the 'Conclusion' to the second *Enquiry* — the arguments come across so poorly.

trying to come up with an ultimate verdict on the person in question, one that will determine his or her future in jail or at large, in heaven or hell. Instead Hume takes moral evaluation to be the everyday way we make sense of people in all the complex situations where we encounter one another.<sup>12</sup> And we do hold people responsible for their being boring when we try to avoid them at dinner parties; we do hold people responsible for their musical talents when we prefer not to stand beside them while singing the national anthem; we do hold people responsible for their intelligence when we hire them for academic positions. Hume's point is that these judgments are not different in kind from our more overtly moral judgments. For when we condemn someone's stinginess, we might still welcome him as an intellectual interlocutor or be willing to have him care for our children while we are out of town. My suggestion, then, is that Hume holds as ethically significant all the ways we make sense of one another as being particular kinds of persons on the basis of our notable patterns of behavior (where this includes both our actions and reactions).<sup>13</sup>

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12 See Hume's description of the 'ultimate test of merit and virtue': '[When] we enumerate the good qualities of any person, we always mention those parts of his character, which render him a safe companion, an easy friend, a gentle master, an agreeable husband, or an indulgent father. We consider him with all his relations in society; and love or hate him, according as he affects those, who have any immediate intercourse with him. And 'tis a most certain rule, that if there be no relation of life, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect' (T 3.3.3.9, SBN 606).

13 Such 'making sense' would have to be disinterested, or it would not qualify as an attempt to make sense of who someone is — it would instead count as an attempt to make sense of what impact someone has on us.

It might seem that Hume will have difficulty accounting for our capacity to recognize persons as falling into kinds. But I have argued elsewhere ('Scepticism about Persons in Book II of Hume's *Treatise*,' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 37 [1999] 469-92) that the philosophical rationale for Hume's lengthy discussion of the indirect passions in Book 2 of the *Treatise* is to account for how people are defined as who they are on the basis of only some of their many characteristics. The problem, I suggested, is that just as the connection between a cause and an effect is not rationally discernible, so also the connection between a person and the features that define her is not rationally discernible. And just as, in light of the former fact, Hume turns to an associative mechanism to explain our beliefs about causes and effects, so also, in light of the latter fact, he turns to an associative mechanism — in this case the indirect passions — to explain our beliefs about persons (see especially T 2.1.5.11, SBN 290). And just as Hume allows an attenuated version of objectivity to apply to causal judgments (T 1.3.15), so also he allows an attenuated version of objectivity to apply to our judgments about what makes a person into who she or he is (T 2.1.6.8-9,

My defense of Hume against Penelhum's criticisms has involved what is surely a controversial interpretation of our moral practices, one that is unlikely to convince those with Socratic (or Kantian) intuitions. Rather than emphasizing our capacity to live our lives according to a particular conception of the good, Hume emphasizes our conception of ourselves as people to whom our lives *happen*. The voluntariness of our behavior is not morally salient because voluntariness turns out not to differ much from nonvoluntariness. I think that Penelhum's criticisms of Hume's compatibilism stem ultimately from discomfort with this conception, and so they are not so much internal criticisms of Hume's project, as a rejection of that project itself (see 149).

## II The Self as Mind and the Passional Self

But even if Hume's moral philosophy is importantly anti-Socratic, Penelhum might still be entitled to his claim that Hume thinks that self-knowledge is a moral goal. To see whether this is the case will require that we first clarify how Hume understands the self, a task that Penelhum undertakes in the five essays grouped under this 'theme.' He points out there that Hume has two different accounts of the self. On the one hand, in his discussion of personal identity, he treats the self as a mind, and the mind as a 'bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement' (T 1.4.6.4, SBN 252). Famously, Hume holds that there is no unity to the mind-bundle at a time or through time except in so far as the imagination's associations lead us to believe in it. On the other hand, in the discussion of the person-oriented 'indirect passions' of pride, humility, love, and hatred, in Book 2 of the *Treatise*, Hume treats the self as an embodied person with a distinctive place in the social sphere. Penelhum then raises this question: To what extent does Book 2's discussion of the passional self presuppose the account of the self as mind from Book 1?

