

Warmongers, Martyrs, and Madmen versus the Hobbesian Laws of Nature

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I Introduction

Hobbes claims all persons agree on the value of the laws of nature and the peace to which they are means.¹ He also sees the laws of nature as the 'conclusions' of right reason.² But Hobbes argues that right reason in nature is particularized; each agent may decide which reasons govern her conduct. If Hobbes is then to cast the laws of nature as conclusions of right reason, he must either explain why the extent to which right reason in nature is particularized is not such as to impede convergence

1 See, for example, *Lev* 1.15, 216. Citations to Hobbes's works are '*Lev*': *Leviathan*, C.B. Macpherson, ed. (New York: Penguin Books 1968) (by part, chapter, and page, respectively); '*El Law*': *The Elements of Law: Human Nature and De Corpore Politico*, J.C.A. Gaskin, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press 1994) (by part, chapter, section, and page, respectively); '*De Cive*' and '*De Homine*': *Man and Citizen*, Bernard Gert, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1991) (each by chapter, section, and page, respectively); '*Dilge*': *A Dialogue between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England*, in *The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury*, Volume 6, Sir William Molesworth, Bart., ed. (London: John Bohn 1840); '*QCLNC*': *Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance* in Molesworth, Volume 5; '*Beh*': *Behemoth*, Ferdinand Tönnies, ed. (Chicago: University Press 1990).

2 Hobbes casts the laws of nature as the conclusions of reason in *Lev* 1.13, 188; and 1.14, 189. He describes the laws of nature specifically as conclusions of *right* reason at *De Cive* 1.15, 119; 2.1, 122-3 and at *El Law* 1.14.6, 79.

on the laws of nature, or he must explain why any divergence is irrelevant to the justification of the laws of nature.

I focus particularly on the case of the glory seekers. Driven by a foolhardy overestimation of their worth, seekers of glory do not value peace as others do. They may not even value peace at all. Their quest for glory then often obstructs peace, which is perhaps why Hobbes condemns vainglory as irrational. But once we clarify what it is that glory seekers seek, it becomes uncertain that gratifying appetites for glory is necessarily against right reason. If Hobbes is then to say that the laws of nature are the dictates of right reason, he must either show that glory seeking is against right reason, or he must explain why the right reason of glory seekers, which argues against the laws of nature, does not count against the normative force of such laws.

In what follows, I explore a Hobbesian account of right reason in light of glory seeking. I argue that glory seeking is not necessarily against right reason, and I explore what this means for Hobbesian accounts of the value of peace. I do not intend to offer a complete account of Hobbesian reason, nor do I wish to give a full argument for the derivation of the Hobbesian laws of nature. Instead I hope to get a sharper picture of the normative force of the laws of nature by focusing on whether right reason precludes the quest for glory.

I start by reviewing how right reason in nature is particularized and how such right reason connects to the laws of nature. I then explore who the glory seekers are, what they seek, and whether their goals are necessarily against right reason. Lastly I consider whether the laws of nature bind the glory seekers, and I close by discussing the implications for the normative force of such laws.³

II Right Reason and the Laws of Nature

We may start by outlining Hobbes's conception of right reason and how right reason connects to the laws of nature. This sketch will highlight why glory seeking poses a problem for Hobbes's theory.⁴

3 A note on methodology: Hobbes remarks on glory and the laws of nature throughout his corpus; I draw primarily from relevant passages in his three main political works. Throughout the political writings there are more or less constant views about glory seeking and about the conception and function of the laws of nature. I note any relevant differences as I proceed.

4 Hobbes's variable use of terms complicates efforts to produce a complete and consistent picture of his views on right reason. Gregory S. Kavka highlights the

Hobbes's views of right reason are in part a response to a Scholastic tradition in ethics, which, to simplify matters a bit, regarded right reason as a faculty through which persons achieve moral knowledge.⁵ Hobbes denies that right reason in nature is an 'infallible faculty' (*De Cive* 2.1, 123n.).⁶ In nature humans simply have a capacity to reason. This is a capacity to engage in a certain *process of reasoning* that Hobbes treats as a sort of mechanistic 'reckoning' (*Lev* 1.5, 111). Conceived as a process, *right* reason in nature is simply the correct inference of the 'Consequences of generall names' from some fixed first principles (*ibid.*). Agents can cultivate such right reason through education and practice, or they can weaken it by lapsed use or with an intemperate lifestyle (*De Cive* 3.25; *Lev* 1.15, 214). But even practiced skills of right reasoning might be of little use when applied to 'dogmatical' matters such as those regarding right and wrong ('Dedicatory,' *El Law*, 19). In such fields, the terms of discourse are unsettled and inconsistently used (*De Cive* 14.17, 282-3; 'Dedicatory,' *De Cive*, 92; *Lev* 1.4, 109). Without settling the meanings of moral terms, there is little room for progress in the moral sciences because there is no definitive sense of what is to *count* as right reason (*Lev* 1.4, 109-10; *El Law* 1.13.3, 74-5).

In one sense, then, right reason is a *process*: it is the correct use of an agent's natural capacity to reason. But in another sense right reason is the decisive *result* of a process of inference. When treating right reason in this latter sense, Hobbes often denies that there is any *natural* right reason.⁷ In nature we find only the particular reckonings of all agents. No conclusion of any such natural reasoning is decisive for all parties, and so no finding of any natural reasoning qualifies as *right* reason (*Lev* 1.5, 111; *De Cive* 2.1, 123n.). Of course, a key Hobbesian tenet is that agents must agree to count the reason of some 'Arbitrator' as right reason or

interpretative problems in 'Right Reason and Natural Law in Hobbes's Ethics,' *Monist* 66 (1983), 120-2, and *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory* (Princeton: University Press 1986), 338-9. The outline presented here should be general enough to capture how the basic senses of right reason bear on the laws of nature.

5 Certain representatives of the natural law tradition may fit here. See, for example, Aquinas, *The Summa Theologica*, 1, Q. 79, Art. 2; 1-2 Q 90 A4, Q 91 A2, Q 94 A2, 4. As Darwall notes of the Hobbesian view: 'There is no *sui generis* normative metaphysical order; nor have we a cognitive faculty that might access it if there were' (Stephen Darwall, 'Internalism and Agency,' *Philosophical Perspectives* 6 [1992], 163).

6 See also Darwall, 'Internalism and Agency,' 162: 'what he [Hobbes] means by right reason is not some faculty of rational intuition, but simply a correct "reckoning" of consequences.'

7 See, for example, *Lev* 1.5, 111, and *El Law* 2.24.8, 181.

else fall into intractable conflict (*Lev* 1.5, 111).⁸ The artificial reason of a Hobbesian sovereign is supposedly uniquely suited for supplying what is missing in the natural condition: a settled conception of right reason.⁹ The sovereign's reason is *right* reason not because it complies with some independent standard of correctness but because it *determines* what is to count as right.¹⁰ Construed then as the decisive result of a process of reasoning, there can be no right reason in nature because, on Hobbes's view, what is right reason is what the sovereign wills.¹¹

But that is not the whole story. While a sovereign may be needed to resolve disputes regarding the content of right reason in civil society, on Hobbes's view the laws of nature are also correct conclusions of natural reasoning. The laws of nature are rules of reason that command life-promoting activities and forbid self-destructive ones (*Lev* 1.14, 189). Instrumental reasoning, which Hobbes sometimes calls 'seeking' (*Lev* 1.3, 96), bears on the right reason by which persons infer the laws of nature. Instrumental considerations (such as how best to satisfy fundamental desires) may give agents a reason to reckon about certain matters and to apply the conclusions of such reckoning in action; human desires may also inform the meaning of the terms about which agents reckon.¹² Agents who carefully reckon the consequences of terms and attend to the relevant instrumental considerations correctly conclude that certain

8 Unfettered reason in nature need not be chiefly responsible for pre-political conflict. As Jean Hampton discusses, some Hobbes scholars trace conflict to agents' unconstrained passions or to their shortsightedness. See Hampton, *Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1986), 58-89.