There is one obvious sense in which Hume clearly does in Book 2 presuppose the bundle view from Book 1. If the mind just is a bundle of perceptions, any description that the 'scientist of man' can give of the

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SBN 293-4). Thus I think that the linkage between the moral sentiments and the indirect passions, so notable throughout Book 3 of the *Treatise* (T 3.1.2.5, 3.3.1.3, 3.3.5.1; SBN 473, 575, 614; see also T 2.1.7.2, SBN 295), results from the fact that virtues and vices, talents and flaws, are the categories by which we divide people up in light of their mental qualities.

passions must consist only of the association of various perceptions, where association cannot be treated as anything other than the tendency of perceptions to display regularities in their appearances in the bundle. And so in the first two Parts of Book 2, Hume offers us the infamous ‘double relation of ideas and impressions’ as an explanation of the indirect passions. But is there any further presupposition, say at the level of mental *content*, so that we would all have to *think* of our minds as bundles of perceptions in order to experience pride or humility (the self-directed indirect passions)?

Penelhum suggests that there is. He is, of course, one of the first interpreters of Hume (perhaps the very first) to take seriously his distinction between the self ‘as it regards our thought or imagination’ — the bundle view of Book 1 — and the self ‘as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves’ — the self of Book 2 (T 1.4.6.5, SBN 253). Penelhum points out that the double relation involved in pride and humility requires both that the cause of the passion have a prior associative link with the idea of self (I have to think of something as *mine* in order to be proud of it) and that the idea of self be the ultimate focus of attention in our experience of the passion (I end up thinking of myself when I am proud of something). This means that Hume’s account of the indirect passions presupposes that we have an idea of self that exists prior to an occurrence of these passions. Penelhum concludes that he here relies on our having the idea of the self as a bundle of perceptions (63, 78, 92-4, 120-1).<sup>14</sup>

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14 Hume defines the idea of self that is the object of pride and humility as the idea of ‘that succession of ideas and impressions of which we have intimate memory and consciousness’ (T 2.1.2.2, SBN 278), and Penelhum assumes that this is an invocation of the bundle view from Book 1 (63, 120). There are four reasons why I think that this cannot be right. First, the self as mind includes *all* of our perceptions, not just those of which we have ‘intimate’ consciousness. Second, it would be strange to think that pride and humility make us think of ourselves as *minds*; instead, as Hume himself says, these passions make us ‘think of our own qualities and circumstances’ (T 2.1.5.6, SBN 287); they ‘cause us to form an idea of our merit and character’ (T 2.1.8.8, SBN 303). Third, in the ‘Appendix’ to the *Treatise*, Hume rejects his account of the self as mind developed in ‘Of personal identity’ (T 1.4.6); yet he does not seem to think that this rejection requires him to revisit the discussion of the indirect passions. And, fourth, as I go on to argue in what follows, I think that, for Hume, the idea of self as mind is an abstruse, philosophical idea, and thus in most cases will not be available to serve as the object of the passions. I take Hume’s definition at T 2.1.2 to indicate what goes on in the mind when the passions cause us to think of our defining ‘qualities and circumstances’: Some of our perceptions are made ‘intimate’ to us, in that the objects of these perceptions are taken to be important in making us who we are. See ‘Scepticism about Persons’ for a full defense of this suggestion.

While Penelhum is right that Hume presupposes a prior idea of self in explaining pride and humility, I do not think that the self from Book 1 will do the job. For, as Penelhum admits (49), what we get there is a rather rarefied view of the self, the self as *mind*. And, while Hume clearly holds that the minds of all of 'mankind' are bundles of perceptions (T 1.4.6.4, SBN 252), it does not follow from this that very many people have actually formulated an *idea* of their minds. Only those with a peculiar philosophical mindset will have made the introspective moves — the 'intimate entry' (T 1.4.6.3, SBN 252) into themselves — that would allow them to form the idea of their minds as bundles. As for the rest of us, Hume tells us that 'in common life 'tis evident these ["abstruse" and "metaphysical"] ideas of self and person are never very fix'd nor determinate' (T 1.4.2.6, SBN 189-90), thus making it clear that he thinks that it is a rare occurrence for the perceptual constitution of the mind to come into focus outside of philosophical contexts. We might, of course, think of our minds by thinking of our *experiences*, as happens when we remember *seeing* the Eiffel Tower, as opposed to simply remembering the Tower. And, while Hume understands the latter to involve only the presence in the bundle of a somewhat vivacious idea of the *Tower*, the former involves the presence of a somewhat vivacious idea of an *impression* (i.e. of the seeing) of the Tower (see T 1.3.8.15-17, SBN 105-6). Hume calls such higher-level ideas that have other perceptions as their objects *secondary ideas* (T 1.1.1.11, SBN 6), whether they arise spontaneously in everyday life or as a result of philosophical introspection. So he does allow that we sometimes come to recognize the perceptions that are the vehicles for our various kinds of awareness, even if we do not, outside of philosophical contexts, bring the whole mind in view as constituted out of perceptions.