9 The sovereign's reason is artificial because the sovereign itself is an artifice (*Lev* 2.21, 263); the sovereign is not a fixture of nature.

10 Hobbes writes that the sovereign's reason 'is no otherwise certainly right than by our making it so by our approbation of it and voluntary subjection to it' (*QCLNC*, *Aminadv.* on #14, 193).

11 There are important caveats here regarding the scope of sovereign right reason's authoritative jurisdiction. Some sovereign dictates might be inconsistent with other commands or importantly problematic for other reasons. In any such cases the person(s) holding the office of sovereign would not bind subjects' conduct if his/her/their commands no longer counted as right reason. For further discussion of this issue, see Jean Hampton, *Hobbes*, ch. 7; and Andrew I. Cohen, 'Retained Liberties and Absolute Hobbesian Authorization,' *Hobbes Studies* 11 (1998) 33-45.

12 For a splendid discussion of competing accounts for how means-end thinking figures in Hobbesian reason, see Mark C. Murphy, 'Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's *Leviathan*,' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 39 (2000) 259-68.

rules of conduct are laws of nature.¹³ This is why Hobbes says the laws of nature are dictates of right reason. Securing some lasting peace is key for a successful life. The laws of nature provide principles of conduct that, when followed, end the state of war and ensure a stable peace chiefly by establishing an absolute sovereign power.

My concern here is not with the specific content of the laws of nature but with their normative force. Much of what commends the rules of conduct that are laws of nature is that 'all men agree in the will to be directed and governed in the way to that which they desire to attain, namely, their own good, which is the work of reason' (*El Law* 1.15.1, 82). Of course, Hobbes's remark here leaves it unclear as to what counts as one's 'good.' A statement in *De Cive* lends some insight: 'the law of nature ... is the dictate of right reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done or omitted for the constant preservation of life and members...' (2.1, 123).¹⁴ More striking is Hobbes's remark in *Leviathan* on the specific values expressed in the laws of nature: 'all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace, which (as I have shewed before) are Justice, Gratitude, Modesty, Equity, Mercy, & the rest of the Laws of Nature, are good...' (1.15, 216). Given that pre-political individuals will almost inevitably disagree on questions of value, it is surprising for Hobbes to claim that they would agree on anything as robust as the laws of nature.

Is Hobbes's idea of reason recommending these 'Articles of Peace' based on false hopes? After all, there are few guarantees here. The force of impulse or ignorance often sways individuals. Even Hobbes admits that most human beings make 'little use' of reason. They tend to let unreflective habit or whim guide their action (*Lev* 1.5, 116). Indeed, many men are apt to dismiss Hobbes's prized geometric science as mere 'conjuring' (*ibid.*). Individuals might then diverge from a commitment to goals secured by the laws of nature.

13 Here I do not wish to minimize difficulties in presenting a complete notion of Hobbesian reason. Recently, for instance, commentators have much discussed whether and how instrumental considerations bear on purely formal Hobbesian reason. (See, for example, Hampton, *Hobbes*, 42-51; John Deigh, 'Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's *Leviathan*,' *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 34 (1996) 33-60; Murphy, 'Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's *Leviathan*'; Bernard Gert, 'Hobbes on Reason,' *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 82 (2001) 243-57.) For the purposes of this discussion I only suppose that causal considerations bear on the truth-conditions of propositions that some rules are laws of nature. (See Deigh and Murphy for a complete discussion of this issue.) I explore what it means for the normative force of such laws were self-preservation not a high value for all persons.

14 The account at *Lev* 1.14, 189 makes basically the same point.

So how is it that all persons agree on the value of peace? I propose to explore this question with a focus on the seeker of glory. The glory seeker seems to reject the ways of peace, both in word and in action. Peace may also seem to obstruct the glory seeker's highest values. If such an individual by reason reaches conclusions that obstruct the laws of nature, then Hobbes has some explaining to do for how it is that all persons by reason agree on the laws of nature and the peace to which such laws are means. In order to explore whether correctly reasoning persons may seek glory, I first turn to outlining what is distinctive about glory seeking.

III Who Are the Glory Seekers?

Glory, Hobbes says, often blinds men to the force of the laws of nature. Is the quest for glory as such against reason? To sort this out, we must first explore what glory is, who wants it, and why they want it.

Glory is a passion, or, as Hobbes says, one of the 'Interiour Beginnings of Voluntary Motions' (*Lev* 1.6, 118, ch. heading). Glory comes from a sense of one's own efficacy in comparison with others. Hobbes discusses three sorts of glory. Proper glory, sometimes called *pride*, comes from a justified sense of eminence over others.¹⁵ *False glory*, on the other hand, is an unjustified sense of superiority over others. False glory comes from hype; it proceeds 'not from any conscience of our own actions, but from fame and trust of others, whereby one may think well of himself, and yet be deceived' (*El Law* 1.9.1, 50). Lastly, *vainglory* is a pretense to the superior station of another real or imagined person. Not all glory is vainglory; some glory seekers are in fact better situated than other persons. Vainglory comes from a delusion.¹⁶

Glory in all its forms is a source of conflict both because it is a status good and because everyone to some extent by nature seeks glory. When we seek 'the mind's pleasure,' we either directly or indirectly seek glory,

15 Hobbes says people call this passion 'pride' somewhat disapprovingly; it is called a 'just valuation of himself' to those who approve of it. See *El Law* 1.9.1, 50; *Lev* 1.8, 140.

16 In *A Streetcar Named Desire*, Blanche Dubois' gentility and deluded pretense to social eminence is one example of vainglory. As examples of vainglory Hobbes cites persons who set to preaching when thinking they are Christ. He also mentions the 'fable by the fly sitting on the axletree, [who says] to himself, What a dust do I raise!' (*El Law* 1.10.9, 63; 1.9.1, 50). The distinction between vainglory and false glory disappears from *Leviathan*, where Hobbes only distinguishes confidence (as a sort of warranted glory) from vainglory. See *Lev* 1.6, 125.

which is to have a 'good opinion of one's self' (*De Cive* 1.2, 112-13). But not everyone can share in glory since it comes partly at others' expense. Glory is then a dangerous passion. It inspires men to conflict over 'trifles' that mark the good opinion of others (*Lev* 1.13, 185). The thirst for glory drives some persons to stir up the causes of conflict. A fear of others' glory brings agents to anticipatory violence in the natural condition.¹⁷

It does not take many glory seekers to foment widespread conflict. There need not be *any* glory seekers; suspicion is enough. On Hobbes's view, the bare possibility that some stranger is a glory seeker may justify initiating violence against him or her. Indeed, there may be good reason for an agent to behave *as if* she were a seeker of glory in order to ward off future attack.

Hobbes may overstate the extent to which glory is a cause for conflict, at least insofar as glory is supposedly a cause for agents who are not glory seekers to engage in anticipatory violence. Kavka convincingly argues that there are important dangers involved in anticipatory violence; it may instead be better to lie low.¹⁸ While thinking of strangers as potential glory seekers may understandably inspire fear and violence, there are nevertheless questionable empirical assumptions at work in such a view. If an agent believes that there is a noteworthy incidence of glory seekers in the population, and if she believes that others believe the same, then she may have reason to engage in anticipatory violence. If, however, she believes that there are few if any glory seekers, and if she believes that others share her belief, she may instead have a better reason to skip anticipatory violence and make moves toward limited cooperative arrangements with others.¹⁹

Agents driven by glory nevertheless incite conflict. When speaking of glory seekers, Hobbes has in mind several sorts of persons. I discuss three sorts; my examples are meant as illustrative and so are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Glory seekers of the first sort, whom I call the *warmongers*, are combative persons such as 'men that are ambitious of military command [who] are inclined to continue the causes of war' (*Lev* 1.11, 161). The warmongers typically have a will to hurt others as a vehicle for enhancing their personal honor (*De Cive* 1.4, 114). They crave the worldly marks of a good reputation, such as come with increased

17 Strictly speaking, it is not glory per se but the desire for glory that is a source of conflict. See Bernard Gert, 'Hobbes's Psychology,' in *The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes*, Tom Sorell, ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press 1996), 161-2.

18 Gregory S. Kavka, 'Hobbes's War of All Against All,' *Ethics* 93 (1983) 291-310

19 For a related discussion, see Kavka, 'Hobbes's War of All Against All.'

rank or other forms of prestige. Often such a passion for glory, Hobbes says, is exaggerated in spirited, credulous young men prone to violence on behalf of some cause or another (*Lev* 1.6, 125).

Glory seekers of the second sort, whom I call the *martyrs*, self-destructively stir up conflict in order to impose heavy losses on some adversary. Whereas the warmongers are *prepared* to die, the martyrs *seek* to die in what we sometimes call a 'blaze of glory.' Martyrs often, though not always, are motivated partly by a belief in rewards in the afterlife.

Glory seekers of the third sort I call the *madmen*. They act out of what Hobbes calls 'madness' (*Lev* 1.8, 140). If they stir up conflict for a reason (which they might not do), they do so out of a desire for battle itself. For the madmen, battle is its own reward.

All such seekers of glory might then seem to reject the laws of nature. Glory seekers put themselves in harm's way at the expense of a lasting peace. Sometimes, as in the case of martyrdom, being harmed while harming others is a *precondition* for an agent's more ultimate goals. Such glory-driven behaviors seem to be goal-directed and so are not clearly irrational. How then can Hobbes say that the laws of nature are conclusions of reason when it seems that some agents, by reason, reject the ways of peace?

Hobbes needs to show that glory seekers do not by reason reject the ways of peace. Glory seeking must, in short, somehow be a failure of reason. There then seem to be three routes available to Hobbes. (1) Hobbes could claim that glory seekers are ultimately not reasoning beings at all, (2) Hobbes could claim that glory seekers reason *poorly*, or, (3) Hobbes could argue that glory is a poor end for a reasoning agent to have. If any one of these were true, Hobbes would have the space to say that the laws of nature remain the conclusions of right reason despite the seeming dissent of glory seekers. I now turn to argue that the first two do not hold and that the third is seriously problematic within a Hobbesian value theory.

IV Are Glory Seekers Project Pursuers?

Perhaps seekers of glory are not reasoning beings at all because they are not responsive to reason. Insofar as they seek glory, they may simply not be goal-directed. At times Hobbes seems to be making just this sort of point. He describes pointless revenges as motivated by 'a certain triumph and glory of the mind, which points to no end' (*De Cive* 3.11, 142).²⁰ Hobbes believes such activity is ultimately not goal-directed; it 'is di-

²⁰ See similar remarks at *El Law* 1.16.10, 91-2.

rected to no end' and is a form of vainglory that 'is therefore without reason' (ibid.). Similarly in *Leviathan*, revenge that neither corrects the offender nor deters others is merely 'glorying in the hurt of another, tending to no end' (*Lev* 1.15, 210). So, on Hobbes's view, certain forms of vindictive revenge are against reason because they are not objects of goal-directed action.

Hobbes is surely mistaken here. No doubt we may, with Hobbes, regard certain instances of injuring others as senseless brutality. But brutality often has its own perverse logic on behalf of degenerate ends. Vindictive revenge is not action 'to no end.' It has an end: the sense of satisfaction that comes from brutally vanquishing one's foe.²¹ What Hobbes must mean is that cruelty is a *poor* end. Now, we might say on Hobbes's behalf that the desire for vindictive retribution is not a source of reasons — but that would be another argument altogether (which I pursue later). So we cannot automatically say that glory seekers are not project pursuers. All that we can say is that their projects are despicable. Being despicable is not necessarily against reason.

V Are Glory Seekers Poor Reasoners?

Perhaps correctly reasoning agents must be peace seekers. If glory seekers then reckon that glory is worth pursuing at the expense of peace, they may be guilty of some failure of instrumental reasoning.²² There seem to be at least two ways that glory seekers might be poor instrumental reasoners. They may fail to choose the best means to some currently declared end, or they may pursue some local end that somehow clashes with one of their more global ends. But glory seekers need not be guilty of either failure of instrumental reason.

21 Things are more complicated in cases of martyrdom. Martyrs may derive satisfaction from knowing that their lives are to culminate in brutal destruction of their foes. They might also derive satisfaction in knowing that the reputation (and sometimes the financial position) of family and friends will improve in light of their martyrdom. And of course there is the sense of satisfaction that comes from believing in the prospect of rewards in the afterlife. There are further complications given that some religious views do not have agents *seeking* martyrdom so much as having it thrust upon them. I pass over these difficulties here.

22 Hobbes writes, 'the Thoughts are to the Desires, as Scouts, and Spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things Desired...' (*Lev* 1.8, 139). As Mark C. Murphy argues, it then seems that reason can be put in service of a desire to obtain some end. See Mark C. Murphy, 'Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's *Leviathan*.'

Consider the first case of selecting poor means to some currently declared end. We can easily dispense with this. The warmonger, for instance, may correctly judge which battles to fight and how to fight them in order to accumulate effectively the honor and prestige he seeks, and so he need not display any failure of instrumental reason.

More promising for Hobbes is the second line of argument that the glory seeker, insofar as he seeks glory, does not act for his more global goals. Perhaps an agent who values peace might believe, when overcome by a fit of passion, that glory is worth pursuing above all else. Such an agent might temporarily fail to treat peace as supremely valuable (if valuable at all). I shall call such a person the *incontinent peace-lover*.