But this means that the idea of self as mind developed in Hume's discussion of personal identity cannot play the role in the production of the indirect passions (via the double relation of ideas and impressions) that Penelhum proposes.<sup>15</sup> If most of us — the non-philosophers and the

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15 Penelhum also thinks that, since the unity of the mind is merely fictitious and since the actual unity of the mind is presupposed in an episode of the indirect passions, Hume should hold that all instances of these passions are 'unreasonable' in that they are 'founded on a false supposition' (T 2.3.3.7, SBN 416). And this means that, once we realize the falsity of our belief in mental unity, we should stop feeling the indirect passions at all, since '[the] moment we perceive the falshood of any supposition ... our passions yield to our reason without any opposition' (T 2.3.3.7, SBN 416). Of course, Hume also thinks that we do continue to believe in the unity of mind despite its falsity, and so we will continue to feel the indirect passions despite their unreasonableness (77). I find it notable, however, that Hume never seems tempted

philosophers who do not share Hume's approach — have not formulated the 'true idea of the human mind' (T 1.4.6.19, SBN 261) as a bundle of perceptions, how can it be associatively linked to the idea of that of which we are proud? And even the indeterminate idea of mind that arises spontaneously in common life will not help here. For in order to feel proud of something, I have to think of it as mine. This requires more than that it be linked with my intermittent grasp of myself as an experiencer; it needs to be connected up with my sense of who I am. Thus the only idea of self that could play a role in the production of pride or humility would be an idea of self that was the outcome of a *prior* episode of these passions. For example, it might be because I think of myself as importantly defined by my family history (through pride or humility in it, see T 2.1.11.14-18, SBN 322-3) that I think of my country as *mine*; and then my pleasure in my country can be transfused by the double relation into pride at myself. I will come not only to believe *that* I was born in Canada, but to think that *I am a Canadian* (or, more accurately, to acknowledge the role of the prior passion-mediated idea of self: *I, an Ainslie, am a Canadian*). For Hume, the indirect passions are a mechanism whereby our self-conceptions are revised, enriched, and deepened as we discover new kinds of value in ourselves and others find new things to value in us.

What of Penelhum's complaint that Hume's double relation presupposes a prior idea of self? If my suggestion is correct, the only prior idea that will serve is the outcome of a previous episode of pride or humility, and thus we seem to be on a regress. I have suggested elsewhere<sup>16</sup> that Hume takes such regresses in stride, in that his interest is in the economy of the mind as it is manifested by relatively mature humans, not in the development of that economy in infancy. Perhaps he fears that the evidence that would support empirical claims about infant development is too thin, allowing only for groundless speculation of the sort that he found in Malebranche's description of the experiences of a newborn as it travels down the birth canal: 'At the same time it leaves the darkness and sees light for the first time, the cold of the outside air seizes it, the most caressing embraces of the woman who receives it offend its delicate

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to take the line Penelhum draws for him; he displays no anxiety over the rationality of the indirect passions. I take this as support for my suggestion that the discovery about the unity of mind that Hume makes in Book 1 is insulated from the passional self of Book 2.