Incontinent peace-lovers are victims to a 'perturbation' of the mind; their passions for glory temporarily obscure right reasoning and keep them from appreciating the merits of peace (*De Homine* 12.1, 55). 'Perturbed' agents might then reckon wrongly because of passions, or the passions may weaken the will to act on correct reckoning. Hobbes claims that emotions, appetites, or incontinent states of mind such as drunkenness may bring persons to prefer an 'apparent' to a 'real good' (*ibid.*; *De Cive* 3.25, 146; 3.27, 149n.). Note, however, that while we may sometimes be overcome by passion, 'there is no man who is not sometimes in a quiet mind' (*De Cive* 3.26, 148). Calm reflection is presumably conducive to recognizing that one's real good excludes glory. Hobbes specifically says that in quiet moments, agents considering whether their conduct is permissible will easily 'know this rule,' namely, the Golden Rule, which Hobbes takes to encapsulate the laws of nature (*ibid.*; *Lev* 1.15, 214-5). The pronouncements of ill temper may then be no indicator of what is of value to an agent with regard to the putative laws of nature.²³

This is not the place to articulate a complete theory of instrumental rationality; we may simply assume on Hobbes's behalf that instrumental rationality requires some form of long-term prudence.²⁴ Incontinent peace-lovers then fall far short of ideal instrumental reasoning insofar as they are incontinent. Their temporary rejection of the ways of peace is

23 Jean Hampton urges on Hobbes's behalf that by distinguishing 'real' from apparent desires, Hobbes has the resources to disqualify as irrational certain declared preferences. See *Hobbes*, ch. 1. She later expressed misgivings about this view in 'Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism,' *Philosophical Perspectives* 6 (1992) 333-53. More on Hampton's later concerns in Section VII (below).

24 This is also not to deny problems in reconciling Hobbesian naturalism with a Hobbesian account of instrumental rationality that defers to the findings of a 'quiet mind.' Here I merely hope to outline the best case for how Hobbesian reason recommends peace.

no argument against reason recommending the laws of nature precisely because incontinence is not an expression of reason.

Besides the incontinent peace-lovers, there are persons who calmly believe that glory is worth pursuing. Some of them realize that peace is an important precondition for maximizing opportunities for glory. They appreciate the tenets of what I shall call *glory consequentialism*. The glory consequentialist understands, for instance, that some forms of honor require recognition that can best — and perhaps only — come in the context of a stable peace. Here consider athletes, entertainers, and members of the military, whose success sometimes depends crucially on hurting others. The glory consequentialist does not think there is a reason to inflict *senseless* harm on others; she maximizes her chances at glory when playing by the rules governing permissible harm. *Senseless* harm would be harm that brings no acclaim; there is often much glory to be had, however, from the *sensible* harm allowed by the rules, such as that inflicted during hockey, American football, cutting satire, or just wars. The glory in such activities requires some stable peace — at least in one's own commonwealth. There are no football games in the Hobbesian state of war. Likely there are no footballs.

The glory consequentialist thus has reason to seek peace. But what of those other persons who crave the glory that comes from smashing foes in violation of the laws of nature? Here we speak not of the glory that comes with fame but of the sort of glory Hobbes calls 'vainglory.'²⁵ Vainglory seeks the 'triumph of revenge' as a vehicle for gratifying aspirations to the higher station of another real or imagined person (*De Cive* 3.11, 142; *El Law* 1.16.10, 91-2).²⁶ There are two sorts of vainglorious persons. The first are persons whose acts are foreseeably ineffective at realizing glory. They might, for instance, pick fights with persons certain to defeat them.²⁷ It seems that Hobbes could dismiss their behavior as a product of poor instrumental reasoning. Assuming such agents do not in fact seek defeat and public humiliation, they show *vainglory* in the strictest sense: they fail to realize even their avowed ends.

Construing vainglory more broadly we can also conceive a second sort of vainglorious agent. She pursues what others might call a 'senseless

25 Recall the earlier discussion of how Hobbes denied that the vainglorious were project pursuers. Though the term 'vainglory' tilts toward Hobbes's mistaken interpretation, it is useful enough to capture the notion of persons bent on revenge.

26 I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for suggesting a link between revenge and the vainglorious quest for personal advancement.

27 I am grateful to Clark Wolf for suggesting this example.

harm,' though she is unconvinced of its senselessness. She might be bent on revenge but have a fighting chance of achieving some measure of glory she deems worthwhile. For example, she might want nothing more than to secure her honor, despite the immense opportunity costs involved.

Is an agent bent on revenge in this fashion guilty of poor instrumental reasoning? Consider, on behalf of such glory seeking, the many athletes, heads of state, politicians, or entertainers whose breaches of confidence or breaches of the law were acts of glory that brought them even greater acclaim than before. As the saying goes, any publicity is good publicity, so the notoriety that comes from brutality might enhance one's glory.

On Hobbes's behalf, however, we might construct an argument against such glory seeking patterned on the one against the Foole. Given other goals one has, it is mistaken to believe that vainglory may 'sometimes stand with that Reason, which dictateth to every man his own good' (*Lev* 1.15, 203) because an agent jeopardizes long-term success by seeking vainglory. The glory seeker cannot be confident that her particular moment of vainglory will redound to her long-term benefit. She may stand to lose her property, her honor, or even her life.

But it should be clear that this is not an argument against glory as such but against short-term or inept glory-seeking. This argument then hangs on the strength of the arguments against incontinent peace-loving and the standard sorts of arguments against the Foole. I am willing to assume on Hobbes's behalf that these arguments succeed. The incontinent peace-lovers, glory consequentialists, and shortsighted honor-driven individuals show a failure of instrumental reason when they pursue glory at the expense of peace.²⁸ For Hobbes then to show that glory seeking always involves a failure of reason, there must not be any glory seekers with a compelling reason to 'stirre up trouble and sedition' (*Lev* 1.11, 162). But there seem to be: warmongers, martyrs, and madmen, for instance, do not obviously have a fundamental interest in peace. They may be inveterate glory seekers. If inveterate glory seekers do not have any long-term interest in peace, then they need not be guilty of a failure of instrumental reason as long as they carefully seek glory.²⁹

28 Hobbesian ethical naturalism may still have serious problems explaining the motivating force of instrumental reason. As Jean Hampton discusses, the normativity of hypothetical imperatives may prove just as mysterious as that of categorical imperatives. See her 'Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism,' especially 346ff. In order to explore the limits of Hobbes's view on whether glory is itself against reason, I am prepared to grant that Hobbes might somehow resolve this problem.

29 Jean Hampton unpacks the desire for glory — especially vindictive glory — as a

There may still be a sense in which inveterate glory-seekers betray a failure of reason. Though they are not incontinent, they might be intemperate. An intemperate rejection of peace might not be an expression of reason. So maybe glory seekers reason poorly not because of shoddy means-end thinking but because their ends are inadequate. I thus now turn to explore a Hobbesian argument that glory is not a proper ultimate end.

VI Do Glory Seekers Agree on the Ways of Peace?

As we have seen, some glory seekers are in fact committed to peace. But it is not clear that all glory seekers are tacit peace-lovers. Some may seem to have little reason to support the ways of peace.