16 'Scepticism about Persons,' 483 n.28

members, all external objects surprise it; they are all objects of fear to it....<sup>17</sup>

Penelhum acknowledges that Hume might plausibly have wanted to avoid speculative developmental psychology (123), and links it up with another explanatory omission in his discussions of the self. While the account of personal identity in Book 1 concerns only a person's beliefs about the unity of *her own* mind, the treatment of the indirect passions, especially the other-directed passions of love and hatred, takes for granted that we can recognize *others* as having minds different from our own. And yet Hume never seems to explain how we have beliefs about the individuation of minds (50, 52, 62-4, 91-2, 120). On Penelhum's interpretation of these passions this omission is especially grievous, for just as he thinks that pride and humility presuppose our having an idea of ourselves as minds, he should think that the other-directed indirect passions, love and hatred, presuppose our having an idea of others as minds. Penelhum makes some suggestions about how Hume could explain our beliefs about others through mechanisms that extend our beliefs about ourselves (52-3). But this will not do if, as I have suggested, our own mindedness is an abstruse belief that is primarily a product of philosophical reflection. I would instead point to Hume's comments about our 'presentations' (T 2.2.1.9, SBN 332)<sup>18</sup> of what someone else is experiencing, and his view that love and hatred are fundamentally oriented towards other *persons*. It could be, then, that Hume, like Wittgenstein, thinks of our grasp of others as primarily attitudinal and affective, rather than inferential.<sup>19</sup>

Penelhum, I think, would reject the line of thought I have been developing here, because he seems to reject the suggestion that the notion of the self as mind in Hume's treatment of personal identity

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17 *Search after Truth*, Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), Book 2, Part 1, Ch. 8, 125

18 Hume seems to have borrowed the term 'presensation' from Shaftesbury, who in his *Moralists* says that animals have 'pre-sensations' of such things as what preparations to make when pregnant; humans have such pre-sensations 'not in any proportionable degree.' He goes on to suggest that our recognition of beauty is dependent on the same kind of pre-sensation 'of a higher degree' (*Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.* Vol. II, J.M. Robertson, ed. [London: Grant Richards 1900], 76, 136).

19 'My attitude toward him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul' (*Philosophical Investigations*, 3rd ed., G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. [New York: Macmillan 1968]). See Tony Pitson, 'Sympathy and Other Selves,' *Hume Studies* 12 (1996), 255-71.

primarily concerns how philosophers think of themselves while introspectively engaging in the 'science of man.' For example, in one of the new essays — a survey and commentary on recent developments in the literature on Hume's treatment of the self — Penelhum says that Hume thinks that 'at least on some level prior to the careful introspection on which [the "science of man"] relies, the mind's contents are "perfectly known"' (103);<sup>20</sup> thus we are *all* 'prone to the error' (104) of believing our minds to be unified; the 'propensity to imagine both identity and simplicity [to apply to the mind] is a natural one, and is not confined to philosophers' (107). But I find these thoughts hard to square with Hume's comments about the indeterminacy of the vulgar view of mind that I discussed above. It would be strange indeed for him to think that we all believed our minds to be bundles of perceptions, the only mistake being that we took the bundle to be unified. Surely Hume recognizes that most of us never were inclined to think of the mind in this way prior to our reading of the *Treatise*. In any case, given that Hume thinks that the only way for us to be aware of an object is for there to be a perception of it in our mind-bundles, I do not see how he could allow for the contents of the mind to be known other than by introspection (i.e. by means of secondary ideas of primary perceptions).

Penelhum himself might have some ambivalence about his claim that a grasp of the self as mind from Book 1 is available in everyday life, for he also says that he accepts the general thrust of my recent attempt to make sense of Hume's criticisms, in the 'Appendix' to the *Treatise*, of the account of personal identity given in Book 1 (99, 116).<sup>21</sup> The starting point

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20 Penelhum is here quoting from T 2.2.6.2, SBN 366: 'In examining those ingredients, which are capable of uniting with love and hatred, I begin to be sensible, in some measure, of a misfortune, that has attended *every system of philosophy*, with which the world has been yet acquainted. 'Tis commonly found, that in accounting for the operations of nature by any particular hypothesis; among a number of experiments, that quadrate exactly with the principles we wou'd endeavour to establish; there is always some phaenomenon, which is more stubborn, and will not so easily bend to our purpose. We need not be surpriz'd, that this shou'd happen in natural philosophy.... But as *the perceptions of the mind are perfectly known*, and I have us'd all imaginable caution in forming conclusions concerning them, I have always hop'd to keep clear of those contradictions, which have attended every other system' (emphasis added). I think it important that Hume is here describing what those engaging in *philosophy* think, not a knowledge of perceptions that is available in everyday life. As I will suggest in what follows, philosophers, while introspecting, take themselves to have unmediated access to their minds, even though their observations actually depend on the presence of secondary ideas in them.