We should clarify at this point just what the challenge is for Hobbes. First note what the challenge is *not*. The challenge for Hobbes is not to account for the temporarily vainglorious person because, as noted earlier, incontinence is supposedly not an expression of reason. The challenge for Hobbes is also not to show that agents should treat peace as *indefeasibly* valuable. Recall that Hobbes only says, ‘all men agree on this, that Peace is Good’ (*Lev* 1.15, 216); he does not say that all men agree on the *unconditional* good of peace.³⁰ Peace may require that a person be executed, for instance, but no one would question her right to resist when arrested or taken to the gallows (*Lev* 1.14, 199). She is also free to make war when anyone — including the sovereign — intends her harm.³¹ Peace itself is of value because it is supposedly a means to one’s ultimate end, namely, ‘the constant preservation of life and members’ (*De Cive*

form of self-destructive and self-defeating hatred whereby one uses violence ineffectively and dishonestly to inflate one’s sense of one’s relative worth. See ‘Hobbesian Reflections on Glory as a Cause of Conflict,’ in *The Causes of Quarrel*, Peter Caws, ed. (Boston: Beacon Press 1989), 78–96, especially 90–4; see a related discussion in her ‘Forgiveness, Resentment and Hatred,’ in *Forgiveness and Mercy*, Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, ed. (Cambridge: University Press 1988), 60–79. So long as glory seekers do not seek glory for its own sake, Hampton is correct. But as Andrew Altman notes, sometimes people are moved to seemingly senseless violence against others for ‘the simple pleasure of making them suffer’ (‘Glory, Respect, and Violent Conflict,’ in Caws, 123). Altman nevertheless seems prepared to concede that glory is an irrational appetite, but as I discuss below, I am unconvinced.

30 In order to foster a *stable* social order, most agents would probably need to treat peace as a *high* value — one not defeasible by most ordinary considerations.

31 See, for example, *De Cive* 2.18. There are important caveats here stemming from Hobbes’s conception of authorized punishment. See Cohen, 38–41.

2.1, 123). After all, the first law of nature merely says that one should *seek* peace, not that one should necessarily *be* peaceful.³²

The challenge to Hobbes comes instead from the possibility of inveterate glory-seekers. These are the degenerates who seek conflict for despicable ends or for no ends at all. They seem to reject the ways of peace by reason.

Before exploring this possibility, note first that the prospect of actual *dissent* from the ways of peace might not count for much. We must steer clear of giving an overly doxastic reading of 'agree' when interpreting Hobbes's claim that 'all men agree on this, that peace is good.' Hobbes does not say men agree *that* peace is good (as if to mean that men have or express favorable attitudes toward peace). Hobbes merely says that men agree *on* the goodness of peace. Perhaps then a nondoxastic reading of 'agree' would help clarify matters.

A nondoxastic reading of 'agreement' would focus not on avowed beliefs, opinions, preferences, or any such intentional states, but on how seeking peace is good to persons in a counterpreferential fashion. On Hobbes's behalf we might then claim agents have reason to seek peace regardless of what they might want. Perhaps the goals expressed by the laws of nature are necessarily valuable to agents with any values at all. Agents might then temporarily (or even permanently) disavow the value of peace, but seeking peace would still be of value to them in any case. Under the nondoxastic reading of 'agreement,' current declared preference is irrelevant for determining what is of value. Inveterate glory-seekers might then just reason wrongly even if they exhibit impeccable instrumental credentials.

Hobbes downplays how important it is that people actually agree on the laws of nature. He notes that such laws are principles 'upon which men *may* be drawn to agreement' (*Lev* 1.13, 188, emphasis added). Hobbes is clear that the laws of nature have the status that they do because of what the laws are, not because persons treat them in a certain way. The *agreement* is not what makes the natural laws dictates of reason. If anything, persons agree to such laws because they are findings of right reason. As Hobbes claims, 'the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the dictate of reason' (*De Cive* 2, sec. heading, 121). The laws of nature could then be conclusions of correct reason — regardless of what agents might think.

If peace seeking were a dictate of correct reasoning, Hobbes would need to explain how inveterate glory-seekers do not by reason reject the

32 This tracks the familiar distinction Hobbes draws in *Lev* 1.15: the laws of nature bind only to a desire ('*in foro interno*'), not necessarily to action ('*in foro externo*').

ways of peace. Since the value of peace derives from its utility in preserving one's life, Hobbes might argue that reasons to preserve oneself are universal and decisive over glory. He could then say that all men agree on peace provided either (1) glory itself is not a source of reasons, or (2) glory is a source of reasons, but reasons to seek glory are never decisive over reasons to seek peace. Unfortunately, as I argue below, it is doubtful that Hobbes has the resources to establish either point.

VII Is Self-Preservation a Necessary End?

We might argue on Hobbes's behalf that glory seekers never have decisive reason to seek glory. One way to start this argument is by challenging whether wanting glory even *counts as a reason* for seeking glory. T.M. Scanlon, for instance, denies that desires are reasons.³³ While some theorists might say that desires offer reasons defeasible by other considerations, Scanlon argues that desires themselves give no reason. In all cases where desires seem to provide reasons, it is instead 'future enjoyment, not present desire' that is the source of reasons.³⁴ Borrowing from Scanlon we might then argue that glory seekers are mistaken to believe they have a reason to pursue glory. Their desire for glory provides no reason to seek it.

Of course, this line of argument would merely be an application of the general principle that a desire is not a reason; it leaves open the possibility that the future enjoyment of the object of the desire (in this case, the desire for glory) provides reasons. The sense of power and self-satisfaction that come from smashing one's foes might offer powerful reason to seek glory — even if one's success must come at the expense of one's reputation, one's property, or one's life. Glory may be its own reward.

Hobbes needs to deny this. He needs to show that glory is never a source of decisive reasons. One way he might show this is by saying that glory is categorically bad. But of course, Hobbesian views on value leave no room for such an idea. On the Hobbesian view, value terms are used

33 T.M. Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge: Harvard 1998), 41-9. See also Stephen Darwall, 'Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,' *Philosophical Review* 109 (2000) 313-47, esp. 335-8.

34 Scanlon, *What We Owe to Each Other*, 44. Scanlon acknowledges that the current desire might 'be an indicator of this [future] enjoyment, but the presence of this state does not, in itself, provide an additional reason for action in the way in which desires are supposed to provide reason to bring about their fulfillment' (ibid.).

in reference to the objects of an agent's appetites and aversions. There is no room for any notion of 'metaphysical goodness'.³⁵

Hobbes might instead argue that glory seekers fail to pursue what is in fact valuable to them. The key value in question here is surely self-preservation, which, Hobbes insists, rational agents necessarily seek as an ultimate end. If Hobbes were right, we then would need only to repeat the standard Hobbesian arguments for following the laws of nature given that they express correct causal statements regarding the best means to self-preservation. Glory would be 'naturally bad' in the same way that poison is: it hinders our self-preservation.³⁶

Let us then consider why self-preservation is supposedly special. The laws of nature specify the necessary means to a goal of self-preservation and so are conclusions of reason as directed by a necessary desire. As Hobbes writes, 'every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evil, but chiefly the chiefest of natural evils, which is death; and this he doth by a certain impulsion of nature, no less than that whereby a stone moves downward' (*De Cive* 1.7, 115). It is this fundamental desire for self-preservation that makes the laws of nature practically compelling.³⁷

Perhaps then the Hobbesian rational agent is not one that simply finds the best means for gratifying his current appetites. Perhaps, as Bernard Gert claims, Hobbesian reason 'has an end of its own, avoidance of violent death.'³⁸ If reason were concerned with avoiding death, then it would not be right reason to infer some conclusion that, in fact, does not help a person to avoid death. David Boonin-Vail, however, specifically

35 The expression is Hobbes's; he claims 'metaphysical goodness is but an idle term.' *QCLNC*, amidadv. on 14, 192. See also *Lev* 1.6, 120. The account here is meant to be neutral between readings of Hobbes as a subjectivist or a projectivist. The subjectivist reading, coming from Hampton, Kavka, Gauthier, and others, sees value terms as designating the objects of our appetites. The projectivist version, recently given compelling defense by Stephen Darwall, sees value terms as vehicles for expressing desire. (Stephen Darwall, 'Normativity and Projection in Hobbes.') More on Darwall's reading below.