21 'Hume's Reflections on the Simplicity and Identity of Mind,' *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62 (2001) 557-78

for my interpretation is Hume's rejection at the start of the personal identity Section (T 1.4.6.1-3, SBN 251-2) of the conception of mind that makes self-awareness intrinsic to thought (in the manner of Descartes, Locke, and others [see 100-4]). It follows from this that he holds that only those who 'enter most intimately' into themselves so as to 'observe' (T 1.4.6.3, SBN 252) their perceptions will face the question that Hume goes on to explore: Why do we think that the perceptions we observe constitute one unified mind, even though it is made up of many different perceptions at a time and through time (T 1.4.6.4-5, SBN 253)? And his answer appeals to the association of secondary ideas, the vehicles for our introspective thoughts about the mind. Just as, for Hume, our belief about the unity of, say, a *tree* involves the association of various *ideas* of the tree, so also our belief about the unity of the mind as a *bundle of perceptions* involves the association of *ideas* of perceptions, in this case secondary ideas of them:

[Identity] is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of *their ideas* [sc. the secondary ideas of the different perceptions] in the imagination, *when we reflect upon them* [sc. when we reflect upon the mind and its perceptions]. (T 1.4.6.16, SBN 260, emphasis added)

So the same natural processes that produce in the vulgar beliefs about external objects work in philosophers to produce their beliefs about the mind when they reflect on it.

In the 'Appendix,' however, I think that Hume realizes that he has explained only why we believe the perceptions *under introspective observation* form a unity, and that he has not explained why we believe that the secondary ideas that produce that belief are also part of the same mind. In his original treatment of personal identity, Hume treats the reflecting mind as if it were different from the mind reflected upon. Consider his thought experiment where we are to imagine what it would be like to 'see clearly into the breast of another, and observe that succession of perceptions, which constitutes his mind or thinking principle'; he then goes on to say that '[the] case is the same whether we consider ourselves or others' (T 1.4.6.18, SBN 260-1). But in the 'Appendix,' Hume seems to realize that the case is not the same. When I reflect on someone else's mind, *my* secondary ideas of his perceptions are not part of *his* mind; and so the association of my secondary ideas to produce my belief in the unity of his mind does not conflict with the content of the belief. When I reflect on my own mind, however, the secondary ideas being associated to produce the belief are in the same mind as the perceptions that are believed to be unified. Moreover, I *believe* that the observed perceptions and the secondary ideas by means of which I observe them

are all part of the same mind. But how is this belief possible? How can Hume 'explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness,' where consciousness is now defined as 'reflected thought or perception' (T App.20, SBN 635-6)?

Penelhum says that he finds this interpretive approach to Hume's second thoughts in the 'Appendix' to 'come close to the truth on this matter, although the vagueness of Hume's text ... makes it impossible to be certain' (99). But Penelhum also says that he is unconvinced that 'on his own principles Hume *ought* to be worried in the way that he is' (117): 'I fail to see why Hume could not say that ascriptions of identity to one's own mental history are always ineluctably incomplete because they are always retroactive' (125, see also 119).<sup>22</sup> That is, since Hume has explained why, at  $T_1$ , we believe that the perceptions then under observation (via unobserved secondary ideas of them) are unified, Penelhum wonders why Hume cannot say that a later reflection, at  $T_2$ , on the mind would allow us to observe the secondary ideas that were unobserved at  $T_1$  (via new higher-order ideas — in this case memories — of them) and thus to believe at  $T_2$  that the mind was unified at  $T_1$ . And he is right that this can happen. For recall my earlier point about how the vulgar have only an indeterminate conception of their mindedness in that, though they are normally ignorant of the perceptual mediation of their experiences, they can later become aware of it. In a sense, Penelhum's point is that *philosophers are usually vulgar with respect to their minds*, since they have only an indeterminate conception of their *reflective* mindedness. In their introspective observation of their mind-bundles, philosophers are not normally aware of the mediation of their introspection by secondary ideas, though they can later become aware of them in just the manner Penelhum suggests.

But I think that Hume in the 'Appendix' is raising a slightly different issue, one that hinges on the connections between the vulgar and reflective outlooks. For he thinks that when a 'truly' skeptical philosopher of

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22 Donald Baxter considers a reading of the 'Appendix' that is similar to mine, and makes a response similar to Penelhum's in 'Hume's Labyrinth Concerning the Idea of Personal Identity,' *Hume Studies* 24 (1998) 203-33, n.32. Baxter's own suggestion about Hume's second thoughts has to do with the difficulty for him of explaining how an idea can represent many things as one. But I think Hume's whole point is that it is the *succession* of associated secondary ideas that constitute the belief in the unity of mind. Moreover, as Baxter admits, if he were right in his interpretation of Hume's problem, he should recognize that it goes to the heart of his explanation of our belief in external objects in T 1.4.2 and 1.4.3, and so he would not describe the problem in the 'Appendix' as his single 'very considerable mistake' (T App.1, SBN 623) in the whole of Books 1 and 2.

the sort he professes himself to be (T 1.4.7.14, SBN 273) 'leaves [his] closet, [and] mingles with the rest of mankind' (T 1.4.2.53, SBN 216), he will take with him his understanding of the principles of human nature that he has uncovered from his introspective self-investigation (T 1.4.3.9-10, SBN 222-4). For example, once he has learned the lessons of Book 1 of the *Treatise*, he can at the same time believe both that 'fire causes smoke' and that this belief is the result of the association in his imagination of the ideas of fire and of smoke, even while he is not in the introspective posture of observing those ideas. Now, given that Hume holds that philosophers are normally vulgar with respect to their minds, the same point applies to them when they are introspecting, only at one level higher in the perceptual hierarchy. For, as I have suggested, Hume in *Treatise* 1.4.6 is interested in the principles of mind responsible not for our vulgar, but for our philosophical beliefs. And so he observes himself introspecting in an attempt to understand why he believes that the perceptions that he observes while philosophizing form a unified bundle. (In observing himself introspecting, he relies on *tertiary* ideas that have secondary ideas as their objects; and, as always for Hume, in having an idea of X, he is aware only of X [in this case, a secondary idea], not the [tertiary] *idea* of it.) He discovers thereby that his philosophical belief is the result of the association of secondary ideas. So, when he leaves the 'closet' of this hyper-reflective moment, and returns to normal philosophical introspection, he can at the same time believe both that his mind is unified and that this belief is the result of the association of secondary ideas in his imagination, even while he is not in the doubly introspective posture of observing those ideas.

But now Hume is in a situation where he believes that his mind contains both unobserved secondary ideas and the observed perceptions that those ideas present to him. And he believes that it is the *same mind* that contains the unobserved ideas and the observed perceptions, for he thinks that it is the imagination's associating of those ideas that leads him to believe that his perceptions are unified. How can he explain this belief in the unity of the unobserved ideas with the observed perceptions? The mechanism provided in *Treatise* 1.4.6 only accounts for a belief about observed perceptions. Penelhum's suggestion of a retrospective attribution of unity will only explain why at a *later* time (at  $T_2$ ) the philosopher *will* believe that these secondary ideas were, at  $T_1$ , unified with the perceptions then under introspective observation (or perhaps Penelhum means that the philosopher *believes* at  $T_1$  that *at*  $T_2$  he will believe that his mind at  $T_1$  was unified). This does not explain why, at  $T_1$ , he *now* believes that his mind is a unity encompassing both observed and unobserved perceptions. Nor can he appeal to the fact that he could at that very time enter the hyper-reflective state of mind in which he observed his introspection (via tertiary ideas of the secondary ideas), for

the same problem will re-occur. Why does he believe that those tertiary ideas are in the same mind as the rest of the observed perceptions?