36 See, for example, *QCLNC*, amidadv. on 14, 192.

37 Stephen Darwall casts the laws of nature as empty instrumental truths until we speak of agents who have an 'inescapable' desire of self-preservation. Their desire confers practical force on the findings of reason. See *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1995), 58-60. See also 'Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,' 335-8.

38 'Introduction' to *Man and Citizen*, 13. See similar remarks by Gert in 'Hobbes's Account of Reason,' *The Journal of Philosophy* 76 (1979) 559-60; and 'Hobbes on Reason,' 248.

rejects this account. He believes Hobbesian reason does not have its own end but functions as it does because it is 'the faculty concerned with determining the consequences of things, and because what is apparently good can be shown to be really evil only by discerning all its consequences.'³⁹ Boonin-Vail speaks of death as the '*summum malum*': 'death is the elimination of all future desire-satisfaction, and is thus the greatest evil for each individual.'⁴⁰ So on Gert's view, self-preservation is a necessary end of Hobbesian *reason*; Boonin-Vail, however, seems to hold it is a necessary end of Hobbesian *agents*.

On either account, Hobbesian agents necessarily have a reason to seek self-preservation. Self-preservation might then be a necessary value (and perhaps a necessary *ultimate* value) to any Hobbesian agent. But just how is self-preservation by necessity of value at all?

Adapting Hobbes a bit, consider first a related argument that all persons 'agree on this, water is good.' According to this argument, whatever aims a person may have, water is a good for her. Of course, this would not mean that water is absolutely or indefeasibly valuable. Nor would it mean that an agent should maximize the amount of water she drinks or has access to now. Nor would it mean that she has decisive reason to drink any water now. The argument is merely that insofar as a person values *anything*, water is a good (and so, she has a reason to *treat* water as good in some respect). So, the truth-conditions of the claim 'water is good' need make no reference to the agent's actual desires.

Perhaps peace is good in just the way that water is. When Hobbes then claims all men agree on 'peace is good,' he might merely mean that insofar as agents want anything, they have reason to seek peace (subject to caveats similar to those mentioned above with regard to water). Peace seeking is of value because it is a reliable means to self-preservation. And on the Hobbesian account, self-preservation is necessarily of value to any person. Philippa Foot makes a related point about how being able-bodied is valuable: 'Hands and eyes, like ears and legs, play a part in so many operations that a man could only be said not to need them if he had no wants at all. That such people exist, in asylums, is not to the

39 David Boonin-Vail, *Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1994), 56. S.A. Lloyd also persuasively argues that Hobbesian reason is not necessarily concerned with self-preservation. See *Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's Leviathan* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1992), 250-4.

40 Boonin-Vail, 55-6

present purpose at all; the proper use of his limbs is something a man has reason to want if he wants anything.⁴¹

Foot may be correct that human beings must have some desires whose satisfaction requires them to be able-bodied, but being able-bodied is a defeasible value. There are, for instance, some able-bodied and otherwise normally functioning persons who desperately seek to have some or all of their healthy limbs removed.⁴² Persons with such 'apotemnophilia' have an overpowering desire to be an amputee. Their body image is such that they would feel completed were they to *lose* one or more of their limbs. So there seem to be persons who do not have an indefeasible reason to remain able-bodied.

Like the value of being able-bodied, self-preservation is a necessary value. Beings constituted as we are must have *some* desires whose satisfaction requires self-preservation.⁴³ But, like being able-bodied, self-preservation need not be an indefeasible value — let alone an ultimate value. If reasons to seek glory can be more stringent than reasons to seek self-preservation, then it would not be clear how all agents by reason conclude that the laws of nature bind them. Hobbes then needs to discount glory as a source of reasons or otherwise show that glory is never sufficiently stringent to defeat reasons to seek available peace.

Interestingly, Hobbes acknowledges that some persons may prefer death in order to secure a good reputation with others or with God.⁴⁴ Sometimes persons may simply kill themselves out of misery. Of course, we might dispute whether any such persons are 'normally functioning'; their desires may be an expression of some profound mental disorder. Hobbes makes just this point:

But I conceive not how any man can bear *animus felleum*, or so much malice towards himself, as to hurt himself voluntarily, much less to kill himself. For naturally and necessarily the intention of every man aimeth at somewhat which is good to himself, and tendeth to his preservation. And therefore, methinks, if he kill himself, it is to

41 'Moral Beliefs,' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 59 (1958-9). Reprinted in 20th *Century Ethical Theory*, Steven M. Cahn and Joram G. Haber, ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall 1995), 373.

42 See the detailed account of this phenomenon by Carl Elliott, 'A New Way To Be Mad,' *The Atlantic Monthly* (December, 2000) 72-84.

43 I am grateful to an anonymous Referee for making this point about the special value of being able-bodied.

44 See, for instance, *Levi* 1.15, 211; *De Cive* 3.12, 142; 6.13, 183; 6.11, 179; *El Law* 1.9.6, 52; *Beh.*, 14-15.

be presumed that he is not *compos mentis*, but by some inward torment or apprehension of somewhat worse than death, distracted. (*Dilge*, 88)

On Hobbes's behalf, then, we can say that desires are not reasons. The suicides, apotemnophiliacs, and glory seekers may all simply be intemperate, or worse, crazy. They are driven by perverse impulses that 'militate against the real good and in favor of the apparent and most immediate good, which turns out frequently to be evil when everything associated with it hath been considered' (*De Homine* 12.1, 55). The 'real good' is of necessity self-preservation. This is 'the end that every one by nature aimeth at' (*El Law* 1.18.14, 98). Those that do not aim at it are intemperate. Their desires are for the wrong things. As Hobbes writes, self-preservation is good, and self-destruction is evil. 'And this is that good and evil, which not every man in passion calleth so, but all men by reason' (*ibid.*). Here Hobbes is explicit that there are counterpreferential values.

This is the tack Hobbes would take against the warmongers, martyrs, and madmen. Their rejection of the ways of peace is an error coming from a mental 'perturbation.' They are driven by irrational desires. Their desire for glory is simply a form of 'madnesse': 'The Passion, whose violence, or continuance maketh Madnesse, is either great *vaine-Glory*; which is commonly called *Pride*, and *selfe-concept*; or great *Dejection* of mind' (*Lev* 1.8, 140). Jean Hampton is struck by this and similar passages: 'Hobbes seems to be criticizing a basic desire as itself irrational or as "impeding reason" not because action from it impedes the satisfaction of a more important desire, but because the desire is "wrong" in and of itself.'⁴⁵ Some persons then exhibit a 'failure of reason,' Hampton claims, not by reasoning poorly but simply by virtue of having certain desires.⁴⁶ But Hampton argues that Hobbesian naturalism ultimately lacks the resources to explain why certain desires are 'perturbed.' As she writes, Hobbes's dismissal of glory seekers as 'mad' smuggles in the 'normativity we had hoped the desires themselves would explain.'⁴⁷ If Hampton is correct, then Hobbes cannot claim that all men by reason endorse the ways of peace. Some agents' ends are obstructive of peace, and those ends would seem to be sources of reasons.

Critics here may press for how it is that glory can be an end except insofar as it is desired. Simply as desired, glory is not necessarily a source

45 Hampton, 'Hobbes and Ethical Naturalism,' 343

46 *Ibid.*

47 *Ibid.*, 345

of reasons.⁴⁸ Responding to related difficulties in accounting for normative force under subjectivist readings of Hobbes, Stephen Darwall argues instead for a *projectivist* account of Hobbes's ethics.⁴⁹ On Darwall's reading of the Hobbesian view, values are properties we ascribe to the objects of our appetites and aversions. Value utterances are expressions, not reports, of our desires (323, 327). Darwall argues that the projectivist interpretation makes more sense of Hobbes's notion of conflict in matters of right reason and helps to explain the normativity of practical judgment (323, 327, 329-30). In desiring, an agent ascribes normative properties to the objects of her desires, but such properties are not in the objects themselves; 'they are the "appearances" of her desires' (333). What confers normativity on practical judgment is a normative premise — the desire itself: 'The deliberating agent reasons from a premise she accepts in having a desire, not from the premise that she has a desire. And this premise is something normative' (333). On Darwall's account, what then gives the laws of nature normative force is precisely the desire we have for self-preservation: 'this is nothing that is entailed by the fact that we have this end, but the normativity we *attribute* to self-preservation in *having* it as an end' (336). So this end is not the sort of thing in need of justification; Hobbes simply takes it as uncontroversial that his readers desire self-preservation. Hobbes then does not intend — and does not need to — offer an account of normativity. His works merely explain what readers must do given the normative premises they already accept (335-8).⁵⁰

On the projectivist reading, considerations then count as reasons secondary to normative claims agents embrace in virtue of having certain desires.⁵¹ On the Hobbesian view, all persons by nature ultimately desire self-preservation. Hobbes does not defend such a desire; he asserts it. Contemporary commentators on Hobbes have noted how

48 Hampton discusses further problems with normativity under subjectivist accounts of value in *ibid.*, especially 346ff.

49 Stephen Darwall, 'Normativity and Projection in Hobbes.' Page numbers in the text refer to this article.

50 Darwall's account is certainly richer than the quick summary here may suggest, but this sketch should suffice to motivate how self-preservation is a Hobbesian value.

51 The projectivist account of which considerations qualify as Hobbesian reasons may then be significantly coextensive with the set isolated by subjectivist readings of Hobbes. (Thanks to Kit Wellman for a discussion of these points.) If neither subjectivist nor projectivist readings can discount reasons to seek glory, then we would need further argument (perhaps appealing to a different Hobbesian meta-ethic) to explain how all men by reason conclude that the laws of nature bind them.

self-preservation stands as an assumed starting point for Hobbes's value theory.⁵² Given what we unavoidably and ultimately desire, agents can then have no reason to seek glory.

Hence Hobbes might argue there can be no reason to seek glory at the expense of available peace. But it should now be clear that this would hold only if agents cannot prefer glory to self-preservation. But plainly some persons desire glory above all else. The glory seekers may then by reason pursue ends obstructive of peace.

Recall that what had launched this portion of the discussion was the question of how Hobbes might show that reasons to preserve oneself are universal and decisive over glory. There were two ways Hobbes could have established this point; one would be that glory was not a source of reasons; the other would be that glory was a source of reasons that were never decisive over considerations of peace. Having shown that glory can be a source of reasons for Hobbesian agents, we can now dispense with the second possibility. All the considerations marshaled for showing that glory is a source of reasons support the possibility that glory could be a source of immensely stringent reasons. Because there are warmongers, martyrs, and madmen, it would seem that seeking peace is not necessarily a dictate of correct reasoning.

Warmongers, martyrs, and madmen need not have decisive reason to preserve themselves. Warmongers may have reason to commit acts of brutality. They thirst for battle as a means for promoting their personal honor. If living by the sword involves dying by the sword, then so much the better. Warmongers then seem to have reason to seek glory, even if

52 Robert Shaver writes that on Hobbes's view, 'virtues or vices are constituted by their connection to peace: A disposition is virtuous provided it conduces to peace. Again, the question of why peace is good need not be answered, provided one finds peace good' (*Rational Egoism* [Cambridge: University Press 1999], 37). Darwall claims that a desire for self-preservation is assumed in Hobbes's account. See, for example, Darwall, 'Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,' 335-6. Boonin-Vail reads Hobbes's ethics as resting on the assumption that 'most people, most of the time, do in fact rank their own deaths as the greatest possible evil' (Boonin-Vail, 57). Interestingly, Boonin-Vail does not discuss how we can exclude persons who discount their self-preservation from counting against the normative force of a Hobbesian ethics. Arthur Ripstein has also noted difficulties with generating a Hobbesian political theory without any substantive presuppositions: 'The Hobbesian contract, no less than its Lockean and Rawlsian offspring, can only serve to justify institutions because it incorporates political conditions we do in fact accept. Insofar as there are other considerations that we do accept, or can be made to accept, the Hobbesian state of nature fails to provide a privileged perspective for social choice' ('Foundationalism in Political Theory,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 19 [1990], 126).

— perhaps *especially if* — doing so comes at the expense of the ways of peace.⁵³

Suppose further that degenerates bent on martyrdom believe that slaughtering countless persons — themselves included — will bring something far more important than their worldly self-preservation. Their acts of brutality, they think, are vehicles of God's will. Their spectacular deaths will bring eternal rewards and leave behind an improved world order. They plainly do not desire self-preservation except insofar as their lives serve their cause. It is the cause that is supreme, so, following the projectivist account, anything for which there is a reason inherits its normative force not from the *fact* that an agent embraces the cause but simply in having it as an end.⁵⁴ The degenerates bent on martyrdom wish to promote their cause, spare no expense. If doing so costs them their lives, this does not necessarily count against their having reason to pursue glory. It may even count as a reason *for* seeking glory. In short, they may have reason to commit acts of brutality at the expense of available peace. Lastly, the same could also be said of the madmen. Madmen who thirst to fight for fight's sake thereby have reason to fight. Battle for them is its own reward. This reason is not necessarily defeated by any considerations for long-term peace.

If there is *anyone* who by reason seeks glory, then Hobbes is in no position to claim that all men by reason agree on the laws of nature and the peace to which they are means. On either subjectivist or projectivist accounts of Hobbesian value, Hobbes either lacks the resources to say that agents have no reason to pursue glory, or he is committed to saying that they might have such a reason. Absent a revised account of Hobbe-

53 Consider the thirst for battle captured in the 'Four Hussar Songs op. 117,' esp. #2, 'Tedious peace': 'Tedious peace/ lasted too long;/ we were separated,/ my trusty sword./ While I was tasting/ the cellar's wines,/ you hung rusting,/ alone on the wall./ I sampled the wine/ vintage by vintage;/ meanwhile the blood/ dried on you./ But at last hot strife/ has flared up, my sword,/ and your moment has come.// I give a bright polish/ to your blade;/ I let you whistle/ your deadly song.// Roar to work/ in a cloud of dust;/ O sabre, we have/ brought each other joy.// Drink deep,/ my thirsty blade,/ of the heady new wine,/ drink from heart to heart.// While you were tasting/ red blood,/ my throat was rusting/ with ardour.' (It has much more of a demonic singsong quality in the original German.) Lyrics drawn from Nikolaus Lenau, 'Vier Husarenlieder op. 117 (1851),' Lionel Salter, trans., as featured in notes to the CD of Schumann's *Liederkreis* Op. 39: *Romanzen & Balladen*, 2000. Thanks to Ken Merrill for bringing this to my attention.