In fact, the same problem will re-occur for any Humean associative mechanism that might be offered to explain the belief in the unity of the mind. For the association of ideas can explain only beliefs about the *objects* of those ideas, as happens when the association of the *idea* of fire and the *idea* of smoke causes our belief that *fire causes smoke*. In this case, someone can know that her belief about fire's causal powers is a result of the association of ideas in her mind without that knowledge undermining the belief, though, as Hume explores in the 'Conclusion' to Book 1 of the *Treatise*, self-awareness about one's psychological propensities can induce a kind of vertigo. But the situation is different when it is a belief about the unity of the mind that is to be explained. Since an associative mechanism can explain a belief only about the *objects* of the ideas being associated, not about the *ideas* themselves (in this case the higher-level ideas of other perceptions), there will be ideas in the mind different from those believed to be unified. This would not be a problem if the person in question were ignorant of the presence of those ideas, for Hume is not trying to explain the *actual* unity of the mind, just our *beliefs* about it, even if those beliefs fail to match the real contents of our bundle of perceptions. What Hume cannot allow is for someone to believe that her mind is unified at the same time as she *believes* this belief to be the result of ideas being associated in her. For then she is aware of ideas that she takes to be part of her mind even though the associative mechanism posited to explain her beliefs about mental unity does not encompass them. Thus Hume enters the 'labyrinth' (T App.10, SBN 633) of confusion about personal identity when he takes seriously what it would be like to believe that the mind is as he describes it.

### III Humean Self-Knowledge

With the description of the Humean self that I have sketched in §II on board, I would like to return to Penelhum's Socratic thesis that self-knowledge is a moral goal for Hume. Since I have argued that the two rather different accounts of the self in the *Treatise* — the self as mind in Book 1 and the self as embodied social person in Book 2 — are less closely integrated than Penelhum suggests, I will have to consider his claims about self-knowledge in connection with each. I will start with the self of Book 2.

To 'know' one's passional self is to recognize those features of oneself that do in fact define one, that is, to feel pride and humility only when their causes merit those responses. In the *Treatise*, Hume says that such apt feelings are virtuous: '[Nothing] can be more laudable, than to have

a value for ourselves, where we really have qualities that are valuable' (T 3.3.2.8, SBN 596); and 'modesty, or a just sense of our weakness, is esteem'd virtuous, and procures the good-will of every one' (T 3.3.2.1, SBN 592). But, while Penelhum suggests that Hume sees self-knowledge as a means to escape anxiety, Hume seems ambivalent about the effects of the passional version of it. On the one hand, while a person's modesty is immediately agreeable to others, it 'produces often uneasiness in the person endow'd with it' (T 3.3.2.9, SBN 597). On the other hand, positive self-esteem 'gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprizes; ... nothing inspires us with more boldness than a good opinion of ourselves' (T 3.3.2.8, SBN 597). But, even in this case, Hume adds some complications. The problem is that, not only are we poorly positioned to make an objective judgment of our own qualities, 'every-one has a strong propensity' to have 'an over-weaning conceit of himself' (T 3.3.2.10, SBN 597). Moreover, we react badly to one another's public displays of self-esteem. Because sympathy causes us to be infected by one another's feelings, we can easily feel threatened by another person's pride, even if it is merited, for her good feelings towards herself can cause us to feel inadequate. And thus the 'rules of good-breeding' (T 3.3.2.10, SBN 597) require us always to downplay our positive self-assessments in our interactions with others. So even though positive passional self-knowledge in itself will reduce our anxiety, it also creates new worries about whether our assessment is accurate and whether we are slipping up by being too public in our displays of feeling.

I think that Hume also has ambivalence about self-knowledge in relation to the self of Book 1, the self as the bundle of perceptions that is the mind. In this case, self-knowledge takes the form of philosophical insight into the principles of human nature. The 'science of man' that Hume pursues in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiries* is an attempt to achieve this kind of self-knowledge. But do we need to engage in this kind of philosophy in order to have a contented life? This is a difficult question that touches on perhaps the deepest issue in Hume scholarship, the nature of his version of skepticism; moreover, as Penelhum points out (183ff.), Hume's answer to it seems to have changed from the *Treatise* to the first *Enquiry* to the *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion*. But a consideration of the 'Conclusion' to Book 1 of the *Treatise* will be sufficient for me to raise some questions about Penelhum's Socratic interpretation.

Hume explores there how his discovery of the principles that stand behind our fundamental beliefs leads him to question, in turn, the validity of those beliefs and the success of his investigations. Self-knowledge in this sense, rather than freeing him from anxiety, drives him into a nervous collapse, where he 'begins to fancy [himself] in the most deplorable condition imaginable, environ'd with the deepest darkness,

and utterly depriv'd of the use of every member and faculty' (T 1.4.7.8, SBN 269). It is only by *quitting* the search for philosophical self-knowledge — dining and playing backgammon with friends (T 1.4.7.9, SBN 269) — that he can escape anxiety. Hume does, of course, return to philosophy, but simply because he enjoys it (T.1.4.7.12, SBN 271); he now sees it as a recreational activity on a par with hunting or gaming (T 2.3.10.8-9, SBN 451-2). So, in so far as Hume accepts the Socratic thesis, it must be relativized to the individual: philosophical self-knowledge is a route to a contented life for those who have a taste for it. Or at least it is a route to as contented a life as is possible for those with philosophical temperaments. It might even be better not to be such a person:

[There] are in *England*, in particular, many honest gentlemen, who being always employ'd in their domestic affairs, or amusing themselves in common recreations, have carried their thoughts very little beyond those objects, which are every day expos'd to their senses. And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers, nor do I expect them either to be associates in these researches or auditors of these discoveries. They do well to keep themselves in their present situation; and instead of refining them into philosophers, I wish we cou'd communicate to our founders of systems, a share of this gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient, which they commonly stand much in need of, and which wou'd serve to temper those fiery particles, of which they are compos'd. (T 1.4.7.14, SBN 272)

There is still a place for philosophy, however, for these lucky gentlemen can sometimes be tempted into dangerous speculations that take them well beyond 'that narrow circle of objects, which are the subject of daily conversation and action' (T 1.4.7.13, SBN 271). The problem here is that 'superstition' — or the third of Penelhum's 'themes,' religion — works on human weaknesses such as credulity and fear to construct otherworldly systems that can threaten not only individual happiness but social stability.

I cannot do justice here to Penelhum's discussions of Hume and religion, where he takes on such issues as the interpretive difficulties posed by Part XII of the *Dialogues*, the religious sections of the first *Enquiry*, and Hume's relation to Butler and to Pascal. They are especially admirable essays, as they show us the difficulty of untangling the complex set of attitudes Hume had towards religion and its place in society. My view of the matter, perhaps not too far from Penelhum's most recent position (243), is that Hume thought that human nature always leaves most of humanity subject to superstition, even if those with the right kind of philosophical mindset can escape its clutches; other philosophers, however, are more likely to fall prey to theocentric philosophical fictions. So even when confronted with religious ideology, Hume is ambivalent about the Socratic search for self-knowledge as a response. He was too aware that, when an attempt at self-knowledge

takes a philosophical form, one could easily end up far from his kind of 'true' skepticism, perhaps even leading one into what he calls an 'artificial life,' such as that exemplified by Pascal.<sup>23</sup>

In conclusion, I should point out that my disagreement with Penelhum about whether Hume is best understood as a Socratic philosopher is not meant to detract from what he has taught us all so well in the essays here (and in his other works). If we are to try to understand Hume, we have to come up with a *systematic* interpretation of his many and varied writings. Hume tells us in the *Treatise* that he hopes that his 'system of philosophy will acquire new force as it advances' from metaphysical and epistemological issues in Book 1, to psychological issues in Book 2, to ethics in Book 3 (T 3.1.1.1, SBN 455). The same holds true of his later writings on economics, politics, society, and religion.<sup>24</sup>

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23 See ¶57 of the 'Dialogue' appended to the second *Enquiry* (see 343 of the Selby-Bigge and Nidditch edition).

24 I presented §I of this notice at the Twenty-eighth International Hume Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, July 2001. I would like to thank Terry Penelhum for his comments on that day, and for his ongoing help in my work on Hume. I also have a debt to Jennifer Nagel, who provided very useful comments on a penultimate draft of the whole notice.