54 I borrow here from Darwall's account at Darwall, 'Normativity and Projection in Hobbes,' 336. It should go without saying that Darwall would not endorse the actions of degenerates.

sian value, Hobbesian naturalism seems unable to say that all men by reason agree on the value of peace.

VIII Conclusions

Some persons do by reason reject the ways of peace. Hobbes is then unable to say that all men by reason conclude that the laws of nature bind them. While this conclusion may seem to vitiate the normative force of the Hobbesian laws of nature, we might ask whether it is a legitimate objection against Hobbes that some agents by reason seek glory.

In one sense, the status of the laws of nature is not in doubt. Any agent who carefully reckons the consequences of terms and attends to the relevant instrumental considerations correctly judges that certain rules of conduct are laws of nature.⁵⁵ But in another more important sense, the normative force of such laws is in doubt because some persons by reason do not seek the peace guaranteed by such laws.

It may nevertheless be too much to ask of a contractarian theory that it show all persons all of the time have reasons to support the ways of peace. Usually people have reason to support the ways of peace, precisely because they are persons for whom long-term flourishing is a key value.⁵⁶ The same might not be true for others with radically different psychologies.⁵⁷

Central to the Hobbesian project is the idea that self-interested persons for whom mutually advantageous relations are possible have reason to be moral. Hobbesian morality is captured at least in part by the laws of nature. What does it mean for Hobbes if we show that some persons do not by reason seek available peace? Mutually beneficial relations between the peaceful and these inveterate glory seekers would then not be possible. The glory seekers would then be outside the scope of the laws of nature.⁵⁸ Christopher W. Morris notes that persons who do not benefit from norms forbidding harm to others 'would not be bound by the

55 Such judgments simply fall out of the definitions of the relevant terms. See the detailed discussions by Deigh ('Reason and Ethics in Hobbes's *Leviathan*') and Murphy ('Desire and Ethics in Hobbes's *Leviathan*').

56 For a related discussion, see Gregory S. Kavka, *Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory*, 439ff.

57 For a related discussion, see Bernard R. Boxill, 'How Injustice Pays,' *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 9 (1980) 359-71.

58 Thanks to Chris Morris for a discussion of these points.

norms; they would, as it were, be outside of the moral framework established by contractarian rational agreement.⁵⁹ Most persons with proclivities to glory can usually be dissuaded through various means from making mayhem.⁶⁰ Warmongers, martyrs, and madmen, on the other hand, have ends giving them reasons to act in ways that obstruct peace. Fortunately, the number of inveterate glory seekers is few, so a lasting, productive peace is possible to us most of the time.⁶¹ Unfortunately, the damages inveterate glory seekers are capable of inflicting are disproportionate to their numbers.

Those with more peaceful sensibilities might then see to it through education and example that few persons develop indefeasible pugnacious inclinations in the first place.⁶² Failing that, those who understand the merits of peace would then need to take measures to quash successful expressions of the appetite for glory. Note, though, that those who prize peace may still have reason to take their conduct toward others — including glory seekers — as constrained by the laws of nature. There would be important dangers involved in controlling glory seeking. It may be difficult to identify who is a glory seeker and which acts count

59 'A Contractarian Account of Moral Justification' in *Moral Knowledge*, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons, eds. (New York: Oxford University Press 1996), 226

60 Kavka points to the great benefits (some material, some psychological) involved in living a moral life in a community with similar minded others. Most persons have reason to be moral, but 'with respect to some individuals, such as hardened but cautious immoralists or clever psychopaths, the argument may fail.' Kavka does not see this as jeopardizing the convergence of reason with morality: 'It is too much to claim that it pays one to be moral, irrespective of one's psychological characteristics. Rather, the argument from internal sanctions supports the prudential rationality of living a moral life for ... the vast majority of humankind.' See 'The Reconciliation Project,' in *Morality, Reason and Truth*, David Copp and David Zimmerman, eds. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld 1984), 306-7.

61 As Morris writes, 'Justice satisfies this practical aim if a sufficiently large number of people have reasons and act on them and if the number of defectors is sufficiently small. As long as the proportion of cooperators is large relative to the proportion of noncooperators and there are not too many disadvantaged, justice will help secure the conditions for our well-being' ('Justice, Reasons, and Moral Standing,' in *Rational Commitment and Social Justice*, Jules L. Coleman and Christopher W. Morris, eds. [New York: Cambridge University Press 1998], 201).

62 One responsibility of the Hobbesian sovereign is to set up public institutions and a cultural climate that fosters respect for the laws of nature. See *Lev* 2.30. Whether the Hobbesian sovereign is in fact necessary for this task is, of course, another matter.

as glory seeking. There would then be good reason for the peaceful not to shun the prospect of peace with anyone.⁶³

For most persons who share a fundamental 'Feare of Death' there is a reason to constrain the extent to which they satisfy their desires. They have a reason to treat others as persons with whom mutually beneficial relations are possible. For most persons there is a common 'Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to obtain them' (*Lev* 1.13, 188). Such persons are disposed to achieve a stable peace, even if it means accommodating themselves to others. They are prepared to incur some temporary costs in order to make it possible to live together peacefully with a certain set of similarly minded others. They simply might not know exactly how to realize the objects of their ultimate desires. But they may know enough to recognize that having some *settled* conception of right reason is the key to launching and sustaining some stable social order.

Given conditions of scarcity, mutual vulnerability, and mutual opacity, a desire for self-preservation coupled with knowledge that others desire the same for themselves give reason for most persons to abide by the laws of nature. Persons inclined to peace recognize the drawbacks of the rule of private reason. They must agree on some settled standard of right reason.⁶⁴

Of course, since the task Hobbes (and Hobbesians) set themselves is to articulate a *political* theory, it would be idle to speak of what persons *may* agree to if it seemed entirely unlikely that they *will* do so given material circumstances and psychological contingencies. Much of Hobbesian political theory, however, is devoted to showing how pre-political agents also *can* successfully implement the laws of nature they rightly recognize. Whether it is best to secure peace by setting up an absolute Hobbesian sovereign is something beyond the scope of this essay.⁶⁵ The

63 Here I have benefited from Christopher Morris's remarks on the advantages of extending moral standing to all persons regardless of their ability or willingness to participate in reciprocally beneficial relationships. See 'Justice Reasons, and Moral Standing,' 196-201.

64 Whether this standard issues from the lips of the sovereign or from the informal norms of public reason is here beside the point. But see Michael Ridge's illuminating discussion of how individuals may enshrine public reason itself as sovereign, without having a traditional Hobbesian sovereign, in 'Hobbesian Public Reason,' *Ethics* 108 (1998) 538-68.

65 This topic has also been well discussed by others. See Ridge's critique in Ridge, 'Hobbesian Public Reason.' See also Gregory Kavka, 'Hobbes's War of All Against All'; and Hampton, *Hobbes*.

point here is that sane, reasonably calm Hobbesian agents who prefer a mutually beneficial peace to the brutality of war have a reason to abide by some decisive standard of public reason. Once agents agree to set aside the rule of private judgment, they can constitute as sovereign some public reason whose findings will provide the settled standards necessary for prosperity. What is the actual content of that sovereign reason is a topic that must be left for another day.⁶⁶

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